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ABSTRACT 
Pervasive mass surveillance in a given in U.S. society. However, whether U.S. citizens 
sacrifice privacy as a result remains under debate. Does privacy fade away in light of the 
connected world in which we all live? The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. 
Jones did not address whether pervasive mass surveillance by the government constituted 
a search under the Fourth Amendment, and, thereby, triggering constitutional review. The 
lack of legal guidance presents challenges for law enforcement investigations, as it can 
takes years for a court to decide a privacy case and surveillance technology evolves at a 
far more rapid pace. Given the refusal, or inability, of the courts to answer what 
constitutional privacy protections are afforded U.S. citizens in light of the growing use of 
sensor technology to conduct mass surveillance, inclusive of GPS, RFID, and LPR, 
comprehensive legislative privacy options must be explored. To date, privacy has been 
left to the individual States, which results in privacy protections based upon geography. 
Federal privacy legislation is limited, focusing on certain technologies, such as 
eavesdropping under Title III, or certain privacy issues, such medical record data under 
HIPAA. Further, very few laws govern the use and dissemination of the PII data that 
derives not only from governmental surveillance, but also from commercial data 
collection. A federal data protection act would define the privacy interests protected, 
rather than using the law to limit the government’s specific use of a surveillance 
technology, which would ensure that the rules of engagement for government 
surveillance were clear and held the government accountable to its citizens. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Pervasive mass surveillance is a given in United States (U.S.) society. Whether U.S. 
citizens sacrifice privacy rights as a result remains under debate. Technology continues to 
push the boundaries of individual privacy. The government’s use of mass pervasive 
surveillance technology brings forth significant challenges for the legal framework that 
addresses the privacy of U.S. citizens. In today’s increasingly networked society, an 
abundance of personally identifying information (PII),1 is generated and increasingly 
subject to sophisticated analytic techniques, which in turn, drives further technology 
innovations (Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World, 2012, p. 5). Yet, the legal 
response to the government’s use of surveillance technology innovations is not only slow, 
but it also relies upon incremental judicial review tethered to older technology. This 
tension between technology innovation and slow legal response continues unabated. 
The viability of legal protections for individual privacy is in question given that 
the U.S. Supreme Court continues to voice concerns about technology’s encroaching 
impact upon privacy yet continues to fail to provide proper guidance for the government. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Jones demonstrates that it 
seeks to narrow privacy issues before it rather than broadly address the privacy impact of 
surveillance technology used by government (United States v. Jones). Additionally, the 
legislative response is not much better in that a patchwork of federal and local law 
addresses privacy in a piecemeal fashion, thereby failing to address comprehensively 
what is individual privacy in a digital world. This lack of sufficient legal guidance is 
troubling for law enforcement as well, in that technology investment, and its use for 
criminal investigations, is subject to a wait and see process as the various privacy claims 
traverse through the U.S. legal system. The delay in legal decision and guidance results in 
financial costs, given technology investments by the government, and social costs, given 
                                                 
1For purposes of this thesis, PII is defined as any information about an individual that can be used to 
distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, including, but not limited to, name, social security number, 
date and place of birth, mother‘s maiden name, or biometric records, and (2) any other information linked 
or linkable to an individual, such as medical, educational, financial, and employment information (Grance 
et al., 2010, p. ES-1). 
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that surveillance actions continue while under legal review. Such processes fail to serve 
either the government’s public safety needs or individual privacy protections. As a 
consequence, whether privacy degrades to a pleasant antiquated concept, or whether it 
emerges as something expressly defined and protected within the modern linked world, 
remains to be seen.  
Privacy determinations under the Fourth Amendment take years and the 
individual legal skirmish lines drawn with each new surveillance technology and its use 
create uncertainty both for the government and for individual privacy. Constitutional law 
and, more specifically, Fourth Amendment doctrine has been the traditional vehicle for 
holding the government accountable for intrusions into the private lives of its citizens. A 
labyrinth process, constitutional review can take years from an initial claim to final legal 
outcome. Additionally, judicial review is an incremental process, predicated upon 
specific fact patterns and precedential decision, which may or may not translate to a 
general rule or guidance on the government’s use of surveillance technology. Finally, the 
judicial outcome may ultimately fail to address the key privacy issue, as seen in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, where the Court declined to address the privacy 
impact resulting from the government’s use of global positioning satellite technology, 
(GPS), to conduct surveillance.  
Technology presents a different context and challenge for Fourth Amendment 
review. The seminal Fourth Amendment decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Katz v. 
United States is predicated upon the government’s use of eavesdropping devices on 
landline telephones, hardly in line with current surveillance technology (Katz v. United 
States). Further, judicial review focuses on the specific technology before it, while the 
precedent-based legal system seeks to use prior decisions to support current legal 
outcome. In applying the Katz standard of reasonableness to increasingly invasive and 
advancing forms of technology, the courts have generated a line of legal decisions that 
are sometimes seen as inconsistent. In part, advances in technology are not fully 
evaluated for their unique privacy impact, but rather are linked to past decisions, as based 
upon relevance as identified by the court. Further, the courts may or may not be informed 
fully as to the technology and its use within society, yet are deciding its privacy impact. 
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For example, GPS does not operate under the same technology as a beeper, yet decisions 
in United States v. Knotts and United States v. Karo, which derive from older beeper 
tracking technology, are used to review privacy claims arising out of the government’s 
use of GPS for surveillance, as discussed within United States v. Garcia. (United States v. 
Knotts; United States v. Karo; United States v. Garcia). While such actions result in legal 
efficiencies, they may not properly address the privacy impact that technology 
innovations bring forth.  
General privacy protections have been left to the jurisdiction of the individual 
states, which results in protections based upon geography rather than standard privacy 
principles. Not only do differing state standards negatively impact criminal investigations 
in an increasingly mobile world, the practical result is that the most restrictive state law 
controls a criminal surveillance investigation anticipated to cross state borders. Existing 
federal privacy legislation is limited in jurisdiction and scope, focusing on certain 
technologies, such as law enforcement eavesdropping under Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 19682 or certain privacy issues, such as medical 
record data under Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 
(HIPAA).3 Recent legislative attempts have been made to exercise federal jurisdiction 
over certain surveillance technology, as seen with recent Congressional attempts to pass 
the Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance Act.4 However, focus on a specific technology 
serves little privacy value long term in that technology evolves quicker than subsequent 
legislative address, as seen with the limitations of Title III and its limited scope.  
The aggregation and subsequent secondary use of data generated by the 
government’s use of sensor technology for surveillance is a new privacy frontier and 
creates unique privacy problems. Very few laws govern the use and dissemination of the 
PII data derived from mass surveillance. Given its prevalence and ability to aggregate and 
individuate data across distinct technology systems, modern mass surveillance 
technology increasingly blurs the Fourth Amendment’s focus on what is publicly 
                                                 
2 Pub. L. No 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 212. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, et al. (1968, 2010). 
3 Pub. L. No. 104-191, §§ Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996)).  
4 112th Congress (2011–2012) S.1212 and H.R. 2168. 
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disclosed and what is not (The Constitution Project, 2011, p. 2). Additionally, the 
collection and use of PII is not limited to the government, as numerous consumer outlets 
and other private entities generate increasing amounts of PII. The Fourth Amendment 
does not apply to private entities and minimal legal restrictions exist to guide and restrict 
the growing data information industry. 
Given the refusal, or inability, of the courts to answer what constitutional privacy 
protections are afforded U.S. citizens, and in light of the growing use of sensor 
technology to conduct mass surveillance, inclusive of GPS, radio frequency 
identification, (RFID), and automated license plate readers, (LPR), comprehensive 
legislative options that address privacy must be explored. A variety of options exist to 
address the growing challenge of protecting privacy given the expansive of pervasive 
mass surveillance, but none are all encompassing. The options include 1) self-governance 
over the use of sensor technology, 2) use of the judicial process to continue to define the 
limits of the government’s use of surveillance technology under existing Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, 3) state control and definition of the privacy protections afforded 
their citizens, or, 4) enacting comprehensive federal legislation to address the 
government’s use of sensor technology and the derivative PII data that results. Of these 
four options, the first has negligible accountability for those establishing self-governed 
standards. The second and third options represent the status quo, and provide minimal 
direction for law enforcement, and do not afford additional safeguards for civil liberties. 
The fourth option, while providing long-term protection for privacy, requires political 
will to address an increasingly complex legal and social problem. 
A federal data protection act would serve to define the privacy interests protected, 
rather than using the law to limit the government’s specific use of a surveillance 
technology. Such legislation would ensure that the rules of engagement for government 
surveillance were clear and would hold the government accountable to its citizens. Unlike 
a Fourth Amendment review, which must first identify whether a protected privacy 
interest exists, a data protection act defines the privacy interests protected and the 
applicable legal standards. Therefore, the law becomes a means to protect privacy by 
identifying when the privacy interest is substantial enough to demand state action rather 
 xv 
than state neutrality (Taylor, 2011, p. 457). The judicial review then centers on the 
privacy interest and not in carving out specifications based on the government’s use of a 
technology. 
As technology changes, expectations of privacy may shift, but the underlying civil 
liberty protections for privacy should remain. A data protection act would not only define 
the privacy interests subject to protection but would establish clear guidance for lawful 
government action in regards to privacy standards regardless of the technology involved. 
Congress is in the unique position of being able to protect individual privacy, rather than 
merely limiting how the government uses a specific technology to conduct surveillance of 
its citizens. Exercise of federal jurisdiction over data privacy would ensure consistent, 
minimal standards for privacy protection with clear rules of engagement for all, including 
private entities. Given that the byproduct of mass surveillance technology, PII, and its 
use, is not comprehensively addressed in U.S. law, a federal data privacy protection act 
would ensure privacy protections for U.S. citizens in an increasingly globally networked 
society. 
 xvi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xvii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Chris and Don, thanks for helping me cross the line. 
To the staff and my classmates at CHDS, thanks for allowing me to learn from all 
of you.  
 
 xviii 




Privacy is a concept that has been part of the popular legal discussion within the 
United States (U.S.) since Justice Brandeis’ raised his concerns over the privacy invasion 
created by portable photography (Brandeis & Warren, 1890, p. 194). In a world in which 
the movement of individuals in public is tracked, often surreptitiously, the question is 
whether privacy is nothing but a radionuclide, left to decay amongst a world of bytes and 
monitors? In today’s increasingly networked society, an abundance of personally 
identifying information, (PII),5 is generated through increasingly sophisticated analytic 
techniques, which, in turn, drive more innovation (Consumer Data Privacy in a 
Networked World, 2012, p. 5). As a consequence, does privacy degrade to a pleasant 
antiquated concept, or does it emerge as something different, something specifically 
defined and protected, within the modern, linked world?  
The concept of privacy has remained tenable within the legal system and in the 
culture of the United States, weathering the advent of various technologies from portable 
photography to deoxyribonucleic acid, (DNA). In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to weigh in and legally define the proper role and structure for government’s 
use of sensor technology to conduct surveillance, thereby defining the privacy rights of 
citizens subject to governmental surveillance in United States v. Jones. The issue before 
the Court was centered on the government’s use of geolocational positioning satellite 
technology, (GPS), to track an individual under criminal investigation without a warrant 
for a period of 28 days through multiple jurisdictions (United States v. Jones). Rather 
than the address the broader civil liberties and privacy concerns raised before the Court, it 
chose to decide the case on the narrower issue of physical trespass—tying the privacy 
issue and decision to how the government attached the GPS device, rather than how it 
used the device and information (United States v. Jones, pp. 949–951). In ignoring the 
                                                 
5 For purposes of this thesis, PII is defined as any information about an individual that can be used to 
distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, including, but not limited to name, social security number, date 
and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or biometric records, and (2) any other information linked or 
linkable to an individual, such as medical, educational, financial, and employment information (Grance, 
McCallister, & Scarfone, 2010, p. ES-1). 
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widespread use of GPS by law enforcement and the privacy concerns of those subject to 
such surveillance, the Jones Court expressly noted that the government’s use of 
surveillance technology creates vexing privacy problems (United States v. Jones, p. 954). 
However, the Court found no need to address the privacy concerns raised before it, and 
identified that analysis of the vexing privacy issues may be needed in the future, but not 
presently (United States v. Jones, p. 954). As a result, the burgeoning privacy issues 
associated with law enforcement’s use of GPS and other sensor technology in criminal 
investigations will continue to be resolved through an ad-hoc legal framework consisting 
of state and federal case and statutory law, public policy, and ongoing constitutional 
review through the courts. The outcome of such a system results in a lack of clear and 
consistent direction to those engaged in the investigation of criminal conduct, inclusive of 
terrorism. Such a system not only fails to guide proper governmental action, it also fails 
to protect civil liberties. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Technology is inanimate, but how technology is used can create significant 
societal impact. The growing use of surveillance technology and its privacy impact is of 
increasing concern, not only over the act of observation itself, but also over the 
subsequent use and retention of the data collected. While government surveillance is not 
new, the older technologies used by the government to conduct surveillance were not as 
intrusive as those in use today. Today’s surveillance technology can be used to track the 
public movement of citizens easily through time and space, using technologies, such as 
GPS or license plate recognition systems, (LPR). The U.S. legal system and its practice 
of stare decisis6 (Cornell University Law School, 2010) places significant reliance upon 
decisions derived from the government’s use of older technologies, including automated 
fingerprint information systems, (AFIS), and closed circuit video, (CCTV). However, 
these decisions provide minimal privacy guidance for the rapidly expanding capacity of 
the modern technology used by the government to monitor the public movement of its 
                                                 
6 Stare decisis is a legal doctrine that obligates courts to follow precedent. Courts will follow and cite 
to stare decisis when an issue has been previously brought to the court, or a higher court, and a ruling 
already issued. Generally, courts will adhere to their previous rulings, although not universally true. (Legal 
Information Institute, 2010).  
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citizens. The meteoric rise of new technology both generates new privacy concerns 
(through the creation of new forms of sensitive data) and renders certain privacy concerns 
related to older technology (that is no longer used) less relevant (Serwin, 2009, p. 876). 
Today’s sensor technology, inclusive of computerized record systems and advanced data 
aggregation, creates more individuated data (Schwartz & Solove, 2011, p. 1821). The 
aggregation and subsequent secondary use of data generated by the government’s use of 
sensor technology for surveillance creates unique privacy problems. 
As rapidly as technology is being developed and refined, it is being deployed and 
used within the homeland security (HLS) field. However, as demonstrated in the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision, United States v. Jones, the courts remain unwilling to, or 
incapable of, addressing the broader issue of privacy protections when reviewing the 
government’s use of technology to conduct surveillance. The U.S. Supreme Court 
continues to kick the can down the road, by recognizing that technology creates novel 
issues that must be addressed, yet refuses to do so (United States v. Jones, p. 954). As a 
result, a burgeoning gap grows between legal policy and operational practice for the 
government’s use of sensor surveillance, which has significant HLS impact given the 
intertwined issues of technology, surveillance, and privacy.  
1. Government’s Use of Technology 
The use of technology within the field of HLS has become ubiquitous. The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is committed to investing in sensor technology 
(Border Security, 2010). DHS has installed closed circuit television monitoring (CCTV) 
and other sensor technology at the southern borders under the Secure Border Initiative 
(SBInet)7 (Lipowicz, 2011). The Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) rely upon a variety of technologies, 
inclusive of CCTV, biometric identification technologies, scanners, and other developing 
technologies to help identify individuals and contraband (Transportation Security 
Administration, 2008). The TSA’s advanced imaging technology, or body scanners, in 
                                                 
7 SBInet was DHS driven technology effort focused on the areas along the Southwest Border of the 
United States, with a goal to use technology to leverage border resources in an effort to secure the borders 
(U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, SBInet Block 1).  
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which air travelers are scanned with full skeletal outline, are another example of the 
TSA’s growing technology investment to support of HLS functions. Even amidst an 
aggressive roll out of current technology, the TSA continues to look for new technology 
to address its overall mission, given a belief that technology reduces emerging HLS 
threats (Transportation Security Administration, 2008). 
Local governments also use sensor technology for a variety of purposes. The use 
of CCTV in support of public safety is prevalent in cities, such as New York and Chicago 
(Cameron, Kolodinski, May, & Williams, 2008, pp. 5–6). LPRs are used within a variety 
of jurisdictions (IACP, 2009, pp. 5–6). GPS is used by both local and federal law 
enforcement for criminal investigations and other public safety purposes, e.g., monitoring 
parolees (Koppel, 2010, pp. 1065–1066; Smith, 2011, pp. 1–3). GPS is also used for a 
variety of administrative purposes ranging from mobile asset tracking (Thomas, 2007) to 
identifying pothole locations (Breier, 2011). Another form of sensor technology, radio 
frequency identification systems (RFID), which allow for identification at a distance, is 
being used for a variety of purposes, including inventory and payment of toll fares (Brito, 
2004, pp. 6–7). New York state currently embeds RFID into their “enhanced driver’s 
licenses,” (EDL), which allow U.S. citizens entry from Canada, Mexico and the 
Caribbean for other than air travel (New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, n.d.). 
Public safety agencies also continue to explore and test newer sensor technologies, such 
as facial recognition technology, (FRT), and iris scanning, in support of their public 
safety and homeland security missions (Steele, 2011). Given the rapid development and 
use of sensor technology, the complexity and capacity to individuate sensor data will 
continue to grow, as will the associated privacy concerns when the government uses 
technology to conduct mass surveillance.  
2. Legal Response 
The government’s use of surveillance technology, which facilitates mass 
monitoring and limits individual control over access to and use of PII information, is a 
privacy trigger. Privacy can be defined as a function of the ability to control access to or 
information about an individual (A. Moore, 2008, p. 414). The government’s monitoring 
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of individual movement in public spaces, through the observation, recording, and 
reporting of such data, limits an individual’s control over anonymity in public space. The 
courts have recognized that the advance of technology affects the degree of privacy 
secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment (Kyllo v. United States, pp. 33–34). What 
the courts and Congress have failed to define is to what degree that impact comports with 
constitutional protections. In a society wherein the boundaries of what is public and what 
is private is being revolutionized as a result of technological development, the failure to 
define privacy protections legally is a significant gap.  
Modern technology allows government to monitor the movement of mass 
numbers of its citizens unobtrusively with relative ease. Existing Fourth Amendment law 
limits the right of government intrusion upon its citizens through analysis of that which is 
and is not “knowingly made public” (Katz v. United States, p. 351). However, sensor 
technology, such as GPS, enables the public movement of individuals to be tracked in 
detail across time, distance and location (Hutchins, 2007, p. 414). The level of detail 
available through government surveillance of the public movement of its citizens, both as 
a matter of initial collection, and in particular, given the ability to aggregate and 
individuate data across distinct technology systems, increasingly blurs the Fourth 
Amendment’s focus on what is publicly disclosed and what is not (The Constitution 
Project, 2011, p. 2). In part, this situation results because privacy issues enter the legal 
system piecemeal, as individual cases with specific facts, which influence the overall 
body of law. As a result, the degree to which technology impacts individual privacy has 
yet to be fully determined, both as a matter of precedential law and as a matter of 
governmental power. See United States v. Jones (pp. 953–954), with Justice Sotomayor 
concurring (pp. 956–957), and with Justice Alito concurring (pp. 962–963). The privacy 
impact of technology and the limitations on the government’s use of technology to 
monitor the public movement of its citizens remains.  
3. Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment has traditionally been used to define permissible 
government action in relation to the privacy of its citizens. For Fourth Amendment 
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protections to apply, first, it must be determined whether the actions by the government 
constitute a search subject to constitutional protections, and then, whether the privacy 
expectations of the individual are reasonable (Katz v. United States). However, no shared, 
common definition exists for what constitutes a search, nor have the courts defined what 
constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy in this age of mass surveillance (United 
States v. Jones). More disconcerting, is that the courts continue to provide limited and 
inconsistent direction for permissible government action in the protection of individual 
privacy (Hutchins, 2010, pp. 1186–1187). As a result, law enforcement is left to attempt 
to guess what constitutes a reasonable search when using modern technology. 
Constitutional analysis of the government’s use of sensor technology to conduct mass 
surveillance remains dynamic; thereby, leaving a gap in the Fourth Amendment 
framework that determines the appropriate restraints on governmental surveillance.  
4. State Privacy Protections 
Constitutional law is not the sole legal vehicle to protect individual privacy. The 
determination and protection of any generalized right of privacy falls to the states (Katz v. 
United States, pp. 350–351). Given the reticence of the U.S. Supreme Court to provide 
guidance on the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the government’s use of 
modern surveillance technology, the states have responded, in varying measures, with 
local statutory protections. Some states, including California, allow only law enforcement 
the right to track a person electronically, with criminal penalties for those in violation of 
the law. See, e.g., California Penal Code section 637.7, Stats. 1998 c. 449 (S.B. 1667) § 
2. Other states, including Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Minnesota, and Florida, use 
legislation to address how GPS may be used by law enforcement, with some mandating 
law enforcement officers obtain a warrant prior to using GPS to conduct surveillance. 
See, e.g., 18 Pennsylvania Constitutional Statute § 5761, South Carolina Code Annotated 
§ 17-30-140, Minnesota Statute § 626A.37, §626A.35, and Florida Statute § 934.06, 
934.42. Additionally, some states have moved to provide broader privacy protections to 




Constitution (Gershman, 2010, p. 929). State statutory law is being used to address the 
privacy gaps generated by the use of modern surveillance technology that federal and 
constitutional law has not addressed. 
The challenge with state-based privacy protections is that the individual laws and 
social mores are not homogenous and may vary from state to state. Competing and 
distinct state laws provide different privacy standards, which may be triggered by virtue 
of an individual crossing a state line. In a mobile society, such as the United States, 
locally determined privacy protections become a matter of determining geography, rather 
than base civil liberty protections or public policy. In turn, disparate laws negatively 
affect law enforcement’s use of surveillance technology for criminal investigations 
(United States v. Jones, p. 931). Absent consistent legal standards, law enforcement is left 
to guess which law applies and when, or spend unnecessary resources trying to 
compensate for the rules of each anticipated jurisdiction of travel during a criminal 
investigation. The privacy impact of sensor technology will continue to be of concern as 
technology development outpaces the legal structure that defines what legal protections 
are afforded citizens under governmental surveillance.  
5. Mass Monitoring—The Future is Now 
Modern sensor technology allows the government to mass monitor the public 
movement of its citizens unobtrusively and consistently. CCTV, one of the first mass 
surveillance technologies, generated significant concern over the government’s 
observation of the public movement of its citizens (Ozer & Schlosberg, 2007, pp. 1–2). 
However, unlike early CCTV, which was generally localized and had limited retention 
capacity, today’s sensor surveillance technology allows for shared environments, 
multiple end-users, and significantly expanded use of the images obtained (Dwyer, La 
Vigne, Lowry, & Markman, 2011, pp. ix–x). GPS, LPR, and RFID all monitor the public 
movement of individuals through time, space, and distance, and each of these 
technologies can be combined with other technologies to create a public surveillance of 
significant scope and capacity (Ozer & Schlosberg, 2007, p. 1). As such, sensor 
technology raises issues not only over the government’s initial intrusion and over the 
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monitoring of citizens in public space, but also in regards to the aggregation of PII data 
through leveraged use of other technologies; thereby, potentially creating a mosaic of 
information regarding the individual, with more information beyond the single 
observation.  
Data mining and aggregation is of growing concern given the ability to augment 
the data developed by one surveillance system with that of another (United States v. 
Jones; People v. Weaver; Kerr, 2011; Posen, 2005). However, concerns over what may 
result from surveillance technology cannot ignore what already exists. Current 
technology in use allows for significant linkage and augmentation of a singly byte of 
data. The ability to individuate PII data, (e.g., to link the tollbooth collections data to the 
license plate of a registered owner to location of an individual for which a warrant exists), 
creates the potential for a larger, more comprehensive scope of surveillance of public 
movement by government (Ozer & Schlosberg, 2007, pp. 3–4). Such aggregation furthers 
public safety efforts in light of the mobility of the criminal population. Therefore, given 
the growing reliance upon sensor technology by the HLS field, the gap in consistent legal 
guidance and the variance in state statutes have significant consequence for civil liberties 
and public safety. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Is a federal privacy statute necessary to address the dual concerns of public safety 
and privacy given the government’s increasing use of sensor technology that monitors the 
movement of individuals within public spaces?  
C. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
Surveillance technologies continue to evolve, and will serve only to further 
heighten privacy concerns. This thesis conducts an in-depth analysis of the existing law 
and policy regarding the government’s use of sensor technologies, including GPS, to 
monitor the movement of people across public spaces. Public safety and civil liberties are 
not mutually exclusive. However, as technology becomes more advanced, and the 
government’s mass monitoring of its citizen’s movement in public spaces becomes more 
prevalent, defining the appropriate boundaries for privacy better ensures the protection of 
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civil liberties. Despite its prevalent use within law enforcement, even the use of GPS 
remains a Fourth Amendment frontier without defined legal boundaries, despite the 
opportunity for the U.S. Supreme Court to establish legal guidelines (United States v. 
Jones; United States v. Cuervas-Perez). Identifying general privacy goals and legal 
protections for individual privacy will stop the circular legal chase brought forth by the 
existing practice of identifying the privacy impact of how the government uses a specific 
technology. A legal framework that recognizes privacy rights, rather than reviews how 
government uses technology, will provide the appropriate legal guidance for the 
government’s use of surveillance technology. 
This thesis contributes to the emerging body of literature intent on analyzing the 
current and long-term issues associated with privacy and technology, and governmental 
surveillance of its citizen’s public movements. By focusing on legal analysis, this thesis 
provides guidance for HLS professionals when making policy decisions regarding 
surveillance technology that will benefit not only the initial investigative objective and 
support prosecution and criminal deterrence, but will also comport with the traditional 
legal principles that have protected the civil liberties of U.S. citizens.  
While the gap between government’s use of surveillance technology and legal 
governance has implication for HLS policy, it has significant practical implications as 
well. In a time of unprecedented fiscal challenge, the government is looking to use 
technology as a means to not only reduce personnel costs, but to also leverage existing 
resources (Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2011, pp. 26–27). While 
technology supports efficiency in government, its implementation also brings forth 
significant cost (Zoufal, 2008, p. 124). For example, the costs of the CCTV systems 
within the various cities that have implemented such systems are well into the millions, 
with some cities, such as Chicago and New York, exceeding costs of tens of millions 
(Cameron et al., 2008, p. 6). Given that the law often lags behind technology 
development and use, contrary legal decisions over the government’s use of sensor 
technology may result in a significant drain on public financial resources, particularly if 
the use is severely limited through judicial decision. Further, criminal investigations, 
prosecution and judicial outcome generate fiscal and social costs when the wrong 
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decision is made regarding the legality of the use of surveillance technology. The 
respondent Jones came under criminal investigation in 2003, was first before the court in 
2006, and after several trials, the matter was finally resolved by the Supreme Court 
almost six years later (United States v. Maynard; United States v. Jones). Specific 
guidance on constitutional privacy requirements is optimally provided ahead of the 
government’s technology investments, rather than subsequent to purchase and 
implementation, as is current legal practice.  
Finally, while this thesis addresses significant privacy issues, many privacy issues 
regarding evolving technology remain unaddressed. George Orwell saw government as 
big brother—all watching (Orwell, 1949). However, complex technology systems exist, 
and growing enthusiasm is increasing for linking and sharing data amongst shared 
enterprise systems within the private domain, either independently for commercial 
purposes or in partnership with government (Digital Government, n.d.). Also significant 
private commercial growth is arising from the mega-data developed as a form of 
surveillance technology now in use.8 The subsequent end use and retention of the data 
amassed from the multitude of surveillance technologies, both governmental and private, 
is a growing privacy concern. Constitutional limitations generally do not apply to private 
entities, and other legal restriction is minimal for said entities. Further, whether PII 
remains a valid touchstone for privacy boundaries and whether it remains subject to 
definition in light of the growing capacity for data aggregation, including the 
individuation of data previously non-identifying, raises new concerns for privacy 
protections (Schwartz & Solove, 2011). A federal data protection statute, applicable to 
both government and private entities, as proposed within this thesis, establishes basic 
privacy protections, and is necessary, given the growing use of surveillance technology 
and the PII data that it derives. Not only is this thesis topic an area ripe for legal 
intercession, it requires further research and review as technology takes on a more 
dominant role in U.S. society; thereby, further transforming the concept of privacy.  
                                                 
8 For example, All State Insurance has recently offered discount opportunities under its “Drive Wise” 
program for drivers who install a monitoring device onto their vehicle that tracks, and allows for 
subsequent analysis and sharing of data related to acceleration, time of day driving and other factors 
deemed relevant (All State Insurance, n.d.). 
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D. METHODOLOGY 
Determining the privacy implications arising from the government’s use of sensor 
technology to monitor the public movement of individuals requires review of law and 
policy. Therefore, the methodology used in this thesis focuses on legal case and statutory 
analysis coupled with a comparative analysis of practices regarding the use of various 
sensor technologies. A review of privacy concepts and how they inform case and 
statutory law is also conducted. Legal case analysis reviews key judicial decisions 
regarding technology and privacy, and includes statutory review, where applicable. The 
purpose of the legal case review is to distinguish and identify the key decisional 
processes and principles used by the courts to determine the parameters of privacy and 
technology under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Identification of some of the more 
commonly used sensor technologies within HLS is also conducted. Using the Fourth 
Amendment and statutory law as a supporting framework, the identification and 
recommendation of a range of policy options that support public safety and civil liberties, 
namely privacy, conclude the thesis. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several themes evolve from the literature on privacy, technology, and the 
government’s monitoring of the movement of its citizens across public spaces. The first is 
literature on privacy as a general concept. Literature attempting to define the inherent 
expectations and legal rights associated with privacy within the United States, both as a 
theoretical concept and as a legal principle, is also prevalent. A growing body of 
literature exists on the privacy impact of technology in use within the HLS field. 
Aggregated data and the subsequent use and retention of mass monitoring data that can 
be individuated are growing areas of exploration within the literature. In the recent 
decision in United States v. Jones, Justice Sotomayor noted that the use of sensor 
surveillance technology, inclusive of GPS, provides for a “substantial quantum of 
intimate information” that bring into question whether it is a reasonable expectation that 
the sum of an individual’s public movements may be tracked for the government to 
peruse at will (United States v. Jones, p. 956), with Justice Sotomayor concurring. While 
the literature confirms that while privacy is strongly embraced, it often eludes specific 
definition. Therefore, as a result, privacy will continue to evolve within a world 
increasingly driven by technology. 
A. DEFINING PRIVACY 
Privacy represents a panoply of concepts and the literature reflects its broadness 
of scope and definition. Privacy not only has multiple meanings but the definition has 
developed over time and is often culturally specific (Gutwirth, 2002, pp. 20, 29). As with 
fashion, privacy evolves and transforms that which used to be private now publicly 
acceptable under new standards and vice versa (Baker, 2010, pp. 313–317). For example, 
as evidenced through reality television shows and social networking, many people are far 
more comfortable disclosing intimate details about their personal lives than in the past. 
Whether technology shifts society’s privacy expectations, particularly as it applies to 
legal standards, remains unanswered. Yet, it is society’s acceptance of technology, 
regardless of individual expectations, that forms a critical component in the legal 
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framework for privacy analysis (City of Ontario v. Quon, p. 2629). To date, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has failed to define the overall extent of technology’s impact on 
reasonable expectations of privacy.  
1. Conceptual Privacy 
Privacy is often claimed to be a fundamental right (Taylor, 2011, p. 456). 
However, seemingly little consensus exists as to what is actually being protected (p. 456). 
Some authors have noted that privacy is inherently rooted in Western culture, with 
Gutwirth (2002) identifying the challenges in applying Western concepts of privacy, 
rooted in solitude, to Africa’s tribal structure or to some religions, including Islam (pp. 
24–29). Others attempt to define privacy within a specific context by identifying salient 
factors that include normative, social/cultural, and psychological influences (A. Moore, 
2008, pp. 411–418; Peters, 1999, pp. 116–118). DeCew (1997) defines privacy, in part, 
through the analysis of the dichotomy between the public and private realm (p. 9). Adam 
Moore (2008) identifies that privacy assumes various mores based upon context and 
situation and is dependent upon cultural boundaries to identify prohibited actions by 
others, including the government (p. 411). Taylor (2011) argues that space affects 
privacy, but is not determinative, and, therefore, privacy is retained within public spaces 
(p. 457). These four factors take on more significance in an age of surveillance 
technology, where an individual’s movements can be measured through GPS for space, 
time, action, and information. Within the broad realm of the literature on privacy, 
inclusive of the works of Thomas Locke through Margaret Mead, more than ample 
support abounds for the existence of the concept of privacy as a matter of natural law, 
cultural, and political process (DeCew, 1997, chaps. 1–4). Yet, its definition remains 
elusive, and privacy is subject to individual context and interpretation. 
As technology enters the privacy analysis, the literature recognizes the challenge 
in claiming a right of privacy in public space. Privacy is often seen as “the right to be left 
alone,” the famous opine of Justice Brandeis (Brandeis, 1890, pp. 193–197). However, 
claims of privacy become enmeshed with digital life, where disclosures of personal and 
intimate information are voluminous and individual ownership, consent, or control over 
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PII data becomes increasingly diminished (Nissenbaum, 2000, p. 7). Taylor (2011), in 
distilling Feldman’s communal view of privacy, identifies four dimensions to privacy: 
space, time, action, and information (p. 457). For some authors, the autonomy of 
individual decision and control of context defines privacy rather than prohibitions on 
access to private information (Garfinkel, 2000, p. 4). Peters (1999) argues that the 
evolving privacy issues within the digital world matter little to real privacy, in that 
privacy is a state of being, so the digital world has little impact (pp. 117–118). While the 
collection and retention of individuated information can affect privacy, Gutwirth (2002) 
notes that such practices have been long standing and existed prior to technology 
advancements (pp. 16–17). It can be argued that privacy concerns based upon intrusions 
created by technological advancement are non-existent, and may be based on 
misinformation and a lack of understanding (Brito, 2004, pp. 19–20). Albeit ephemeral in 
definition and affected by context, privacy is a well-established concept for review and 
analysis within the overall literature, at least within the Western culture. 
2. Privacy as a Legal Determination  
Within the United States, legal decisions and statutory law provide the literature 
from which the legal concept of privacy is analyzed and defined. In that privacy is 
evaluated within the lens of cultural, social and technological perspective, McCullagh 
(2001) argues that privacy definitions and protections are directly correlative to the 
current views of legislators, judges, and bureaucrats (p. 133). Kerr (2004) identifies that 
the current legal landscape for privacy relies upon the courts and the Constitution as the 
primary vehicle for protecting privacy, with Congress and state legislatures having a 
limited, secondary role (pp. 802–804). Kerr further states that the popular legal view 
advocates that privacy be advanced by judicial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to 
limit the intrusions brought forth by government using surveillance technology (p. 804). 
However, Heffernan (2001) argues that the judiciary does not have sufficient depth of 
knowledge to evaluate privacy encroachments fully in light of the current complexity of 
privacy issues raised by technology (p. 3).  
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a. Fourth Amendment and Privacy 
The literature identifies that, at least within the United States, privacy 
claims arising under claims from governmental surveillance are inherently linked with 
the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Fourth Amendment states: “The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.” (U.S. CONST. Amend. IV). A 
long line of judicial decisions9 have established the legal framework for determining 
whether an impermissible governmental intrusion is occurring under the Fourth 
Amendment (Olmstead v. United States; Katz v. United States; United States v. Knotts; 
and Kyllo v. United States; United States v. Jones). The law has established that 
individuals do not have a general constitutional right to privacy (Katz v. United States). 
However, the law also states that if the governmental action in question constitutes a 
search of a person, house, paper, or effect under the Fourth Amendment, then judicial 
review is warranted to determine whether the government acted in adherence to 
constitutional principles given the intrusion upon the citizen (Katz v. United States; Kyllo 
v. United States).  
(1) Search and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy. The 
literature identifies that not every government intrusion is a search (Oliver v. United 
States).10 Judicial interpretation of the term “search” is not only sometimes inconsistent 
with its popular use within the lay population; it is subject to varying judicial definition 
(Hutchins, 2007, p. 422). Even if it is determined that a search occurred, the courts must  
 
 
                                                 
9 Case law serves as the “literature” for legal analysis, and is defined as “the aggregate of reported 
cases as forming a body of jurisprudence, or the law of a particular subject, as evidenced or formed by the 
adjudged cases, in distinction to statutes...” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1979).  
10 In Oliver, the U.S. Supreme Court held that government’s search of a field removed some distance 
from the defendant’s home was not a search under the Fourth Amendment, thereby reaffirming the open 
fields doctrine, under which there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields, despite an 
individual’s attempts to limit access (Oliver v. United States, p. 178). 
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still determine whether the individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, 
whether the individual privacy interests were objectively reasonable (Hutchins, 2010, pp. 
1191–1192).  
Katz (Katz v. United States) identifies that location is not the sole 
driver for reasonable expectations of privacy, as the Fourth Amendment protects people 
and not places (p. 351). However, trespass by the government remains a key factor under 
the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis, even in an age of technology, as 
evidenced in its most recent decision in Jones. Rather than address the issues associated 
with mass surveillance by the government through use of GPS, the Supreme Court 
focused on the government’s physical trespass to install the GPS device in holding that 
the government had conducted a search for Fourth Amendment purposes (United States 
v. Jones, pp. 948–950).  
Gershman (2010) maintains that “place” remains a central issue in 
determining reasonable expectations of privacy, as demonstrated in the Katz court’s focus 
on the use of surveillance to listen into a conversation from within a phone booth (p. 
928). Given the traditional focus on physical entry as a predicate for a finding of a search, 
at least in conjunction with a reasonable expectation of privacy, Kerr (2005) questions 
what would constitute a search when a computer storage device or its data is involved 
(pp. 538–539). Kerr further discusses the challenges of place, such as in distinguishing 
what is a “home,” the traditional privacy boundary, in an electronic age where many 
private effects are now portable (p. 538).  
Other authors also identify that the existing analytical framework 
and legal theory of the Fourth Amendment, particularly as it applies to technology, is 
confusing and inconsistent (Recent Cases, 2011a, pp. 832–834; Plourde-Cole, 2010, pp. 
579–582). Cloud (2002) finds that the Katz standard of reasonable expectation of privacy 
fails when applied to surveillance technologies (pp. 28–29).  
Justice Alito argues that technical trespass, the basis for decision in 
Jones, is a step back in the privacy jurisprudence (United States v. Jones, p. 960), with 
Justice Alito concurring. He further observes that the majority fails to follow its own 
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precedence, as decided in Kyllo, in which the Court recognized that the Fourth 
Amendment does not require physical trespass, and in Katz, in which the Court identified 
that the existence of a property right is but one element is establishing a reasonable 
expectation of privacy (p. 960).  
Clancy (2012) argues it is almost impossible to identify exactly 
what the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy means under existing legal 
jurisprudence (p. 303). Hutchins (2007) puts forth the idea that the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment analysis has been erratic and occasionally 
contradictory (p. 422). Gershman (2010) identifies that the factors used by the courts in 
determining reasonable expectations vary on their face (pp. 928–929). Given the circular 
analysis required under the Katz standard of reasonable expectation of privacy—as the 
two pronged test to determine a reasonable expectation of privacy requires both the 
subjective and societal privacy expectations be met for a privacy claim to be deemed 
reasonable—the literature lacks consistency in defining what is required to assert a claim 
of privacy properly under the Fourth Amendment.  
Under the reasonable expectation of privacy standard, the literature 
discusses whether length and duration of the government intrusion contributes to the 
finding that the government action was a search. Solove (2004) identifies that much of 
the 4th Amendment jurisprudence focuses on a search as a physical incursion (pp. 196–
197). Gersham (2010) identifies that modern technology enables the government to 
intrude into places and activities that previously were inaccessible, and the courts have 
yet to address the issue under a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis (pp. 928–929). 
Kerr (2011) posits that given a government search is defined as a discrete act, legal 
determinations based upon the duration of the act, including the continuing delivery of 
information arising from the act, should not define whether a search occurred. 
Alternatively, Kerrane (2011) argues that with GPS, the ability to capture large amounts 
of information via constant satellite monitoring should impact determinations of whether 
a search has occurred for Fourth Amendment purposes (pp. 1734–1741). Therefore, when 
technology is involved, the legal literature differs as to what specific factors are 
determinative of whether a search occurred, be it physical intrusion, duration or degree of 
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intrusiveness (Hutchins, 2010, pp. 1185–1190; Plourde-Cole, 2010, pp. 571–627; Wells, 
2009, p. 225; Koppel, 2010, pp. 1069–1073). As technology is able to obtain greater 
stores of information with minimal physical intrusion or awareness by the individual 
under surveillance, the debate over the degree of governmental intrusion will become less 
relevant. 
(2) Reasonable Expectations of Privacy. The expectation of 
privacy is a two-pronged test, inclusive of a subjective expectation of privacy, where an 
individual exhibits an actual expectation of privacy, and the second prong, a requirement 
that society is prepared to recognize the expectation as reasonable (Katz v. United States, 
pp. 347, 361). Objective societal expectations have been defined as those expectations 
that drive the “normal course of business” or information that is voluntarily and/or 
routinely disclosed (Smith v. Maryland). Within the context of reasonableness, the courts 
have recognized that although a person voluntarily exposes their daily movement and 
actions in public, a person does not leave his privacy home upon exiting the door (United 
States v. Maynard, p. 563).11  
The literature identifies that evolving technology presents 
challenges to identifying societal expectations of privacy. Slogobin (1993) identifies that 
the Court relies upon societal understandings of privacy in defining legitimate 
expectations of privacy under the Fourth Amendment (p. 731). With technology in play, 
Freiwald (2007) states the courts lack the competence to evaluate societies’ views about 
the intricacies of technology and its application, as most users and judges do not fully 
understand new technology (p. 8). Even the Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that 
Katz test has been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable (Kyllo v. 
United States, p. 34). Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that the reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis requires an underlying expectation that the reasonable 
person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations (United States v. 
Jones, p. 932), with Justice Alito concurring. However, expectations of privacy are 
subject to significant flux during times of dramatic technological advancement (p. 932). 
                                                 
11 Maynard is the D.C. circuit court decision that is subsequently renamed and decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Jones v. United States. See footnote 17.  
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Given the ongoing dramatic changes in technology, the literature does discuss that the 
judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of 
emerging technology before its role in society has become clearly understood and 
accepted, and embraced under reasonable expectations of privacy (City of Ontario v. 
Quon, p. 2629). Within the literature, there a public reserve for privacy is recognized. 
However, whether subjective expectations of privacy remain objectively reasonable is 
influenced by society’s acceptance and understanding of the overall use of technology. 
The dicta of the court, as expressed through concurring and 
dissenting opinions that attach to judicial decisions, also expands the literature on legal 
interpretation of the privacy protections afforded U.S. citizens under the Fourth 
Amendment and the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine. For example, while the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Jones decision was unanimous, meaning that all the justices 
concurred that the government engaged in a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, the 
basis for the opinions varied (United States v. Jones, p. 945). The majority12 in Jones 
held that the government engaged in trespass by placing a GPS device on the subject’s 
vehicle, and therefore, was search under the Fourth Amendment (p. 954). However, the 
majority chose not to address whether the use of GPS for a period of 28 days without a 
warrant violated the reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, 
finding it unnecessary to do so given the governmental trespass (p. 950). While Justice 
Sotomayor concurred that trespass did in fact give rise to the finding of a search for 
constitutional purposes, she gave separate voice, in her concurring opinion, to the unease 
surrounding the growing privacy concerns and impact on the relationship of government 
to its citizens in light of advancing surveillance technology (pp. 954–956). The remaining 
Supreme Court justices, while concurring with the finding that the government engaged 
in a search under the Fourth Amendment, disagreed as to the majority’s reliance upon the 
trespass doctrine (United States v. Jones), with Justice Alito concurring (pp. 961–963). 
Rather, Justices Alito, Ginsberg, Breyer and Kagan all concur in the finding, but identify 
                                                 
12 The majority comprised of Justices Scalia, who delivered the opinion of the Court, and Justices 
Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas and Sotomayor. Justice Sotomayor also filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito 
also filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan joined 
(United States v. Jones, p. 947). 
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that for most offenses, longer term use of GPS monitoring impinges on reasonable 
expectations of privacy. See United States v. Jones, with Justice Alito concurring (p. 
964). Therefore, while the decision in Jones is unanimous, a review of the contributing 
opinions identifies distinct lines of support for the decision. 
The Jones’ opinion will contribute to the ongoing legal discussion 
during subsequent judicial review of claims of Fourth Amendment violations arising out 
of the government’s use of GPS, as well as other sensor technology, to conduct 
surveillance. In that the determinations of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy is 
factually driven and is subject to the privacy hermeneutic of the deciding judge, (as well 
as proficiency with modern technology), the case law will always show some level of 
variance in the analysis of distinct technologies and their privacy impacts. However, the 
law’s capacity to address the privacy impact of new technology occurs through the lens 
of socially accepted uses of technology and the dynamics of communication and 
information transmission (City of Ontario v. Quon, p. 2629). As a result, the literature 
identifies that the expanding use of technology becomes part of the fact pattern for Fourth 
Amendment analysis in determining both subjective and reasonable expectations of 
privacy, which serves to add to the confusion over the proper use of technology in 
conducting mass surveillance. 
(3) Other Legal Privacy Protections. The legal literature on 
privacy also derives from a wide variety of statutes that address privacy at both the state 
and federal levels. Legal statutes are the result of legislative action, as opposed to case 
law that arises out of judicial decision. Solove (2010) identifies that legislative bodies are 
the more appropriate conduit for delineating rules for government information gathering 
and the courts are best situated to evaluate whether these rules meet the basic principles 
of the Fourth Amendment (p. 1538). Unlike the Fourth Amendment, statutory provisions 
to protect privacy interests may also regulate the activities of private individuals.  
(4) Federal Statutes. The literature review identifies that a 
general right of privacy does not exist in either constitutional or statutory law within the 
United States (Stanley & Steinhardt, 2003, p. 15). Various federal laws address privacy 
by limiting the context in which government, and some private entities, may access 
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information deemed private. For example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which regulates 
the sharing of PII financial information about individuals engaged in business with data 
collectors (Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA). Video records are protected through The 
Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2002) The Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) defines and limits how 
government and private entities access and disseminate individual health care information 
(The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 1996). Consistent with the 
examples provided by these laws, statutorily mandated privacy protections are generally 
of limited scope and application, often focusing on a specific area of the law or issue. 
Some generalized data protections exist at the federal level for PII 
data under government access and control, although they also are limited in overall scope 
and application. The Privacy Act of 1974 governs the maintenance and disclosure of PII 
records maintained by federal governmental agencies (The Privacy Act of 1974, as 
amended 5 U.S.C. § 552a). The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 28 Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) Part 23, acts as a guideline for standards on the collection and use of 
criminal intelligence, inclusive of PII for federally grant-funded multijurisdictional 
criminal intelligence systems (Institute for Intergovernmental Research, n.d.). However, 
the literature identifies that not all data is subject to statutory restrictions, and the depth of 
information about individuals held by the federal government creates privacy concerns 
given the relatively easy access to data and the subsequent ability to aggregate data 
(Gross & Inkley, 2005).  
The literature identifies that federal statutory control over 
technology and practices used by local law enforcement to conduct surveillance is 
limited. One notable exception is the Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, (“Title III”), which regulates wiretap surveillance of 
communications for both federal and local law enforcement (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522). 
Title III provides for a limited grant of authority to law enforcement for electronic 
surveillance for specifically delineated crimes and only in accordance with certain 
procedural requirements as listed under 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). Statutory law, rather than 
constitutional protections, provides the better legal privacy protection from governmental 
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wiretapping surveillance (Kerr, 2004, p. 850). The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that in 
enacting Title III, Congress ensured that the complex field of electronic surveillance was 
not left to the courts to govern through evolving case law (United States v. Jones, p. 963). 
However, Title III is limited in its privacy protections as it addresses only specified 
eavesdropping technology in use by the government, and not others, inclusive of GPS 
(United States v. Torres, p. 884). The literature identifies that other federal statutory 
limitations exist, for example, through components of Title III, such as the Stored 
Communications Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712), or through the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, (ECPA), (18U.S.C.§2510–2522, Pub. L .99–508). 
However, the literature does not identify a similar federal jurisdictional reserve as is seen 
in Title III, which illuminates both the gap in privacy as a result of anemic statutory 
privacy laws and the ability of such legislative action to provide comprehensive legal 
protections. 
b. Privacy under State Law 
State and other local law has a growing impact on individual privacy 
protection as it relates to the use of technology, although little consistency or shared 
policy focus exists amongst the states. The Supreme Court has ruled that the protection of 
a person’s general right to privacy, inclusive of the right to be left alone, is similar to the 
protection property and life, and therefore, is a responsibility of the states (Katz v. United 
States, pp. 350–351). While a variety of local law addressing private information and its 
protection exists, a literature review identifies that no single state has a comprehensive 
privacy protection statute. Some states provide constitutional protections for general 
human rights and privacy. For example, the Florida Constitution provides that “Every 
natural person has the right to be left alone and free from governmental intrusion into the 
person’s private life except as otherwise provided herein (Florida State Constitution, art. 
1. sec. 23). The State Constitution of Alaska recognizes a right of privacy for people and 
states that it shall not be infringed (Alaska State Constitution, art. 1, sec. 22). Some 




government interest driving the intrusion exists (Hawaii Constitution, art. 1, sec. 6). 
Therefore, while the federal constitution remains silent on the issue, some states have 
identified privacy as an inherent right within their constitutions. 
The literature reflects that Freedom of Information Act laws (FOIA) and 
sunshine laws also affect privacy. The literature identifies that given concerns over 
growing government bureaucracy and secrecy, FOIA was the legislative response to 
ensure an open government with appropriate public access (Wichmann, 1998, pp. 1217–
1218). However, technology brings forth voluminous amounts of data and at least one 
author has questioned whether public records, which contain significant amounts of PII 
data, were meant to be public to the degree enabled by technology (Salzmann, 2000, p. 
356). Regardless of legislative intent, state level FOIA laws increasingly define privacy, 
given the mandated disclosure of data under the FOIA goals of openness, without legal 
consensus as to what is appropriately identified as PII and disclosed within the context of 
privacy (p. 379).  
In the absence of federal statutory preemption or a comprehensive 
Supreme Court decision on privacy, local and state governments are increasingly 
establishing their own legal parameters for the use of surveillance technology. However, 
the privacy policies of the varying states may conflict with one another. The literature 
identifies that some state courts, including Washington, Delaware, New York, and 
Massachusetts, require law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant before using GPS 
surveillance, absent exigency (Smith, 2011, p. 7). Other state courts, including those of 
Nevada and Virginia, have found that use of GPS surveillance does not constitute a 
search, and therefore, does not raise any state or federal constitutional concerns (p. 7). 
Other states, including California, have statutorily limited the right to track a person 
electronically to law enforcement, and identifies that doing so without a person’s 
knowledge is a violation of reasonable expectations of privacy. See, e.g., California Penal 
Code section 637.7, Stats. 1998 c. 449 (S.B. 1667) § 2. The emerging body of local 
privacy laws applicable to the government’s use of surveillance technology is varied and 
does not reflect a unified policy vision for privacy.  
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The literature notes increased reliance upon state law in protecting the 
privacy interests of its citizens. Gersham (2010) has noted that the expectation of privacy 
jurisprudence from the U.S. Supreme Court is confusing (p. 929). As a result, Gersham 
argues that the lack of legal consistency has encouraged state courts to reject the Katz 
doctrine and to provide broader protection to its citizens under the state’s law (p. 929). 
For example, the Washington State Supreme Court has held that a right to privacy is one 
of conscious decision and to define privacy through the capacity of current technology is 
inconsistent with state constitutional privacy protections and fails to guide proper 
governmental action (State v. Young, p. 598). The issue before the court was whether the 
use of a thermal imaging device to obtain information from within the home of a 
suspected marijuana grower was a search under the Fourth Amendment (p. 594). In 
ruling that the government’s action was an impermissible search, the court held that an 
“even more rigorous protection of privacy” exists under the state constitution than under 
the Fourth Amendment (pp. 596–598).13  
Another example of local law providing rights not specifically delineated 
in federal law occurs in Commonwealth v. Connolly (Commonwealth v. Connolly). The 
issue before the Supreme Court of Massachusetts was whether the use of GPS by law 
enforcement to conduct warrantless surveillance was illegal (Commonwealth v. 
Connolly). Relying upon the protection under Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights, which grants the right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures 
absent proper warrant, the court found an impermissible search occurred (Commonwealth 
v. Connolly, p. 369). In addressing the government’s claims that no Fourth Amendment 
right to privacy exists regarding a vehicle’s movement about the public way, the court 
held that the state law provides protection at least equal to, and at times greater than, that 
provided by the Fourth Amendment, and that the installation of the GPS device 
constituted a seizure under the state law (Commonwealth v. Connolly). The legal 
literature reflects the variance in the local protections for privacy among the states. This 
                                                 
13 This 1994 decision predated the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision on a similar use of the technology 
in Kyllo v. U.S. in 2001. The U.S. Supreme Court decided along similar lines in its decision in Kyllo, 
finding that the use of an infrared imaging device to obtain information from inside the home was a search 
under the Fourth Amendment (Kyllo v. United States). 
 26 
variance has negative impact on the government’s ability to conduct criminal 
investigative surveillance, which in terms, limits individual privacy rights in that privacy 
protections become a matter of jurisdictional border and not consistent public policy.  
(1) Comparative Law. The literature identifies that legal 
privacy protections within the United States are anemic in comparison to those of its 
European counterparts. From the perspective of PII, Bergelson (2003) states that within 
the United States, comprehensive legislation regulating the privacy rights and 
responsibilities of individuals and commercial enterprises that collect PII is needed due to 
the development of privacy laws in the international arena (pp. 394–395). Many 
European countries,14 including members of the European Union (EU), offer specific, 
enumerated privacy protections for their citizens. Those countries with delineated privacy 
protections under law include, but are not limited to Belgium, Brazil, Finland, Greece, 
Israel, Italy, Spain, and Sweden (Privacy International, 2007).  
One significant vehicle driving privacy rights is the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).15 Bignami (2007) states that while the European 
Union is not a party to the ECHR, both treaty and case law establish that ECHR rights are 
guaranteed to citizens within the European Union (p. 241). Morariu (2009) identifies that 
while Article 8 of the ECHR guarantees the right to private life and family life, it also 
provides for restrictions of this right under certain circumstances (p. 47). Taylor (2011) 
argues that privacy rights are not absolute and that proportionality, a recurring theme 
under European law, is focused on maintaining the contextual integrity of individual 
privacy in light of governmental surveillance (p. 460). The examination of the balance 
between societal rights and personal privacy protections is a recurrent theme within some 
of the EU literature and discussion on privacy.  
Beyond general privacy principles, Bignami (2007) identifies that 
within the European Union, data protection is treated as a basic human right (p. 233). The 
literature notes that data protection acts regulate the retention and use of derivative data 
                                                 
14 This thesis focuses on European countries given the shared democratic principles and general legal 
concepts with those of the United States. 
15 The Council of Europe includes 47 member countries and seeks to develop common principles 
based on the ECHR in the protection of individuals (Council of Europe, n.d.). 
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and not a specific technology or interest area. For example, The Data Retention Directive, 
(Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 
2006), provides for a variety of protections associated with the collection and 
transmission of PII and data transmitted through electronic means (See Article 4 and 
Article 5). Elaluf states that data privacy laws are privacy driven, and not focused on a 
specific technology and therefore are seen as technology neutral (Elaluf-Calderwood, 
Hosein, Karrberg, & Liebenau, 2011, p. 6). Overall, the literature identifies that EU data 
protection laws focus on the individual/societal privacy interest rather than a specific 
technology in making privacy determinations.  
Technology use also drives privacy definitions and protections 
within the European Union. The evolution of the use of CCTV within the United 
Kingdom is a good example of how the privacy issues brought forth through the 
government’s use of technology to conduct surveillance help to further define privacy 
standards. The literature identifies that as a result of a legal gap in the early stages of the 
U.K.’s implementation of CCTV, surveillance occurred with minimal regulation (Zoufal, 
2008, p. 129). Zoufal states that as co-regulation evolved, self-regulation with 
government and private sector involvement, also helped establish privacy standards for 
the U.K.’s use of CCTV (p. 129). For Webster (2004), the lack of formal legislation 
governing CCTV is seen as opening the way for the development of voluntary codes of 
practice, which in turn, fed the emerging legal standards for CCTV implementation (pp. 
231–232). These emerging U.K. legal standards, according to Taylor (2002), included 
protecting the individual’s privacy right not only in the initial collection of sensor data, 
but also in the subsequent dissemination of data captured via surveillance (pp. 76–78). In 
guiding determinations about use and dissemination regarding surveillance data, Taylor 
(2011) states that the law becomes a means to protect privacy by identifying when the 
privacy interest is substantial enough to demand state action rather than state neutrality 
(p. 457). The literature review reveals that no encompassing federal statute regulating 
general rights of individual privacy or data protection exists in a manner comparative to 
that seen within many European nations.  
 28 
B. PUBLIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY  
While technology is inanimate, its use by government is not and the literature not 
only evaluates the capacity of technology, it explores the policy implications of the 
government’s use of surveillance technologies. Taylor (2002) notes that surveillance 
generally has two faces, that which intrudes upon or curtails privacy rights, and that 
which pre-empts crime and protects the public (p. 66). Garfinkel (2000) notes that 
technology development and its use do not occur in a vacuum, but that public choice and 
politics also have a role in defining rights and expectations around technology use (p. 11). 
Although the science of sensor technology is not a focus of this thesis, aspects of the 
science do impact the discussion on privacy, particularly as to the reliability of the 
science behind evolving technology. Technical literature covers the realm of sensor 
technology used in support of HLS interests, with some recognition of the inherent 
privacy concerns brought forth by the use of sensor technology to conduct surveillance. 
See Introna and Nissenbaum (2009, pp. 44–46) for a discussion on alleviating privacy 
concerns over the use of FRT. The literature on the privacy impact of the government’s 
use of surveillance technology often results in use and/or policy recommendations.  
A variety of authors weigh in on evaluation and policy recommendations 
concerning the government’s use of surveillance technologies. Civil liberties groups, such 
as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), contribute to the literature through 
analysis of certain technologies resulting in policy recommendations for the 
government’s use of sensor technology generally more restrictive given identified privacy 
and other constitutional concerns. The ACLU maintains a website, Spy Files,16 which 
catalogues many privacy issues associated with surveillance technology. Literature from 
civil liberties advocates generally favors reduced reliance upon and greater controls over 
the government’s use of sensor technology.17  
                                                 
16 See the ACLU website for a variety of issues and concerns over governmental surveillance (Spy 
Files, n.d.). 
17 For example, see the website for the Northern California ACLU, “Connecting the Dots” 
(Connecting the Dots, n.d.). 
 29 
The literature generated by governmental agencies and those generally associated 
with the government tend to focus on technology performance and its efficiencies, and 
often provide recommendations for reducing privacy impact. For example, technical 
literature, such as that written by the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) 
(2006), analyzes the performance of the underlying biometrics technology, and also 
identifies privacy concerns with recommendations for policy (pp. 43–57). The 
International Association of Chiefs of Police’s (IACP) (2009) report on the privacy 
impact of LPR analyzes not only the key components and use of the technology, but also 
identifies privacy concerns and makes recommendation for policy so that law 
enforcement can reduce the privacy concerns.  
Literature also evaluates technology, from the general evaluation of efficacy, to 
the impact on specific privacy concerns that the different types of technology bring 
forward. While the science informing sensor technology is not a focus of this thesis, the 
science does impact aspects of privacy, and therefore, some of the literature remains 
relevant. The literature is informed by academic articles regarding the science behind the 
technology, such as evaluation and validation of the underlying algorithms for LPR 
(Obeid et al., 2007). Government sponsored evaluation of technology is another source of 
literature, such as the review and measurement of FRT improvement over time, inclusive 
of comparison among specific vendors (Phillips, Scruggs, O’Toole, Flynn, Bowyer, 
Schott, & Sharpe, 2007). Even the literature on scientific validation of the technology is 
cognizant of privacy concerns linked to surveillance technology. The NSTC 
Subcommittee on Biometrics provided analysis of existing biometrics and associated 
public policy concerns for use, both front and end use, of the data collected—including 
collection, storage and comparison (NSTC, 2006). Introna provides an analysis of the 
efficacy of FRT technology, gives policy considerations informed by the technology 
requirements and limitations and identifies the resulting impact on privacy concerns 
associated with FRT (Introna & Nissenbaum, 2009). The technology evaluation literature 
informs as to the capacity of the technology, as well as its resulting privacy impact. 
Civil liberty advocates are generally more focused on the resulting privacy impact 
of technology. The ACLU has contributed much to the literature on the privacy impact of 
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technology, including technology evaluations and policy recommendations that strongly 
advocate for enhancing privacy protections within existing surveillance systems (Ozer & 
Schlosberg, 2007; Chicago’s Video Surveillance Cameras, 2011). Cameron (2008) 
studied the use of video surveillance within the Los Angeles area and identified the 
strengths and limitations of the technology and the policies in use by law enforcement (p. 
53). Other literature calls for a moratorium on the expansion of video surveillance by 
citing the need for an open evaluation before the government chills expressive freedom 
(Chicago’s Video Surveillance Cameras, 2011, pp. 1–3). The ACLU of Northern 
California identifies that video surveillance has not proven effective and that government 
should pause on the implementation to determine whether funding would be better spent 
elsewhere (Ozer & Schlosberg, 2007, p. 2). The literature, therefore, covers a range of 
issues in regards to the technology itself, from the scientific underpinnings to how the 
technology creates privacy concerns to drafting policies to address or limit such concerns. 
1. Legal Impact of Technology 
Some legal-based literature examines surveillance technology used by the 
government and its impact on privacy from a legal perspective. Well before the expansive 
reach of modern technology, Justice Brandeis noted that technology allows the 
government to invade privacy in a manner equivalent to, or even more far reaching, than 
any physical intrusion (Olmstead v. United States, pp. 472–473). Zoufal (2008) notes that 
even court decisions involving analogous technology often result in disparate judicial 
outcomes (pp. 103–105). For example, Plourde-Cole (2010) identifies that despite similar 
technologies, the law has yet to link consistent legal theory to the privacy impact of cell 
phone tracking and GPS tracking (p. 575). Zoufal (2008) identifies that disparate legal 
outcomes are rooted in a judicial privacy analysis specific to the technology in use and 
not to general privacy implications (p. 104). Freiwald (2007) argues that the courts are 
incapable of tackling the challenges of technology and that the Katz test fails to provide 
for any consistent direction in evaluating the privacy impact of technology. As the 
literature demonstrates, the technology itself continues to play a key role in determining 
whether the government’s use of certain technology in fact triggers statutory or 
Constitutional protections. 
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Some authors have argued that the legal jurisprudence under the Fourth 
Amendment is either inapplicable or flawed in regards to today’s digital world. Solove 
(2006b) argues that a new taxonomy is needed for privacy to be protected within the 
United States as the Fourth Amendment simply does not work in protecting privacy given 
the advancements of technology. For McCullagh (2001), technology and its impact on 
privacy cannot be properly addressed within the law, but, rather, is a market issue that 
will increase or decrease depending upon the privacy values identified within the society 
(pp. 129–131). In McCullagh’s market driven privacy protections, as technology 
advances, individuals are free to develop and use technology to diminish the negative 
privacy impact brought forth using technology (pp. 129–131). The law is merely a 
secondary vehicle in protecting privacy. 
Privacy as a function of capitalism is also discussed within the literature under the 
umbrella of data aggregation. Garfinkel (2000) identifies an Orwellian world in which 
privacy, by means of aggregated data, is forfeited not as a result of government control, 
but rather as an outgrowth of capitalism and societal priorities (p. 2). Peters (1999) 
identifies that businesses, rather than just government, also have a vested interest in 
computerized monitoring and the aggregated data that results (p. 57). Scott (2012) puts 
forth a consumer driven theory of privacy. He uses Facebook’s reference ads for third 
party websites that deliver targeted advertising to Facebook consumer’s home pages, as 
an example, and notes that such policies are driven by the company’s ability to mine and 
use the data content on Facebook user’s pages (Scott, 2012).  
Conversely, other authors find that the existing legal framework to protect privacy 
rights is up to the challenge brought forth by modern technology (Brandeis & Warren, 
1890, pp. 193–195). Kerr (2004) favors the primacy of the Fourth Amendment for 
limiting privacy encroachments caused by the government’s use of surveillance 
technology, which is the popular legal view (pp. 802–804). He advocates that when 
technology threatens privacy, the courts and the Constitution should be the primary 




existing legal literature, inclusive of the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Jones, is 
founded upon the existing Fourth Amendment framework in determining the privacy 
rights of individuals given the government’s use of surveillance technology. 
C. MINDING THE GAP 
How technology impacts legal determinations of privacy is another theme in the 
overall literature. Despite the prevalence of surveillance technologies in use by private, 
commercial, and government actors, the literature generally reflects a greater focus on the 
privacy impact resulting from the government’s use of sensor technologies (Brito, 2004, 
pp. 30–33). The literature reveals an active debate as to what is the appropriate legal 
nexus between privacy and the government’s use of surveillance technology. 
Justice Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead argued that evolving technology allows the 
government to be less intrusive when entering into the private realms of its citizens 
(Olmstead v. United States, pp. 471–485). His focus of concern still remains a valid legal 
issue. As technology continues to advance, some authors, including Posen, have noted 
that new technologies generate greater concerns for individual privacy in light of the risk 
of disclosure that massive data collection brings (Posen, 2005, p. 632). However, Solove 
(2006b) puts forth that it is not technology, but rather, the activities of people that erode 
privacy (p. 564). Solove states that the way to protect privacy is for the courts and 
legislatures to regulate the activities of people and not the technology (p. 564). Zoufal 
(2008) finds that while modern technology generates privacy concerns, legal privacy 
protections are well established under U.S. law (pp. 156–159). Accordingly, privacy will 
not be destroyed or impacted by technology to the degree claimed by privacy advocates 
(pp. 156–159).  
Conversely, Clancy (2012) argues that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Jones merely recycles old law regarding property versus privacy, and the law does not 
adequately confront the privacy issues of the digital age (p. 303). Given the adherence to 
precedence under case law, Hutchins (2010) notes that decisions involving earlier 
technology determine the tolerance for future technologies, but the older decisions fail to 
address or account for the greater intrusions brought forth by modern technology (p. 
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1187). Solove (2006b) posits that “abstract incantations of privacy” are not nuanced 
enough to capture the practical and intricate problems involved with the governmental 
use of surveillance technology and its impact on privacy (p. 480).  
The retention and aggregation of data is the new privacy frontier. Earlier literature 
regarding privacy and technology is often focused on how the technology facilitated or 
enhanced observation. For example, in Kyllo, the U.S. Supreme court analyzed the 
privacy implications under the Fourth Amendment when the government used infrared 
technology to conduct surveillance into an individual’s home, but was focused on the 
issue of observation and not necessarily collection18 (Kyllo v. United States, p. 27). 
However, as the government’s use of sensor technology to conduct surveillance continues 
to grow, the literature reveals increasing concerns over privacy protections as they apply 
to the government’s back end collection and retention of data (Sanchez, 2010). As Solove 
(2010) notes, individuals may not have a concern in disclosing relatively small amounts 
of PII data, but with modern surveillance technology, smaller amounts of PII data can be 
combined, and thus create an aggregation effect that provides a far more comprehensive 
picture of the individual than the discrete dataset deemed acceptably disclosed (p. 1523). 
The literature is beginning to focus more on the aggregation use of the data captured 
through government’s use of surveillance technology, as opposed to just the initial 
observation. Whether the concerns over technology’s impact on privacy and the 
availability of aggregated, individuated data is a real or inflated concern remains subject 
to ongoing debate within the literature.  
Judicial decisions are also beginning to note the privacy concerns generated by 
the aggregated data that results from the government’s use of surveillance technology. In 
United States v. Maynard, the court discusses the Mosaic Theory—the amassing of 
individual, discrete data such that a broader, more descriptive, and therefore intrusive, set 
                                                 
18 In Kyllo, the U.S. Supreme Court opened the door to the issue of whether technology that is widely 
available, “in general public use” can impact privacy expectations, in ruling that the use of infrared 
technology to conduct a search of a home interior was a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, in part 
because the technology used was not in general public use (Kyllo v. United States, p. 28). 
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of data results (pp. 561–562).19 The Maynard court found the level of data collected 
through GPS surveillance to be of significant concern for privacy. (pp. 561–562). The 
Maynard court identified that the continual surveillance of a person’s every movement 
over a period of 28 days was not “knowingly” exposed to the public, as little likelihood 
existed that anyone would view all movement (p. 558). The court went further and stated 
that the ability of GPS to capture the whole of an individual’s movements, rather than 
distinct parts, did not result in a constructive exposure as a person would not reasonably 
expect such action, and therefore, the government’s use of a GPS tracking device in this 
manner was a search for Fourth Amendment purposes (pp. 561–562). In a New York 
state court decision, People v. Weaver, the court found that GPS is a vastly different and 
exponentially more sophisticated technology easily and cheaply deployed with virtually 
unlimited and remarkably precise tracking capability (p. 1199). The Weaver court held 
that because of the detailed information collected by a GPS tracking system, significant 
privacy concerns are created, and therefore, legal protections attach. The split in 
decisions among the lower courts contributes to the overall uncertainty relative to the 
proper use of surveillance technology by the government. 
The Supreme Court has not provided guidance on privacy standards associated 
with the mosaic theory or aggregated data, despite opportunities to do so, even as recently 
as its decision in Jones (United States v. Jones, p. 948). As such, given the reliance upon 
stare decisis within the U.S. courts, PII and data aggregation privacy protection remains, 
for the most part, a matter of statutory regulation. The literature shows that the U.S. 
Supreme Court favors state regulation, as opposed to constitutional review, of privacy 
data that arises as a result of technology advancements (Whalen v. Roe, pp. 605–607). 
1. Impact 
The literature brings forth concerns over the potential for misuse and abuse of the 
secondary data derived from the use of sensor technology to conduct surveillance. The 
                                                 
19 U.S. v. Jones was a consolidated case, originally named U.S. v. Maynard. However, the conviction 
of the defendant Maynard was upheld by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals while the defendant Jones’ 
conviction was overturned as a result of the GPS claim. The government sought writ of certiorari from the 
U.S. Supreme Court only as to Jones and the issue of whether GPS is a search for Fourth Amendment 
purposes. 
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literature also discusses not only the capacity for enhanced data aggregation that 
technology brings forth, but also the individuated detail that becomes accessible through 
larger databases (Zoufal, 2008, p. 113; Guidelines for Public Video Surveillance, 2007, 
pp. 1–6). Concerns are raised about the potentially chilling effect on civil liberties, which 
arise out of the ability of government to influence individual conduct or ignore individual 
constitutional rights improperly because of data collection practices (National Research 
Council of the National Academies, 2008, pp. 3–4). Most recently, Justice Sotomayor 
noted that government surveillance may chill associational and expressive freedoms, and 
the unrestrained power to aggregate the data obtained is susceptible to abuse (United 
States v. Jones, p. 956).  
However, DeCew (1997) identifies that value does exist in government 
surveillance as a means to end crime and posits that technology and privacy are not 
antithetical to one another (p. 163). Introna recommends that governmental policies and 
practices need to evaluate and address technology’s capacity to gather significant 
amounts of data (Introna & Nissenbaum, 2009, p. 5). Garfinkel (2000) goes one step 
further by claiming that the government may be the best option to protect privacy (p. 6). 
Kerr (2011) challenges whether the mosaic theory has any relevance in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence and argues that the Fourth Amendment is discreet and applies 
only to searches and/or seizures. Under the mosaic theory, Kerr (2011) argues that any 
attempt to make that which is not a search a search if information is grouped in a 
particular way has no appropriate standing under Fourth Amendment law. For Kerr, it is 
or is not a search, and the degree of governmental intrusion is irrelevant in making the 
determination. The literature reflects that as data becomes increasingly digitized, and 
more easily accessed and associated, concerns about data accuracy and the subsequent 
use and impact of individuated data grows.  
2. Conclusion 
The use of technology and sensors to conduct surveillance continues to expand 
rapidly, as does its use within the HLS field. A vast amount of literature covers privacy, 
technology, and the ensuing implications for civil liberties. Surprisingly, no single 
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definition of privacy exists within the literature. Not as surprising, this gap translates, in 
part, to varied and sometimes contradicting legal definition and privacy analysis by the 
legal system, particularly under the Fourth Amendment. As the literature reflects, the 
rapid growth in technology, as compared to the relatively slow evolution of privacy law, 
creates a gap in not only legal structure, but also in defining the boundaries of privacy 
and government policy relative to the collection and use of PII and personal data overall. 
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III. THE INTERSECTION OF PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY 
A. PRIVACY 
That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a 
principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary from 
time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection.  
– Justice Brandeis, U.S. Supreme Court, 1890 
You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it. 
– Scott McNealy, Sun MicroSystems Co-Founder, 1999 
(quoted in Schwartz, 2001) 
 
The explosive growth of governmental surveillance technology to track the 
movement of individuals within public spaces has served to elevate civil liberties and 
privacy concerns. Defining privacy is critical to the legal framework that ensures the civil 
liberties granted to American citizens. As it applies to the government’s use of sensor 
technology to monitor the public movement of its citizens, it becomes an issue of 
relativity—what is private within the public arena? However, what privacy means in a 
world in which a variety of technology can continuously monitor individuals and their 
movement across public spaces has yet to be adequately defined, through either law or 
culture. Government and its citizens continue to grapple with defining privacy in an age 
of CCTV, GPS, sensor technology, smart phones, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and 
client loyalty registrations. Given the growing web of digital immersion, the privacy 
debate has been energized because what is “public,” and therefore not private, is 
undergoing a sea of change within modern society (Garfinkel, 2000, ch. 5). As such, the 
courts are left to interpret the cultural context afforded privacy in a rapidly evolving 
technological world. Absent sufficient definition and structure, the law cannot give full 
effect to privacy protections, subjective or objective.  
1. Defining Privacy 
Privacy reflects a “penumbra of rights and expectations” (Griswold v. 
Connecticut, p. 483). From a practical perspective, privacy is an umbrella term covering a 
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disparate range of concepts (Solove, 2006b, p. 483). Yet, little consensus exists as to 
what is actually being protected under the claims of a fundamental right of privacy 
(Taylor, 2011, p. 456). Webster’s definition of privacy hits three key concepts: seclusion, 
freedom from unwarranted intrusion, and secrecy (Merriam Webster, n.d.). Privacy has 
no single meaning, despite its status as a touchstone within U.S. culture, in part because 
intangible nature of privacy makes attempts at definition an exercise in subjectivity. As a 
result, the lack of consistent definition creates significant variance within the legal 
framework that serves to protect the variety of actions and interests that are defined as the 
privacy interests of U.S. citizens.  
2. Conceptual Privacy 
The malleable nature of privacy is what allows it to remain a viable concept both 
from a cultural and from a legal perspective. A society and its culture define privacy as 
the value of privacy is identified by and held within the culture that defines it (Taylor, 
2011, p. 456). Privacy standards, like fashion, evolve, and what at first seems invasive 
and uncomfortable, can ultimately become acceptable (Baker, 2010, pp. 314–316). Given 
the prevalence of technology in U.S. society, and how Americans use it, what has been 
traditionally deemed private may no longer be assumed as such, and vice versa, as what 
has traditionally been deemed public may be considered private. Therefore, the effort or 
value attached in trying to define privacy may be questionable given the overly broad 
context from which privacy definitions often derive (Solove, 2006b, pp. 477–564). The 
rapid evolution of technology contributes to the definition of privacy, and as with 
technology, defining what was does not assist in identifying what exists now.  
Traditional definitions of privacy are often centered on distinguishing between 
that which is public and that which is private, as first discussed by Plato (DeCew, 1997, 
p. 9). The private realm, generally equated with the home, has long been recognized 
within Western culture and stands for the right of freedom in association and thought 
(Gutwirth, 2002, p. 15). However, as with any right, society may limit the individual’s 
exercise of privacy rights. For example, the government may be granted authority to enter 
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a person’s home without the individual’s authority through the issuance of a judicially 
approved warrant granting a right of entry.  
Privacy is not merely an exercise in cultural definition, as it is also related to the 
individual’s state of being. Privacy may be used as a vehicle to protect a person’s 
relationships with others and for ensuring freedom of expression and choice (Peters, 
1999, pp. 115–120). Within this context, privacy becomes an issue of self-regulation 
inclusive of personal associations, outward conduct, and public disclosure (pp. 115–120). 
This concept of privacy as a state of self-determination is supported by Westin’s theory 
of the four states of privacy, under which privacy includes personal autonomy, emotional 
release, self-evaluation, and limited, controlled communications (Zoufal, 2008, p. 71). 
Therefore, privacy also translates to a self-identified, active role for the individual in 
maintaining privacy through the control of his individual’s self and communications.  
Technology and the use of sensors by the government to conduct mass 
surveillance, raises privacy concerns because it pushes the public/private boundaries. As 
the use of sensor technology expands, privacy in the traditional sense becomes more 
difficult to achieve in that the individual may not control the capture of personal images 
or other PII, nor retain control over dissemination of the data captured. For example, 
CCTV is ubiquitous in many large cities (Cameron, Kolodinski, May, & Williams, 2008, 
pp. 5–6). Capture of an individual’s image through CCTV becomes available for many 
uses subsequent. A well-known example occurred in the United Kingdom when an 
individual was filmed during a public suicide attempt. The captured video surveillance 
was then later widely disseminated, both in print and broadcast, with the individual 
identifiable, although some versions masked his facial features, as a demonstration of the 
success of the U.K.’s investment in CCTV (Bickel, Brinkley, & White, pp. 357–358). 
While the CCTV undoubtedly contributed to saving his life, the very personal action of 
the individual was not subject to widespread viewing, discussion, and debate.  
Within the United States, release of CCTV or LPR footage under a Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) inquiry provides individually identifying information that may 
be used to establish action, time, and location of individuals upon the public way, all 
without individual approval, and in some cases, even knowledge. Further, the 
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proliferation of surveillance technology may serve to chill expressive activity, as people 
tend to act with more restraint in engaging with other people or groups when they know 
they are being watched (Ozer & Schlosberg, p. 6). As control over a person’s personal 
images and actions are increasingly removed from the individual, privacy concerns over 
government’s mass surveillance of the public movement of its citizens will continue to 
grow, as will uncertainty as to how to define privacy within a digital world. 
The capability for continual mass surveillance by government through use of 
sensor technology brings into question whether privacy can be maintained in public. 
While the lore of anonymity within public areas remains; increasingly, what happens in 
public is captured, recorded, indexed, and is retrievable far beyond the original site of 
occurrence (Garfinkle, 2000, ch. 5). Location, (space), is an important factor for privacy, 
as it is sometimes defined as a bundle of interests affected by space, but not determined 
by space (Taylor, 2011, p. 457). Taylor’s communal view of privacy identifies four 
dimensions of privacy: space, time, action, and information, which are based upon 
context and provide the social value for secrecy, dignity, and autonomy in regards to the 
individual (p. 457). All four may affect privacy or only one of the communal privacy 
dimensions, but an individual reserves privacy in that which is not voluntarily disclosed 
within another social sphere (p. 457).  
Mass surveillance technology attacks the communal concept of privacy in that the 
data not only captures an individual’s travel to a location; it can be aggregated to derive a 
whole of information not previously accessible. For example, surveillance technology can 
be used to identify route of travel, frequency of travel, time, dates, type of location, and 
how often an individual enters a location. However, the availability of this information 
does not equate to a voluntary waiver of all privacy attached with the individual’s use of 
the facility and it does not release of all privacy dimensions that attach to the individual’s 
distinct actions for that location. Under the communal theory of privacy, certain privacy 
rights remain in place; for example, if the location were a medical facility, the individual 
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does not waive privacy as to medical conversation with the doctor, type of treatment, 
nature of illness, etc.20  
The growing capacity for individuated data arising out of the government’s 
expanded use of sensor technology to conduct mass surveillance of public movement is 
what brings forth concerns over the mosaic theory as discussed by the court in Maynard 
(United States v. Maynard, p. 562). Under the mosaic theory, which has its origination in 
national security intelligence, seemingly disparate items of information, although of 
limited value or information individually, can take on added significance when combined 
with other items of information (Pozen, 2005, pp. 629–630). Extrapolation of discrete 
data has long served to assuage the public when used for crime solving, which now 
generates growing privacy concerns because of mass surveillance.  
The expanding role of government into the private lives of its citizens has further 
eroded the concept of privacy as a measure of self-determination. Control over 
information about an individual is a critical privacy component, as is the degree of access 
that others have to the information, regardless of who controls it (Nissbaum, 2010, p. 71). 
Privacy is also identified as the right of access, or lack thereof, to personal information 
(Garfinkel, 2000, p. 4). Prior to the mid-19th century, the collection of PII data by the 
government was generally limited to the recording of the birth, marriage, and death of 
individuals (National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 1977, p. 4). PII records 
contained limited information, and afforded minimal outside access, as they were often 
only available and stored locally (Solove, 2002, p. 1139). However, over time, as 
citizens’ interaction with the government has expanded, the government generates and 
retains significant amounts of PII (Constance, 1995, p. 399). Both the federal and state 
governments develop, maintain, and access detailed PII records as a result of the various 
transactions between governments and its citizens (National Criminal Justice Reference 
Service, 1977, p. 5). As society becomes more dependent upon the data generated and 
                                                 
20 Should the location be a facility for specific treatment, say alcohol rehabilitation, then the 
conversation may not matter much. A FOIA request could be used to identify a significant amount of 
information for the individual who repeatedly travels to the location. Therefore, it would beg the question 
as to whether a privacy right attaches.  
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maintained by government, technology supplies the ability to access and use PII data 
easily, which in turn, feeds the demand for more information.  
Privacy is also defined as an expectation of limiting accessibility to a individual’s 
personal information (Solove, 2002, p. 1140). Voluminous data, once sheltered within 
file cabinets of local government offices, are now readily available, often for purposes 
unrelated to their origination (Salzmann, 2000, p. 356). Disclosure and discussion of the 
status of a person’s bank account may be appropriate with a tax professional, but takes on 
a different context if said person’s subordinates in the workplace are discussing the 
information (Nissbaum, 1998, p. 20). Yet, the detailed PII developed by government is 
now an easily disseminated commodity, given the expanding capacity of technology 
(Solove, 2002, p. 1139).  
Additionally, public policy, often through legislative action, facilitates the 
commodification of record information under FOIA, and a myriad of other complex state 
and local laws predicated upon public disclosure of government documents (Solove, 
2002, p. 1139). Often, the PII contained within public documents is secondary to the 
document itself in regards to the FOIA production. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized the privacy impact of FOIA requests for aggregated data. In United States 
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, the respondents had 
submitted a FOIA to the FBI for the disclosure of the rap sheets compiling the criminal 
records for certain individuals (United States Department of Justice v. Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of Press). The U.S. Supreme Court ruled against the FOIA 
request, based upon the privacy exception, and identified that the subjects had a privacy 
interest in the “aggregated” information, despite the individual pieces of information, the 
arrests, being a matter of public record (p. 764). Although the “individual events in those 
summaries [were] matters of public record,” the Court upheld the FBI’s invocation of the 
privacy exception to the FOIA by holding the subjects had a privacy interest in the 
aggregated “whole” distinct from their interest in the “bits of information” of which it 
was composed (p. 764). The court found that disclosure of such information would 
subject the individual to an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy (p. 764).  
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Aggregated surveillance data remains subject to FOIA absent certain exceptions. 
Don Zoufal, an electronic surveillance privacy expert, has noted that with LPR data, if 
the data does not compromise a criminal investigation, local governments may make any 
data retained by the system publicly available under FOIA laws (Harwood, 2010). LPR 
data, in turn, provides PII as to location, time, and actions of individuals to whomever 
inquires. Therefore, the potential for even private citizens to track the public movement 
of individuals using governmental surveillance technology is not inconceivable. Nor are 
the individual privacy interests generally considered when the government responds to 
FOIA—particularly if the individual targeted by the requesting party is not known or 
identified by the governmental agency responding to the FOIA.  
Mass data collection is not restricted to the government. Private entities, including 
employers, banks, cellular telephone companies, and even retailers, such as grocery 
stores, collect significant amounts of PII (Committee on Technical and Privacy 
Dimensions of Information for Terrorism Prevention and Other National Goals, National 
Research Council, 2008, p. 121). In that information collection is a growing component 
of the digital economy, private sector data collection also has significant implications for 
personal privacy (p. 121). It has been shown that Americans are willing to disclose 
private information provided sufficient benefit attaches (Peters, 1999, p. 115). Often, 
disclosure becomes a question of relative worth—is it worth it to an individual to disclose 
PII to receive benefits, such as access to a social networking site, discounts on groceries, 
or free software?  
It is a given that the knowing and voluntary disclosure of PII data is the 
consumer’s decision right (Taylor, 2011, p. 457). However, the collection of PII data 
within the private sector is largely unregulated (Nissbaum, 2010, p. 45). Much of the 
aggregated data generated by sensor technology, and developed and retained by the data 
industry, are subject to disclosure without permission or knowledge of the original, 
disclosing party (Solove, 2002, p. 1140). If nothing else, the growth in digital data 
collection and dissemination of information has affected reasonable expectations of 
privacy, in that such disclosures have made privacy invasion more probable (Peters, 
2009, p. 115). Subsequent identification of impermissible PII disclosures become 
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challenging, if not unlikely, as limited legal protections for privacy and PII exist. Federal 
statutes, such as the Privacy Act of 1974, which limits the government’s use of PII, apply 
only to federal agencies. Other laws, such as HIPAA and The Video Privacy Protection 
Act, have limited privacy protections, medical information, and video rentals, 
respectively. However, the private sector remains largely unregulated in regards to access 
and use of PII. 
The public/private boundaries that guide privacy determinations further break 
down in an era in which the social spheres of public and private life have increasing 
intersection. Depending upon the context under which the privacy definition is sought, 
privacy transmutes with the mores of the society filtering the definition (Gutwirth, 2002, 
pp. 20, 29). Privacy has traditionally been seen as an individual hermeneutic, which 
centers on freedom from excessive intrusion into an individual’s life with personal 
control over the degree of PII disclosed (Committee on Technical and Privacy 
Dimensions of Information for Terrorism Prevention and Other National Goals, National 
Research Council, 2008, pp. 27–28). However, as technology becomes more advanced, 
privacy discussions become less focused on the philosophy of privacy and more upon the 
impact of sensor surveillance (Masiello, 2003, p. 9).  
Today’s world is one in which everything is linked to everything else (Barabasi, 
2003, p. 7). In many urban areas of the United States, merely driving across public streets 
discloses potential PII through a variety of surveillance technology in use, inclusive of 
CCTV, LPR, and traffic cameras. Given the explosive growth of the ability to individuate 
data through the data mining of governmental and private databases, a growing 
disconnect occurs between reality and existing individual expectations of privacy and 
established boundaries (p. 167). As mass surveillance of public areas grows within the 
United States, the concept of individual decision and control over PII, and therefore 
privacy, becomes less of a driver for defining privacy than does society’s reasonable 
expectations in determining what is private and what is not. 
In a digital age, where voluminous amounts of information are disclosed in the 
execution of mundane tasks, secrecy may not be the prerequisite to privacy (United States 
v. Jones), with Justice Sotomayor concurring (p. 957). In fact, Justice Marshall in his 
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dissent in Smith, succinctly stated, “Privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed 
absolutely or not at all” (Smith v. Maryland)21 Given the growth of surveillance 
technology, defining privacy as a function of personal control and reserve may be 
misplaced given the expanding technological mashup and use of technology to conduct 
mass surveillance by the government. This tension, the sharing of private information for 
limited personal benefit versus the lack of data protection with the potential for 
subsequent commodification of PII data, is accelerating as the technology’s capacity for 
sharing information grows.  
3. Privacy as a Legal Concept 
Various legal mechanisms, both statutory and constitutional seek to protect 
privacy within the United States and internationally, as a matter of comparative law. In 
that privacy is a compilation of a variety of interests, legal address of privacy is often 
specific to the interest identified (Solove, 2006b, p. 481). Within the United States, the 
Fourth Amendment is the primary legal vehicle for limiting the government’s intrusion 
upon the privacy of its citizens. However, much of the constitutional-based privacy law 
derives from autonomy privacy, or independence in making personal decisions, with 
minimal subsequent focus on, or definition for information privacy, or the constitutional 
right to avoid the disclosure of personal information (Solove, 2006a, pp. 23–24). Given 
the growing impact of the information industry, this lack of definition and focus on 
information privacy creates a gap in Fourth Amendment doctrine and has a significant 
impact on real privacy.  
In addition to constitutional law, state and federal laws provide a patchwork of 
statutory privacy protections (McCullagh, 2001, p. 133). Given the specificity of statutes, 
often less outcome variation exists for privacy interests protected under statute, than that 
seen under federal constitutional law, which is fact based. However, existing statutory 
protections are often limited and targeted to specific interests, such as medical privacy 
                                                 
21 Smith stood for the validation of the third party doctrine by the U.S. Supreme Court. The release of 
information by the defendant in using negotiable instruments to conduct his business was found to be a 
voluntary release of personal information, and the government’s subsequent search of those records did not 
implicate Fourth Amendment protections (Smith v. Maryland). 
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under HIPAA. As such, federal constitutional law remains the primary legal vehicle by 
which to address impermissible governmental intrusions upon the privacy of its citizens. 
Comparative law provides for insight into legal privacy principles, as legal 
recognition of privacy is not unique to the United States. Privacy rights within many 
western European countries exist under both constitutional and statutory laws. Given the 
often shared democratic and human rights principles shared by the European Union and 
the United States, comparative law analysis provides for a review of the legal and policy 
controls in use in the European Union to help inform policy makers and legal 
development within the United States. However, unlike the United States, many 
European countries offer clearly defined privacy protections for their citizens. For 
example, The Netherlands’ Constitution distinguishes the privacy rights of the individual 
and those attached to the home (The Netherlands Constitution, Article 10; Article 12. 
1983). Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, (ECHR), guarantees the 
right to private life and family life, but it also provides for restrictions of this right under 
certain circumstances (Morariu, 2009, p. 47). The European Union also has specific 
protections for PII and data privacy. The Data Retention Directive, (Directive 
2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006), provides 
for a variety of protections for the collection and transmission of PII through electronic 
means, which makes the provisions applicable to other European Union member states 
(Article 4 & Article 5). An examination of comparative law allows analysis of what 
statutory data protection, including data privacy with oversight of both government and 
private entities, and other privacy law, provides for individual privacy protections within 
other democratic nations.  
4. Constitutional Privacy  
While the U.S. Constitution does not contain a general right of privacy, one of the 
more controversial areas of U.S. Constitutional law in recent times has been privacy 
(Chemerinsky, 2006, p. 644). The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that while the Fourth 
Amendment does not provide for a general constitutional right to privacy, it does provide 
for individual privacy protections by creating boundaries between the citizen and the state 
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(Katz v. United States, pp. 350–351). While the government’s interference with the 
privacy of its citizens is generally governed under the Fourth Amendment, the courts 
have also identified limited rights of privacy within other constitutional provisions. For 
example, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy exists 
within the U.S. Constitution (Roe v. Wade). However, the Supreme Court remains 
steadfast in that not every governmental intrusion creates constitutional concern (Skinner 
v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association). As a result, Constitutional legal doctrine on 
privacy is focused on the interaction between government and its citizens and what 
degree of governmental intrusion warrants privacy protections. The Supreme Court has 
recognized privacy protections for personal autonomy, identified as matters involving the 
most intimate and personal choices a person may make; those decisions central to 
personal dignity and autonomy, under the right of liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment (Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey). While a variety of 
privacy interests have been recognized by the courts, the Fourth Amendment remains the 
primary vehicle used to define privacy interests challenged by the government’s use of 
mass surveillance technology. 
In Griswold, which pre-dated the Katz decision by two years, the Supreme Court 
held that while the Constitution does not explicitly provide a right to privacy, the First 
Amendment contains a penumbra of grants that protect individual privacy from 
governmental intrusion (Griswold v. Connecticut, p. 483). In Griswold, the Court was 
faced with a challenge to the state’s right to control information and access to birth 
control (p. 480).22 Finding that the right of access as a right to information that impact 
individual autonomy, the Supreme Court held that the state may not, consistently with the 
spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge to its citizen. 
(p. 482). Therefore, while holding that the Constitution does not provide an express right 
of privacy, the Supreme Court continues to find specific, limited privacy protections to 
exist in various portions of the Constitution. 
                                                 
22 The Griswold Court also held that the Court does not sit as a super-legislature to determine the 
wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions, 
advancing its concerns about the appropriate role and process of the Court under the separation of powers 
doctrine (Griswold v. Connecticut). 
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A constitutional right of privacy has also been recognized within the Due Process 
provisions of the Constitution. The right of liberty, as granted under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, was the basis for the Court’s decision in 
Roe v. Wade (Chemerinsky, 2006, p. 649). In Roe v. Wade, the issue before the Court as a 
challenge to the constitutionality of Texas’ criminal abortion laws, which severely limited 
access to the medical procedure, except for purpose of saving the mother’s life (Roe v. 
Wade). The Court, in ruling that that the Texas law was unconstitutional, held that 
personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty,’ are constitutionally protected (p. 152). The privacy right inherent in the right to 
liberty under the Due Process Clause gives citizens the right to engage in private conduct 
without the intervention of government (Lawrence et al. v. Texas, p. 578). Therefore, 
limited privacy rights are also found within the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
The privacy impact of technology and data storage has also been of issue for the 
U.S. Supreme Court for many years. The Supreme Court has also distinguished between 
information privacy and autonomy privacy, the right of individual privacy and the right to 
make decisions about the individual’s personal life (Whalen v. Roe, pp. 599–601). In 
1977, the Whalen court identified concerns over computer-generated data and the implicit 
threat to privacy arising from the government’s ability to aggregate the vast amounts of 
information available through computerized data banks and other government files 
(Whalen v. Roe). The issue in Whalen concerned whether the automation of previously 
manual prescription records and the sharing of that information for billing purposes 
created a constitutional privacy invasion (pp. 600–601). The Court held that the mere 
computerization of past practice, in this case automating prescription records, did not 
create any constitutional privacy violations (pp. 600–601). However, while the Court 
raised “the threat to privacy implicit” in computerized government files and data banks, it 
found that data collection by government is generally covered by a regulatory or statutory 
duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures and such regulations are sufficient to protect the 
privacy issues raised before the Court (pp. 605–607). Early court decisions on privacy 
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demonstrate a willingness to find constitutional privacy protections for personal conduct, 
and demonstrate some recognition of the privacy impact that technology generates. 
While the U.S. Supreme Court continues to express concerns over the privacy 
impact of technology and mass data aggregation, it is no longer a hypothetical concern 
and daily mass surveillance continues to grow. The government’s use of mass 
surveillance technology in U.S. society has a significant impact on privacy expectations 
and becomes a meme in defining privacy. As conditions change, so must the thought 
processes that have defined past conditions (Parfit, 1986, p. 85). The law’s capacity to 
address the privacy impact of new technology occurs through the lens of socially 
accepted uses of technology and the dynamics of communication and information 
transmission (City of Ontario v. Quon, p. 2629). The Constitution, in protecting against 
abuses of power, must adapt to a changing world, otherwise “rights declared in words 
might be lost in reality” (Brandeis, & Warren, 1890, p. 194). Therefore, the privacy 
issues generated by the government’s use of sensor technology not only affect privacy as 
a matter of context and cultural definition, but the omnipresence of sensor technology 
also affects the constitutional and legal definition of privacy, particularly as it relates to 
reasonable expectations of privacy as held by the individual. 
B. THE TECHNOLOGY  
Integral to the concept of privacy in a digital age is understanding why this is an 
issue that continues to vex, despite fairly well developed cultural mores on privacy. 
Evolving technologies present new privacy frontiers, and the intersection of privacy, law 
and technology is a mashup of significant consequence for civil liberties and public 
safety agencies. The government’s use of sensor technology continues to expand as it is 
seen as capable of bringing greater efficiencies and strengthening evidence in criminal 
investigations (Wilson & Woodard, 1987, Foreword; Smith, 2011, pp. 1–2). The 
downside to the use of newer technology is its significant cost, unproven efficacy and 
reliability, and the potential for negative impact on civil liberties (Government 
Accounting Office, 2011; Chicago’s Video Surveillance Cameras, 2011). Regardless, the 
privacy concerns associated with the government’s use of technology can serve to inform 
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policy makers on how to harness technology appropriately for public safety purposes 
while ensuring civil liberties remain protected.  
1. Sensor Technologies 
New technology is continuously being developed and tested by the government, 
in part, based upon the belief that technology is a critical component in facilitating public 
safety (Evolution and Development of Police Technology, 1998). The Department of 
Defense (DoD) uses unmanned aircraft systems that are reliant upon sensor technologies 
to identify and attack targets overseas, as well as to conduct intelligence and cargo 
missions (Dempsey, 2010, pp. 1–4). DHS has invested in biometric technology to 
identify foreign visitors and to protect U.S. borders through technology, such as U-VISIT 
and video surveillance (Borkowski, 2011). The Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) uses scanners, biometrics and explosives trace detection technology in seeking to 
secure air transportation (Transportation Security Administration, n.d.). Law enforcement 
uses the automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS), CCTV, LPR, and RFID 
technologies in the furtherance of public safety (Casanova & Roberts, 2012; Woodard, 
1987; Perin, 2011; National Institute of Justice, 2003). However, while the specific types 
of surveillance technology used by the government may change overtime, the privacy 
concerns brought forth by new technology often remain consistent.  
a. Automated Fingerprint Identification System—Old Technology, 
Same Issues 
The privacy issues presented by the expanding network of sensor 
technology are similar to those faced during the introduction of AFIS in the late 1980s. 
Not only are fingerprints the seminal biometric identifier, but the AFIS technology is a 
precursor to the sensor technology of LPR and FRT. Over 30 years ago, AFIS was 
identified as one of the greatest technology developments in law enforcement (Wilson & 
Woodard, 1987, p. 1). As with many of today’s sensor technologies, AFIS increased 
efficiencies through the use of technology and facilitated quick, efficient sharing of 
fingerprint data among law enforcement agencies. AFIS is the largest biometric database 
in the world (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). Despite the store of biometric data 
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that allows for rapid identification of individuals, public concern over AFIS’ privacy 
impact is rarely raised. Little public discussion occurs around AFIS’ privacy impact 
today, despite a growing range of verification and identification products for the 
government and private sector that rely upon fingerprint technology (Zoufal, 2008, p. 
106).  
Biometrics establish identity through PII data, which in the case of AFIS, 
the biometric data are the fingerprints.23 Biometric systems do not make definitive 
identification, but rather probabilistic identification (NSTC, 2006, p. 8). In other words, 
the system makes a determination of probability of match based on the biometric 
characteristics supplied (p. 8). The biometric data entry into the database is unique to the 
individual who supplies the data, which allows for the identification and match.  
AFIS also shares similar technology with LPR and FRT. For identification 
to occur, the database must contain the comparison data to make a positive identification 
—as it does not generate identification of its own (Fisher & Fisher, 2004. pp. 5–6). The 
identification comparison derives from an algorithm that processes the submitted data 
against the existing database, which for AFIS, consists of a database that includes more 
than 66 million sets of fingerprints (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). The true 
identification, e.g., the match of the individual to the fingerprint, is made through 
subsequent review and confirmation of the probable match produced by the AFIS 
algorithm (Wilson & Woodard, 1987, p. 6). Therefore, as with LPR and FRT, AFIS 
leverages technology to process the data for comparison in a timelier, automated process.  
AFIS facilitates the identification of individuals when little other 
information or evidence is available (Constance, 1995, p. 401). While the ease of 
identification may create a level of discomfort for civil liberties advocates, technology 
does not create constitutional privacy issues, as merely automating a manual process does 
not raise Fourth Amendment protections (Whalen v. Roe, pp. 600–601).  
                                                 
23 Fingerprints are considered individual identifiers, given the unique ridge patterns of the fingers of 
humans (Wilson & Woodard, 1987, p. 5). 
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AFIS’ evolution is relevant in a review of the privacy issues generated by 
surveillance technology because when AFIS was first introduced, it generated legal and 
public policy privacy issues. For example, privacy concerns were raised about AFIS 
because it allowed for the identification of individuals with minimal information (Wilson 
& Woodard, 1987, p. 15). Other concerns were focused on gaps in the data because of 
existing laws and policies as to who could be fingerprinted and when (p. 15). The 
subsequent use and retention of AFIS data for other than criminal purposes generated 
additional privacy concerns, which parallel concerns present with mass surveillance 
technology currently in use (Constance, 1995; Goodman v. Liebovitz). Today, the use of 
AFIS and its biometric identification information is well entrenched within the public 
safety arena, as well as within the private sector for a variety of identifications uses.  
The identification ability of technology and the government’s use of 
sensor technology to conduct mass surveillance have expanded significantly since the 
advent of AFIS. Many of the sensor technologies in use by the government today share 
similar data processing capabilities with AFIS that facilitate the identification of 
individuals. As such, their use by the government raises analogous concerns over public 
policy and privacy concerns, as AFIS did initially. Therefore, as history has shown with 
the evolution of AFIS, current concerns over the intrusion of newer sensor technologies 
may be much ado about nothing. Then again, the next advance in technology may create 
even larger privacy concerns, given the greater capacity of many modern technologies to 
individuate the data collected. 
b. Global Positioning Satellite 
GPS has become a significant privacy issue given its prevalent use by law 
enforcement to conduct surveillance of criminal suspects. Unlike a tracking beeper, GPS 
is not merely a tracking device as it provides data over time, distance, and location 
(Pham, 2011, p. 3). Originally developed for military purposes, DoD maintains and 
controls GPS24 (GPS.gov, 2011). The GPS system consists of three segments: the space 
                                                 
24 GPS is a term specific to the U.S. navigation system. The generic term is global navigation system. 
For example, in Russia, the navigation system is called GLONASS, for Global Navigation Satellite System 
(International Committee on Global Satellite Systems, 2010). 
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segment, the control segment, and the user segment with the U.S. Air Force controlling 
the space and control segments (GPS.gov, 2011). The space component uses the one-way 
signals of 30 operating satellites that give the current GPS satellite position and time 
(Pham, 2011, p. 3). The control component consists of worldwide monitor and control 
stations (p. 3). In addition, the user component consists of GPS receiver equipment, 
which identifies the three-dimensional position and time for the location based on the 
signals received from the GPS satellites (ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location 
Based Technologies and Services, 2010, pp. 38–39).  
The government’s use of GPS has capitalized upon its location 
identification capabilities. From a law enforcement perspective, in addition to its use for 
surveillance purposes, GPS has been used for a variety of purposes, from tracking law 
enforcement officers’ locations in the field to identifying the location of callers for 911 
services (Aerospace, 2005). Some states are using GPS technology to track police 
vehicles, including Arizona, Mississippi, and, New York (Ferraresi, 2005; McCullough, 
2011; K. Moore, 2008). Some law enforcement agencies have put GPS into the portable 
radios carried by the officers individually (Ferraresi, 2005; McCullough, 2011; K. Moore, 
2008).  
GPS’ ability to constantly track movement, even remotely, has proven to 
be a significant force multiplier for law enforcement surveillance investigations. To 
conduct surveillance, law enforcement officers need only to place a tracking device on 
the vehicle of interest, and its movement, location, and time of activity are consistently 
transmitted to a remote receiver (Jallad, 2010, p. 357). Given the installation of a GPS 
unit on a vehicle requires minimal intrusion and resources, the driver of the vehicle is 
often unaware of the tracking device (Shah, 2009, pp. 284–285).  
Not all GPS tracking units are the same and offer varying levels of 
information. Some GPS units track movement in real time, while others allow remote 
login and access capacity to movements that may be stored on a database (Shah, 2009, 
pp. 284–285). Additionally, GPS technology may also be integrated with existing 
dispatch systems and even LPRs (pp. 284–285). As a result, while police surveillance 
becomes more efficient and less resource intensive using sensor technology, such as GPS, 
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it becomes more invasive, in that it is generally continuous and allows detailed 
recordation of a vehicle’s movement over time, space, and distance. 
GPS tracking is not limited to vehicles in that most, if not all, cellular 
telephones now contain GPS technology (ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location 
Based Technologies and Services, 2010, pp. 7–10, 12–31). Unlike a standalone GPS 
tracking device, the GPS unit is carried by the individual with the cellular telephone, 
which allows for tracking the individual’s location, including within a private home 
(ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services, 2010, 
p. 31). GPS data can be stored and analyzed historically, as well as be mapped through 
various software applications (Shah, 2009, p. 285). Further, GPS data can be linked or 
merged with other databases, inclusive of LPR technology (StarChase Covert Tracking 
System, n.d.). As a result, a more robust dataset of the individual’s movement is derived. 
With GPS, the traditional concept of following a suspect becomes a new type of 
continual surveillance that comes with digital analytic tools that process current and 
historical data, as well as linkages with other data sets, that provides for a broader scope 
of surveillance than anything seen heretofore (The Constitution Project, 2011, p. 4). 
Further, GPS cellular telephone information is capable of tracking an individual’s every 
movement, even that into private homes, because the telephone is carried by the 
individual, and, therefore, provides greater detail than possible ever before (pp. 1–2).  
c. Cellular Triangulation Technology 
Cellular telephone technology can derive location information 
independently of GPS, through triangulation location technology, known as network 
based location technology (ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based 
Technologies and Services, p. 22).25 Such technology has been used to track user 
location, albeit only to the area of coverage for the tower for cellular triangulation, in 
further aide of law enforcement investigations (Lichtblau, 2012b). Under E911 systems, 
                                                 
25 Each area of cell coverage operates on a path from base station to the cellular phone, which even 
when not in use by an individual, sends out registration signals, usually every seven seconds, or when 
signal strength fails, by way of the reverse path. The registration signals contain the mobile phone’s 
specific code identification, phone number, and home system ID (Glover, 2007, p. 1549). 
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emergency location features in cell phones make use of GPS either in the cellular 
telephone or through network based location technology to identify the location of the 
cellular telephone accurately (Clark, Langer, & Powell, 2010, p. 73).  
The criminal investigative value of triangulation technology is significant. 
For example, a common practice within law enforcement known as “dumping” allows 
officers to receive all cellular telephone subscriber location information for any cellular 
phone identified as being near a location at a certain time and date (Lichtblau, 2012b). 
Triangulation technology has been used to track criminal and victim locations (Lichtblau, 
2012b). However, dumping is not discrete, and it identifies all users in a certain location 
for the time and dates identified as parameters of the search. Nor is it as accurate as GPS. 
However, as with GPS, it raises privacy concerns in that the individual is carrying the 
tracking device and may be tracked without the knowledge or disclosure by the 
government. Regardless of whether GPS is attached by the government to a car, or if it is 
carried by the individual within personally owned technology, Fourth Amendment 
determinations that continue to be based upon the use and type of technology, the how, 
rather than the privacy issues of those subject to surveillance, the what, constitutional law 
will continue to fall short of the needed guidance for both government and civil 
libertarians. 
d. Automated License Plate Readers 
LPR is a relatively new technology that generates tension between the 
competing interests of government efficiency and individual privacy. LPR technology 
arose out of the UK’s desire to better track and identify vehicles within the United 
Kingdom given the government’s concerns over terrorism in the early 1980s (Perin, 
2011, p. 1). Within the United States, LPR is used for routine law enforcement 
surveillance by various agencies, including the Chicago Police Department, the Los 
Angeles Police Department, the Virginia State Police, and a host of other law 
enforcement agencies (IACP, 2009, pp. 1–3). While LPR use is newer to the United 
States, it is being assimilated rapidly. For example, within Chicago, LPR is not only used 
by law enforcement, but it is also used for issuing parking violations for street 
 56 
sweeping.26 Syracuse, New York is mounting cameras to school buses to capture traffic 
violations, e.g., cars passing the school bus when stopped (Mason, 2008). Some 
governmental entities also use LPR for administrative purposes, such as parking tickets 
(Manson, 2008). While LPR technology shares similar structure and components, the 
policies that control when and how data is collected and stored create variance in LPR 
data and the resulting privacy impact. 
LPRs are a form of video surveillance with a targeted function, to identify 
license plate information (Obeid et al., 2007, p. 486). All LPR systems share the same 
basic technology structure, with the overall quality of the images affected by the quality 
of the component parts (p. 486). LPR uses video camera images to identify license plate 
character information (p. 486). LPR cameras can be fixed or mobile (IACP, 2009, p. 21). 
Fixed post cameras are generally based upon traffic flow or some other determinant, and 
portable cameras are generally mounted on police vehicles (p. 21). However, portable 
LPR is also being deployed as a means to allow fluid response to identified needs and to 
limit the drain on law enforcement officers from the field needed to monitor and await 
response from the LPR data hits (Prototype Portable LPR System Provides Options, 
2012, p. 1). Portable LPRs are generally mounted to a moving platform that can remain 
as a standalone LPR but be moved as needed, such as a trailer (p. 1).  
LPRs have five general components: 1) a sensor that provides intake for 
the data and reduces it to a standardized template and data storage format, 2) the 
processing algorithm that takes the input data and formats it for analysis, 3) the data 
storage, 4) the analytic algorithm that processes the data against the outside, or match 
data, and 5) the determination of probability (NSTC, 2006, pp. 3–5). As seen with other 
sensor technology, the actual match, e.g., confirmation of identity, occurs through 
subsequent review of the probable identification, either through human review or through 
technology (pp. 3–5). 
                                                 
26 The LPR camera system is mounted on the street sweeper, which then photographs the license plate 
number and a picture of the vehicle that was not removed, as required under City ordinance, from the street 
during street sweeping days. A parking violation notice is then mailed to the identified to the registered 
owner of the vehicle, information that is not kept within the LPR system itself (Manson, 2008). 
 57 
LPRs use a recording device, usually a high-speed camera, which then 
feeds data to the algorithm that converts the license plate data so it can be read against the 
supporting database (IACP, 2009, p. 5). Once the image is captured, the system utilizes 
character recognition to define the license numbers for the consistent reading of the data 
(Obeid et al., 2007, p. 486). Both sets of information, the image, and the subsequent 
comparison within the database, are achieved through the use of algorithms to extract and 
identify the data (p. 486).27  
The accuracy within LPR systems is dependent upon the quality of the 
captured image for the validation of the license plate information (IACP, 2009, p. 5). 
Various factors, from lighting to environmental conditions, affect image quality, which is 
why LPR cameras generally use both regular and infrared camera images to enhance data 
collection (p. 5). Many LPR systems are also linked with GPS that allows capture of the 
time and location information in addition to the license plate information (p. 6). Linkage 
to other databases and systems extends the depth and breadth of the LPR monitoring 
capacity rather than just capture of a license plate image. 
Assuming accuracy within the underlying technology, the identification 
probability of a LPR image is only as good as the data within the comparison system 
(NSTC, 2006, p. 11). LPR data is run against a comparison database, which generally 
contains license plate information, the comparison data. Most agencies utilize the 
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) databases, which are maintained by the 
Department of Justice (National Crime Information Center).28 Local law enforcement 
                                                 
27 Algorithms, generally proprietary, perform optical character recognition using six consistent 
functions to identify a license plate including:  
1. Plate localization, which finds and isolates the plate contained in the picture;  
2. Plate orientation and sizing, which compensates for the skew of the plate and adjusts the 
dimensions to the appropriate size and shape;  
3. Normalization, which adjusts the brightness and contrast of the image;  
4. Character segmentation, which finds the individual characters on the plates;  
5. Optical character recognition, which converts the image into actual characters; and  
6. Syntactical/Geometrical analysis, which checks characters and positions against state based law 
or internal agency policy to identify the state issuing the license plate (IACP, 2009, pp. 5–6). 
28 NCIC is a national database of criminal justice information available only to law enforcement, and 
includes information, such as criminal record history information, arrest warrants, and stolen vehicle 
information (NSTC, 2006, p. 11). 
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agencies usually maintain a separate, local database, where they can add additional 
information, pursuant to the policies established by the agency that owns the LPR system 
(Perin, 2011, p. 2). For example, local databases may also include local warrants 
associated with the owners of the license plates, the validity of the driver’s license for the 
owner of the license plate, or other priorities as identified by the entering agency (p. 2).  
LPR systems allow for easy access to information already in the public 
realm and aggregates it for analysis and dissemination (IACP, 2009, p. 12). While the 
LPR system does not contain PII, it associates the LPR data with other databases that 
then can provide the ability to individuate the information and obtain PII (pp. 9–10). The 
more linkages of PII to license plate information, the more individuated the data 
becomes, and thereby, increases privacy concerns. Further, LPR’s ability to access and 
link to information and its significant storage capabilities are of growing concern to some 
civil libertarians given the lack of consistent policies for database retention and sharing 
(Johnson, 2011).  
In that as a matter of function LPR requires linkage with other databases 
to make probable identifications, it creates privacy concerns. The initial LPR data 
captures the license plate image, and has no intrinsic value; rather, it needs to be linked to 
another data source, such as plate registration information to derive investigative value. 
For example, within the United Kingdom, license plate reader technology, called 
Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR), has been integrated into larger databases 
including the target hardening and the security plan known as the “ring of steel” within 
London (Coaffe, 2004, pp. 204–209). All the ANPR data for England, Scotland, and 
Wales is stored within one centralized computer database (Bilton, 2009). Not only does 
the United Kingdom have a large, aggregated database for vehicle identification, it also 
inputs all criminal offenders wanted anywhere within the United Kingdom (Bilton, 
2009).  
LPR is designed for database extraction and sharing; thus, its aggregation 
capacity is inherent within the technology design. However, LPR technology can be used 
to preserve, or least enhance, privacy. Some LPR technology has the ability to blur the 
facial and license plate images captured by LPR automatically through pixilation (Malin, 
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Newton, & Sweeney, 2003). However, at this time, no simple way exists to classify the 
features of an image into automated data rules for general masking techniques (p. 21).  
 
Even with masking technology, comparison between shared databases can still occur 
through the underlying data while limiting the government’s intrusion into the privacy of 
the individuals under surveillance.  
Even absent technology, LPR systems can be programmed to limit privacy 
concerns through codified retention and use policies. For example, during the tour of 
duty, the South Portland, ME police department allows vehicle license plates to be 
entered by officers for a variety of reasons, but purges these entries at the end of their 
shift (Perin, 2011, p. 2). In addition to purge programming, policy can serve to limit 
retention and individual privacy impact, even if technology cannot do it independent of 
human intervention. Given the HLS field’s interest and appetite for data analysis within 
multiple databases, data mining through LPRs becomes a growing area of concern for 
privacy advocates (Strandburg, 2008, p. 476).  
e. Radio Frequency Identification  
RFID is a form of sensor technology known as automatic identification 
and data capture (AIDC) technology that uses electric or magnetic fields at programmed 
radio frequencies to transmit information associated with a tag (Barber, Bunn, Eydt, 
Karygiann, & Phillips, 2007, p. ES-1). Other auto-id systems include technologies, such 
as barcodes, smart cards, and optical character recognition systems (Brito, 2004, p. 2). 
RFID has a variety of uses, including asset management, inventory tracking, security 
access control; digital payments, and even for personal identification (Barber et al., 2007, 
pp. 3-1—3-6).  
A RFID system has two main components, the RFID tag and the RFID 
reader (Anagnostopoulos, Anagnostopoulos, Giannoulos, Kayafas, Kolias, & Loumos, 
2010, p. 2). The tag contains a digital number associated with the physical object to 
which it is attached (p. 2). The reader is generally connected to a backend database and 
operates as a radio transceiver that communicates with the transponder or tag via radio 
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waves (Brito, 2004, p. 4). RFID tags are always “listening” for radio signals sent by 
RFID readers, and when the appropriate query is received, the tag responds by 
transmitting the unique ID code stored in its memory back to the reader (p. 4). While 
RFID technology is similar to barcode technology in that it provides tracking for 
specified objects, it also provides greater information value because it can read the tag 
outside the line of sight, has greater data capacity, enhanced reading distance, and the 
ability to link tag information to a variety of databases (Barber et al., 2007, p. 2–1). RFID 
technology reduces the need for human involvement in the identification process and can 
record historical information regarding the movement or location of the tagged item (p. 
2–1). RFID is a strong technology for deriving location information, provided the system 
is maximized for read capacity, signal strength, and time of scanning (Anagnostopoulos 
et al., 2010, p. 2). 
RFID tags are either passive or active. Active tags have an independent 
power source and transmit signals autonomously over distance and time (Barber et al., 
2007, p. 2–5). Passive tags are cheaper and last longer, but require an external source for 
power and to transmit and record a signal (p. 2–5). Unlike other signal-based tracking 
systems, such as Wi-Fi tags or Bluetooth, RFID is relatively low cost (Anagnostopoulos 
et al., 2010, p. 3). The tradeoff for a simple, (cheaper), RFID system is that RFID tags 
can be cloned easily, absent cryptographic security measures, which may lead to 
economic and information loss (Seuschek 2010). Further, RFID shares similar signal 
degradation problems with other signal-based technology systems, including 
environmental interference, suitability of the location being tracked, and the need for 
proximity of the reader based on the system used (Anagnostopoulos et al., 2010, p. 3). 
Growing concern is increasing over the use, type, and security of RFID systems as they 
relate to individual privacy impact (Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), 
n.d.d.). 
The government uses RFID for a variety of purposes, including facilitating 
the management of the supply chain for emergencies and large-scale disasters (Seuschek, 
2010). The U.S. military uses RFID technology for inventory control, and tracking a 
range of items from uniforms to armored tanks (Brito, 2004, p. 13). RFID is growing in 
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use for toll collections and is used in states, such as Illinois, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and 
Maryland.29 Under the E-ZPass system, LPRs are mounted at the toll collection sites, to 
capture both front and rear license plate information (E-ZPass Group, n.d.). Users place 
the RFID-enabled toll transponder in the window of their vehicle that is subsequently 
read at the collection point and the retrieved information is fed into the appropriate 
database that deducts the toll from the user’s account by cross-referencing the license 
plate to the appropriate toll account (E-ZPass Group, n.d.).  
Document tracking is another possible use of RFID within the HLS field, 
as demonstrated by the Real ID (Electronic Privacy Information Center, 2008). The Real 
ID is essentially a plan for a national identification card and is seen as a means to 
enhance national security, guard against terrorists and illegal immigration (Electronic 
Privacy Information Center, 2008). Privacy advocates raise concerns to the contrary 
citing the lack of demonstrated need, historical aversion to national identification, and the 
PII creep of social security numbers (Electronic Privacy Information Center, 2008). 
While the National Real ID act remains subject to ongoing political debate,30 under the 
Western Hemisphere Initiative, (WHTI), the DHS has installed RFID readers at the top 
customs entry points to the United States to enable quicker entry processing of travelers 
to the United States (Napolitano, 2009). The majority of U.S. and Canadian citizens were 
already using WHTI-compliant documents at border crossings and over 950,000 RFID 
enabled passport cards have been distributed by the Department of State as of 2009 
(Napolitano, 2009). Despite privacy concerns, the use of RFID documents is growing. 
Several states are also using RFID technology in identification documents, 
including EDLs. These states include New York, Vermont, and Washington (Homeland 
Security, n.d.b.). The EDLs are imbedded with an RFID tag that signals a secure system 
                                                 
29 See http://www.ezpass.com/static/links/index.shtml for a listing of states using RFID technology 
under EZPass. 
30 Congress passed the REAL ID Act as part of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for 
Defense, the Global War on Terror and Tsunami Relief Act (P.L. 109-13) and it was signed into law by 
President Bush on May 11, 2005 and effective January 15, 2013. “The REAL ID Act established minimum 
standards for state-issued driver’s licenses and identity documents that are used for Federal purposes, such 
as to enter a Federal building or a nuclear power plant or to board an airplane.” (Secure Identification, 
2012). Controversy continues over the implementation of the Real ID Act and what implementation means 
relative to privacy (Secure Identification, 2012; EPIC, n.d.b.). 
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to identify the biographic and biometric data associated with the person issued the EDL 
(Homeland Security, n.d.b.). A Machine Readable Zone, (MRZ), which is basically a 
scanner, allows the CBP officer to read EDL bar code information if the EDL is 
presented at a crossing not equipped with RFID (Napolitano, 2009). 
RFID’s use within the HLS arena has been primarily for asset tracking and 
identification documents. Yet, the key strength that RFID provides is the ability to 
identify real time location, which facilitates mass surveillance (Anagnostopoulos et al., 
2010, p. 2). Given its ability to provide unique identification, based upon the tag, RFID 
continues to be of interest not only for its identification abilities, but also for its ease of 
integration with other surveillance technology, including CCTV (pp. 4–5). As a result, 
RFID raises considerable privacy implications given the relative ease in which RFID 
signals can be read and/or intercepted. Given the expanding use of RFID in PII 
documents, such as EDLs, data protections for RFID are as important as the data 
efficiencies created by technology.  
2. Aggregation Capacity 
The immediate privacy interests raised by surveillance technologies, the initial 
intrusion, have been the center of most discussions around their growing prevalence 
within U.S. society. However, concerns over the back end, the creation of mega databases 
and network analysis techniques or other data mining, are growing (Strandburg, 2008, p. 
795). The government’s ability to engage in continual mass monitoring of the daily lives 
of individuals, combined with the increased detailed information these systems generate, 
stands to create new opportunities for combining data elements to generate greater 
amounts of and access to PII (Barber et al., 2007, pp. 6–3). Through various 
technological developments, the use of one sensor technology can link to and data mine 
other technologies to create more complete information.  
In a world in which mass surveillance is common, economies of scope are driving 
data aggregation, as seen with the mega databases resulting from AFIS and the ANPR 
national database in the United Kingdom. Moreover, not just the government is looking 
to further aggregate PII data. Commercial development is also seeking to harvest the full 
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value of the information rich society in which everyone lives. For example, the Mobile 
Offender Recognition and Information System (MORIS), can identify a person via FRT 
or through iris scanning (Seifert, 2011).31 MORIS can operate from a common smart 
phone’s camera to obtain the subject’s picture and to take an iris scan, which is then run 
through a backend database to develop an identification match probability (Seifert, 2011). 
MORIS also uses biometric identification through fingerprints that are also obtained 
through use of the smart phone (Seifert, 2011). As with any sensor technology, access to 
the comparative data is required to ensure appropriate identification probabilities. In the 
case of MORIS, general commercial viability is possible provided access to a supporting 
database is available, such as facial photograph images for FRT and fingerprint data.  
Another example of growing commercial development is the use of validity 
sensors32 on mobile devices. A mobile device or tablet screen can be equipped with 
fingerprint recognition technology that functions within the device, with minimal 
interference with operations, and thereby, creating greater security than a traditional 
password (Planet Biometrics, 2013). Despite not yet having any customers for this sort of 
technology, Apple is seen as positioning itself to incorporate such technology within its 
iPhones (Planet Biometrics, 2103).  
Facebook’s “tag” program is another example of the commercial development of 
sensor technology. FRT housed on Facebook’s servers scans users’ uploaded 
photographs of individuals for possible matches, which once confirmed, allows users to 
“tag” a large set of photos quickly (Paul, 2011). This technology also allows for rapid 
identification of other associations within the Facebook system, independent of the user 
uploading the image (Paul, 2011). The popular line “there’s an app for that,”33 might well 
apply to the commercial use of a sensor system for the smart phone. The technology  
continues to expand, thereby creating a growing data economy not controlled by the 
                                                 
31 The MORIS manufacturer is seeking approval from Apple, Inc. to allow application permission, 
“app,” from Apple, Incorporated to allow function on the I-phone platform (Seifert, 2011). 
32 Validity sensors are nearly invisible and provide enterprise-grade security by verifying the 
fingerprint used on a button or pad and sent to the host processor with the one matched on-chip (Highest 
Performing Fingerprints Sensors for Handsets, Tablets and PCs, n.d.). 
33 Apple, Inc. has received trademark rights to the slogan (Chen, 2010). 
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government nor fully regulated as a private enterprise and individuals are not subject to 
most existing privacy laws. 
The mega data that results from mass surveillance creates a conduit for access to 
PII by both government and private entities. One example is the automated toll readers 
that allow for mass surveillance of travel and location of vehicles upon the toll ways and, 
presumably, their owners or drivers. The New York Department of Transportation tracks 
vehicles in real time, through linkage to E-ZPass that uses RFID technology (NYSDOT, 
2007). The availability of such data results in requests for surveillance camera, LPR, and 
toll way reader data, and has become a matter of regular practice for legal discovery to 
either prove or disprove travel and presence across the toll ways (Newmarker, 2007).  
Some toll way authorities, cognizant of the privacy implications of automated toll 
collections, offer anonymizing practices, such as the ability to purchase a pre-loaded pass 
for a certain amount without disclosing PII data (TxTag, 2011; Landis, 2009). Other 
states have relied upon legislation to protect the PII of tollway users with RFID toll 
passes. For example, the State of Illinois limits access to, and therefore, the privacy 
impact of PII data derived from electronic toll collections systems. The PII deriving from 
toll collection systems may not be sold or provided to any person (605 ILCS 10/19.1(b)). 
PII is broadly defined as any information that describes a user, including information that 
identifies travel pattern data, address, telephone, email address, license plate number, 
photograph, bank account information, or credit card number (605 ILCS 10/19.1(a)). 
Further, under 605 ILCS 10/19.1(g), PII generated through electronic toll collection 
system is exempt from FOIA. Therefore, privacy concerns generated through sensor 
technology are addressable through technology and legislative action. 
The ability of sensor technology to capture and store information also brings forth 
significant back-end privacy issues around data sharing and data aggregation. The depth 
and breadth of detailed PII available through sensor technology, that is then subject to 
unlimited retention and data mining, stands to alter the relationship between the 
government and its citizens (United States v. Jones), with Justice Sotomayor concurring 
(p. 956). The privacy concerns generated by sensor technologies, such as RFID and LPR, 
are interrelated with security considerations and system development address both 
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privacy and security during development (Barber et al., 2007, pp. 6–3, 6–14). Today’s 
technology increasingly blurs the distinctions surrounding the government’s proper use of 
technology given the mass surveillance, aggregation capacity, and connectivity of 
databases (Zoufal, 2008, p. 113). Further, while minimal statutory regulation exists for 
PII data within the government sector, little to no oversight occurs within the private 
sector data information business (Woodard, 1998, p. 7). Despite voicing its concerns over 
data aggregation for decades, the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress have done little to 
ensure the privacy of U.S. citizens in a digital age. 
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IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF U.S. PRIVACY LAWS 
The Fourth Amendment serves to define the limitations on the government’s use 
of sensor technology to conduct surveillance of the public movements of its citizens. The 
protections of the Fourth Amendment are not stagnant, but rather derived from evolving 
social norms, practices, and expectations (Marceau, 2011, p. 705). However, establishing 
the legal boundaries for law enforcement’s permissible use of surveillance technology 
has been an arduous and circuitous process as evidenced by the progression of 
technology-related privacy decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.  
A. FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated…  
U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV 
Absent a search, no Fourth Amendment privacy issue exists. Surprisingly, 
defining “search” under the Fourth Amendment remains elusive and it is not readily 
defined within existing case law (Hutchins, 2007, p. 422). Generally, a search exists for 
Fourth Amendment purposes when the government takes an action that infringes upon an 
individual’s assertion of privacy over said individual’s self, home, papers, and/or effects 
and (1) has demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) society is willing to 
recognize the expectation of privacy as objectively reasonable (Kerrane, 2011, pp. 1705–
1706). The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment in an erratic and 
occasionally contradictory manner (Hutchins, 2007, p. 422). As a result, Fourth 
Amendment doctrine lacks consistent guidance for law enforcement in determining the 
appropriate standards for the use of technology to conduct surveillance.  
In the digital world in which Americans work, play, and store their personal 
effects, the U.S. Supreme Court struggles to marry the underlying Fourth Amendment 
concept of “place” with the virtual world in which Americans increasingly spend their 
time. In 1967, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects people rather 
than places (Katz v. United States, p. 351). However, this pronouncement belies the 
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history and continuing focus of the Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis. In its 2012 
decision in the Jones case, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “the text of the Fourth 
Amendment reflects its close connection to property, since otherwise it would have 
referred simply to “the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and 
seizures”; the phrase “in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” would have been 
superfluous” (United States v. Jones, p. 945). The U.S. Supreme Court continues to tether 
privacy to a concept of place. Courts appear to deal better with resolving privacy issues if 
they track traditional concepts of privacy, such as physical intrusion (Solove, 2006b, p. 
564). However, as technology reduces the need for “place” to store personal affects and a 
reduced need for physical, or even cognizable, intrusion by government to delve into the 
private realm of citizens occurs, the traditional boundaries of constitutional limitations on 
government surveillance begin to blur.  
As stated, the Supreme Court decisions on privacy and technology vary and lack 
consistency. On the one hand, the Court has held no constitutional Fourth Amendment 
protection exists for what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even within the 
home (Lewis v. United States).34 Yet, the Court has also recognized that Fourth 
Amendment constitutional protections may apply if someone seeks to maintain a private 
reserve, even if they are in public (Katz v. United States, p. 352). The Court has also 
stated that no constitutionally protected zones of privacy exist (pp. 351–352). However, 
in Kyllo, the Court carved out specific privacy protections for the home by identifying 
that all details are intimate details within the home, because the entire area is held safe 
from prying government eyes (Kyllo v. United States, p. 37).  
The Fourth Amendment doctrine of Katz, which is fact drives and requires courts 
to analyze an individual’s subjective assertion of privacy, coupled with the courts’ 
perceptions of social expectations of reasonableness, contributes to the lack of 
consistency in privacy law. In part, the failure to provide sufficient definition to privacy 
                                                 
34 In Lewis, an undercover government agent entered the home of a narcotics seller to purchase 
narcotics after being invited in to do so. The defendant argued in that he was a government agent, a warrant 
was needed. The Court held that the home was a location chosen by the defendant and within the 
parameters of the facts before the Court, the government’s conduct did not constitute a constitutional 
violation (Lewis v. United States). 
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occurs because courts have a tendency to shortcut the Katz analysis due to a lack of 
empirical data to identify “society’s” reasonable expectations of privacy when technology 
is involved (Freiwald, 2007, pp. 8–9). Further, as the government’s use of surveillance 
technology expands, determining the evolving boundaries of private space starts to fall 
apart in a world in which the physical location of information is of dwindling importance 
(Wells, 2009, p. 223). What places and what actions are afforded constitutional privacy 
protections will change as privacy intrusions become increasingly digital and the measure 
of governmental intrusion, within the physical sense, becomes a relative term. As such, 
the growing use of mass surveillance will continue to exploit the gaps within Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. 
B. CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY LAW AND TECHNOLOGY—HOW DID 
WE GET HERE? 
In regards to the confluence of technology and privacy, the Fourth Amendment 
doctrine and its implications for mass surveillance by government continues to evolve. 
U.S. law is precedential, which means that earlier decisions drive subsequent judicial 
analysis and determination. Unfortunately, legal privacy determinations based upon case 
law deriving from older technology may fail to account for the greater intrusiveness of 
current technology or recognize key distinctions in its use or application (Hutchins, 2010, 
p. 1187). Privacy decisions about the use of public phone booths have little practical 
translation in a world in which conversations in public move with the individual. As a 
result, the existing legal guidance is less than clear for law enforcement’s use of sensor 
technology under the Fourth Amendment. However, an understanding and review of the 
precedent informing current law on mass surveillance and technology provides a 
foundation for key issues driving the decisions of the courts and clarifies how the law got 
to where it is at this time. 
1. Olmsted v. United States 
The Supreme Court’s 1928 decision in Olmstead v. U.S. held that the purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment was to protect against the use of governmental force to search or 
seize a man’s house, person or effects and to prevent their seizure absent permission 
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(Olmstead v. United States). At issue before the court was whether the government 
engaged in a search when it electronically tapped eight telephones over a period of nearly 
five months (p. 471). The government attached a listening device outside the home to 
listen over telephone wires to conversations occurring inside the home (pp. 456–457). 
The Olmstead court held that for the Fourth Amendment to be implicated, the 
government has to have engaged in a physical search and seizure of a person, material 
effects, or an actual physical invasion of the home (p. 466). The Court found that the 
Fourth Amendment did not prevent the government’s use of the “senses” in listening to 
the conversations and noted that all surveillance actions occurred outside the home 
without any entry into the home or a seizure of things (p. 464).  
Justice Brandeis dissented35 noting that “rights declared in words might be lost in 
reality,” and strict adherence to protecting things under the Fourth Amendment ignores 
the more subtle and far-reaching means available to the government to invade privacy 
(Olmstead v. United States, p. 474). Brandeis argued the Constitution granted not just 
mere protection of property but the right to be left alone, one of the most prized rights of 
civilized men (p. 474). Brandeis argued that to protect Constitutional privacy rights, 
unjustifiable government intrusion upon the privacy of the individual, regardless of 
whether it constitutes a physical intrusion, must be held a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment (pp. 478–479).  
Justice Brandeis’ dissent frames one of the core privacy issues that exists today 
relative to the use of technology by the government to conduct mass surveillance. Should 
governmental intrusion into the private realm be measured by the technical—the level of 
intrusion; or, by the conceptual—the right to be left alone, in determining whether 
constitutional protections are warranted? Over time, privacy theory and the decision of 
the U.S. Supreme Court have evolved Olmstead. The Supreme Court retreated from the 
                                                 
35 Within the U.S. Supreme Court, a majority opinion establishes a binding precedent pursuant to stare 
decisis. However, Supreme Court justices write additional opinions to the majority decision that either 
concur or dissent with the decision of the majority. While not binding law, they provide insight as to the 
inner workings and decision matrix of the court. However, some argument is raised that plurality opinions 
and even concurring might contribute to precedential law as well, which serves only to add to the point of 
this thesis that case law is not the ideal way to define privacy in a digital world (Ledebur, 2009). 
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Olmstead’s bright line division between home and public in providing Fourth 
Amendment protections beginning in 1967 with Katz v. United States.  
2. Katz v. United States 
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court provided privacy protections for 
intangibles under the search and seizure limitations against the government under the 
Fourth Amendment (Maceau, 2011, p. 687). At issue in Katz was whether the 
conversation of an individual inside an enclosed public telephone booth was entitled to 
constitutional protection from government surveillance under the Fourth Amendment 
(Katz v. United States). The Katz court stated that the failure to provide privacy 
protections to individuals within the public arena ignores the critical role of evolving 
technology (Katz v. United States, p. 353). In finding that the government’s action was a 
search under the Fourth Amendment, the Katz court held that the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not just places (p. 352).  
Despite overruling the property-based focus of Olmstead and expanding Fourth 
Amendment protections beyond the home, the Katz court refused to find that the 
Constitution granted a general right to privacy (Katz v. United States, p. 351). 
Significantly, the Katz Court held that Fourth Amendment privacy protections were 
predicated upon whether the individual had a subjective expectation of privacy and 
whether society was willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable (pp. 352–352). 
While Katz is predicated upon a subjective exercise of control as a means of 
demonstrating an expectation of privacy, the reasonable expectation of privacy is 
identified, and defined, by the trier of fact, and not the individual making the claim of a 
privacy right (Rubenfeld, 2008, pp. 106–107). In effect, the Court expanded upon the 
Olmstead determination of constitutional privacy protections for property by substituting 
terms people for places and privacy for property (Clancy, 2012, pp. 306–307). 
Justice Black dissented, arguing that the Court improperly expanded the Fourth 
Amendment to cover general privacy rather than establishing a limitation on the 
government’s authority under which it could conduct searches and seizures of its citizens 
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(Clancy, 2012, p. 373).36 In what he characterized as abandoning the Fourth Amendment 
standard of governmental intrusion to find constitutional standard to include a more 
generalized privacy right, Justice Black argued that the Court was expanding its powers 
into an ongoing constitutional convention (p. 373). Such decisions, according to Justice 
Black, were better addressed through Congressional legislative action given the 
constitutionally mandated separation of powers (p. 373). 
In a rapidly expanding virtual world, Fourth Amendment privacy expectations 
and the social norms that define reasonable expectations of privacy remain unsettled. 
Although the Katz standard is one of reasonableness, it does, in part, re-emphasize the 
concept of the individual’s relation to the claim of privacy (Clancy, 2012, pp. 306–308). 
As noted by Justice Harlan, determinations of privacy generally do not occur without 
reference to a place, despite the assertion that the Fourth Amendment protects people 
(Katz v. United States, p. 361). The focus on place under Fourth Amendment doctrine has 
challenges in defining privacy when technology requires limited or no physical intrusion 
to access, which serves to confuse the subsequent constitutional analysis (Wells, 2009, 
pp. 229–230). Given the growth in surveillance technology and capacity, a timely and 
coherent precedential legal framework for decision is needed if the Fourth Amendment is 
to remain a viable vehicle for the protection of individuals against increasingly intrusive 
action by government (Marceau, 2011, p. 699).  
Mass surveillance technology alters the individual’s control over personal data 
and actions upon the public way. The Katz doctrine, with its circular standard of 
reasonable expectations of privacy, skirts a key privacy issue for today’s state of mass 
surveillance—does the prevalence of observation and even surveillance in U.S. society 
negate a reasonable expectation of privacy in public? In a modern society in which the 
pervasive presence of sensor technology has people accustomed to continual surveillance, 
diminution of constitutional privacy protections, based upon the Katz reasonable 
                                                 
36 Justice Alito finds problem with the seemingly inapposite position of the Court in the 2012 decision 
in Jones v. United States. He argues the majority decision in Jones contravenes Katz, in that the Court 
wrongly relies upon a finding of technical trespass by the government is sufficient to find that a search 
occurred for Fourth Amendment purposes rather than deciding on reasonable expectations of privacy 
(United States v. Jones, pp. 959–961), with Justice Alito concurring. 
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expectation of privacy analysis, is not without concern (Hutchins, 2010, p. 1193). Given 
mass surveillance, the problem for privacy is can an individual claim a reasonable 
expectation of privacy on the public way, given the proliferance of surveillance 
technology in use by the government and privacy entities? Therefore, hypothetically at 
least, the government could overcome subjective and objective privacy expectations by 
posting notice not to expect any privacy in regards to sensor surveillance (Chemerinsky, 
2006, p. 650). Whether the prevalence of mass surveillance serves to negate any 
reasonable expectations of privacy in public, as defined under Katz, has yet to be 
addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
3. Third Party Doctrine 
Third party doctrine has significant impact on privacy decisions where technology 
is part of the fact pattern. Under the third party doctrine, the courts have held that the 
government can use information disclosed by an individual to a third party without 
implicating Fourth Amendment protections. In United States v. Miller, at issue was 
whether the government’s access to an individual’s bank records was an impermissible 
search under the Fourth Amendment (United States v. Miller). The respondent argued he 
had a Fourth Amendment interest in the records kept by the banks because he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in that they were copies of his personal records and 
were made available to the banks for a limited purpose (p. 442). However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that the individual assumes the risk that when revealing affairs to 
another, that the information will be conveyed to the government by that person (p. 443). 
Further, the Court held that banking records were not confidential communications, but, 
rather, negotiable instruments voluntarily exposed to third parties, which did not provide 
for a reasonable expectation of privacy (pp. 441–443). Even if the individual held an 
expectation of privacy based on an assumption of confidentiality, the Court ruled that 
society was not prepared to recognize such an expectation as reasonable (pp. 441–443).  
Therefore, does the use of technology vitiate a reasonable expectation of privacy? 
With the advent of the web and cloud computing, many personal transactions and much 
private information is generated and stored in a third party environment. Exposure of 
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information to a third party is a given where most digital data is remotely stored or 
accessed (Wells, 2009, p. 230). The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided a third party 
doctrine case in the modern era in which social norms and technologies dictate that vastly 
more PII resides with third parties, as a matter of routine business requirements 
(Henderson, 2011, p. 42). As noted by Justice Sotomayor, the third party doctrine is ill-
suited to the digital age where people necessarily disclose significant amounts of personal 
data just engaging in daily business (United States v. Jones, p. 957), with Justice 
Sotomayor concurring. Even the U.S. Supreme Court has pondered whether new 
technology entails a trade-off between convenience and privacy, with the issue being 
whether technology inevitably reduces privacy as a matter of law (p. 962). The existing 
Fourth Amendment doctrine defines privacy interests within a framework based upon 
governmental intrusion, rather than privacy principles. 
Cellular telephones provide context for the insufficiency of Fourth Amendment 
privacy protections. By merely possessing a cell phone, which has become ubiquitous in 
today’s society, it is possible to surrender location privacy. Tracking technology that uses 
cell tower information to locate a cellular telephone is not considered a Fourth 
Amendment search, under the theory that the cell phone signals are knowingly exposed to 
a third-party—the cell phone company (United States v. Bermudez). In Bermudez, the 
government used an electronic device and cellular telephone tracking technology to 
identify the location of purported narcotics activity, including the residence of the 
targeted individual (United States v. Bermudez). The Bermudez court ruled pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (the Stored Communications Act) and 18 U.S.C. § 3121 et seq. (the 
Pen/Trap Act) and under Fourth Amendment review that the government acted within the 
law in capturing the electronic signals of the telephone that emanated from inside the 
house, given that no reasonable expectation of privacy was anticipated in the 
transmission of the cellular telephone signals (United States v. Bermudez). The court 
relied upon third party doctrine citing that the owner knowingly transmitted signals to the 
third party, and if a desire existed not to do so, all that had to be done was to turn the 
cellular telephone off (United States v. Bermudez). 
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As recently as 2012, the 7th Circuit reaffirms that no reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists concerning cellular telephone numbers, and perhaps even for information 
contained therein (United States v. Flores-Lopez). At issue in Flores-Lopez was whether 
a search for Fourth Amendment purposes occurred when the government looked at the 
cellular telephone to obtain information without a warrant (p. 805). The court likened the 
access to the phone as similar to obtaining information from a diary discovered upon the 
person arrested, which is permissible under the Fourth Amendment (pp. 806–807). The 
court further held that obtaining the cellular number information from the phone was also 
permissible, because by subscribing to the telephone service, the user of the phone is 
deemed to surrender any privacy interest this user may have had in the phone number (p. 
807).  
In 2011, law enforcement made over 1.3 million requests for cell subscriber data 
from cellular telephone companies (Lichtblau, 2012a). Additionally, law enforcement is 
increasing its use of cell tower location services. AT&T reported a triple increase in law 
enforcement requests as compared to 2007 (Lichtblau, 2012a). However, as noted by the 
Bermudez court, law enforcement’s use of real time cell site information for surveillance 
is a relatively new tool and Congress has yet to provide specific legislative boundaries on 
the practice (United States v. Bermudez). As a result, under third party doctrine, 
possession of a cellular telephone may properly act as a tracking device for the 
government without the knowledge or permission of the individual carrying it. While this 
is the decision of the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, the analysis could apply to any court 
absent legislative control of the issue.  
While not on point, the U.S. Supreme Court has reviewed the individual right of 
privacy in the use of a texting pager provided by the government to an individual (City of 
Ontario v. Quon). In essence, the employee had used the text pager to send messages he 
considered private; however, the government employer accessed those messages and took 
a job action as a result (p. 2622). When the Court evaluated the invasiveness of the 
government employer’s action, it stated that the audit of the employer provided pager was 
“not nearly as intrusive as a search of his personal e-mail account or a wiretap on his 
home phone line” (p. 2631). Missing from the Court’s discussion was any mention of a 
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cellular phone, despite its recognition of cellular telephones as pervasive in today’s 
society (p. 2631). Therefore, while the Court specifically recognized a lesser protection in 
pager text messages as compared to a personal email, it completely sidestepped whether 
the lesser protection for text messages to a pager would also extend to cellular 
telephones, one of the more robust texting modalities in society. The exponential increase 
in data mining of the location of individual cellular telephone owners may be a tradeoff 
for the convenience of owning a cellular phone, but the current law comes as a result of 
the Court’s failure to provide guidance or even recognize the privacy impacts brought 
forth by cellular telephone use within modern society and the government’s use of these 
devices as a surveillance technology.  
4. Fourth Amendment and Technology 
The intersection of technology and privacy continues to evolve in part, because 
technology becomes part of the fact pattern under Fourth Amendment analysis. 
Individual expectations of privacy and society’s acceptance of technology, regardless of 
individual expectations, are critical determinations under Fourth Amendment privacy 
analysis (City of Ontario v. Quon, p. 2629). Rather than focusing on the government’s 
actions, privacy determinations by the courts focus on what the targeted individual knew, 
or should have known, regarding the expectation of privacy under a Fourth Amendment 
analysis (Freiwald, 2007, p. 22). Constitutional privacy decisions often become circular 
arguments, as identifying what society deems reasonable is determined by the same court 
that decides whether a search has occurred (Rubenfeld, 2008, pp. 106–107). Therefore, 
legal decisions on privacy will always lag behind the development and use of technology 
because the reasonable expectation of privacy is predicated upon the specific use of the 
technology and how that use impacts both the subjective and objective expectations of 
privacy (McCullagh, 2001, p. 140).37 However, in that Fourth Amendment law is fact 
driven, the evolving nature of technology makes it more difficult to synthesize disparate 
technologies and fact patterns into a usable framework for guiding government to ensure 
the appropriate use of mass surveillance technology.  
                                                 
37 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court did not review GPS technology used for surveillance until 
2012, well after its general use within the public realm.  
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a. AFIS Evolution 
Regarding the seminal biometric identifier, fingerprints, the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that the provision of fingerprints to the government was not a search given it 
was a minor governmental intrusion (Davis v. Mississippi). At the time of the Davis 
decision, which was prior to AFIS, fingerprint analysis was a labor intensive and time-
consuming manual process subject to individual review of fingerprints (Wilson & 
Woodard, 1987, p. 13). AFIS automated the manual fingerprinting process, thereby 
allowing for the comparisons of thousands, if not millions of prints, in a short time, 
(Constance, 1995, p. 401). Today, the AFIS database contains over 60 million 
comparison fingerprints (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). Despite the vast amount 
of comparison data now available, and a more efficient process for the comparison of 
fingerprints, the technology did not create a Fourth Amendment issue. 
However, the subsequent processing, retention, and use of the fingerprints, 
as biometric data, is distinct from the initial collection of the fingerprints. For example, 
an administrative requirement to fingerprint jurors raised issues regarding whether the 
fingerprinting of jurors was constitutional and whether the subsequent retention and use 
of those prints created a privacy invasion (Goodman v. Liebovitz). The Court held that 
mandatory fingerprinting of jurors was not a search or seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment (p. 506). However, the subsequent retention and use of those prints, (the 
data), after they served to verify the initial identification requirement, were not supported 
by law or policy (p. 507). Therefore, the court ordered their expungement or their return 
to the jurors (p. 507). In essence, the court distinguished the fingerprints, the data 
collection, from the subsequent retention and dissemination of fingerprints, and the 
Fourth Amendment privacy implications that attach.  
If it is believed that history repeats itself, AFIS’ evolution has lessons for 
today’s use of surveillance technology. As a result of the technology advancements 
provided by AFIS, it became an important identification tool usable not only for criminal 
investigations, but also by other agencies, government and private (Constance, 1995, p. 
403). The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that efficiencies provided by enhanced 
technology do not automatically give rise to constitutional violations (United States v. 
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Knotts, p. 284). The social drivers for the expansion of the government’s use of 
technology present today—resource scarcity, efficiencies, and advancing investigative 
practices—also drove the development of AFIS (Moses, 2012, chap. 6, p. 8). The back 
end issues of data storage and retention generated from the government’s use of 
surveillance technologies continue to test traditional concepts of privacy, and as a result, 
the law lacks guidance on what constitutes privacy in a digital age (Solove, 2002, pp. 
1217–1218). These same issues, data retention and subsequent use, were of concern when 
AFIS first rolled out. However, today, rarely is any thought given to the taking of or even 
subsequent use of fingerprints. Does society just “get over” privacy concerns as 
technology becomes more commonplace? 
b. Today’s Surveillance Technology 
While Olmstead, Davis and Katz provide the foundation for Fourth 
Amendment analysis of surveillance technology’s impact on privacy, these decisions do 
not address the government’s mass monitoring of individuals’ movement in public 
spaces. Even the Supreme Court has recognized that mass surveillance is different from 
other technology uses and may well require another type of analysis and/or decision 
framework (United States v. Knotts, p. 284). Privacy decisions involving surveillance 
technology contribute to the legal jurisprudence, but have limited scope in that they are 
often technology specific, as seen in the following review. 
(1) Berger v. New York. The privacy impact of law 
enforcement’ use of surveillance technology became part of the national discussion with 
two cases, Berger v. New York and Katz v. United States. The U.S. Supreme Court gave 
notice to Congress that electronic bugging, (Katz), and electronic wiretapping, (Berger), 
would be reviewed in its upcoming term, and Congressional action on surreptitious 
surveillance would have to wait for the Court’s decision in these cases (Kerr, 2004, p. 
849). In part, it was the Katz decision that prompted Congress to enact legislative 
guidelines for law enforcement’s use of surveillance technology, particularly as it applies 
to wire taps and overhears (United States v. Jones, pp. 962–963). Both decisions continue 
to have significant impact on law enforcement’s use of surveillance technology even 
today. 
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(2) Berger v. New York. In Berger, the U.S. Supreme Court 
struck down a state law that allowed eavesdropping absent judicial oversight and without 
time controls as unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment (Berger v. New York). 
Reaching back to 1862, the Berger Court analyzed the evolution of the law relative to 
eavesdropping and its progeny, which identified the growing ease with which technology 
allows access to private conversations (Berger v. New York, pp. 50–53). The government 
argues that striking down the state law would cripple law enforcement’s ability to 
dismantle organized crime (Berger v. New York, p. 60). However, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the state statue authorizing law enforcement wiretaps for an unspecified 
duration and without judicial oversight lacked the procedural and legal safeguards 
required under the Fourth Amendment (p. 60).38 The Supreme Court, in providing 
guidance to government on appropriate standards for wiretapping surveillance, outlined 
constitutional prerequisites, including: 
• Judicial or neutral evaluation of the existence of probable cause; 
• Specificity as to the crime committed, the place to be searched, and 
items or people to be seized; 
• A termination date for the surveillance; 
• Some form of notice or special circumstance to excuse notice; and, 
• A return on the warrant (Kerr, 2004, p. 848).  
Six months later, the Supreme Court decided Katz, and established 
the reasonable expectation of the privacy standard under the Fourth Amendment. Also 
under Katz, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that suppression remedies would be 
available to individuals subject to unlawful surveillance by the government (Freiwald, 
2007, p. 51). Suppression remedies are a critical tool for defense and civil litigation, as 
they provide for sanctions, a remedy not present in other subsequent statutory 
enactments, such as ECPA (Freiwald, 2011, p. 681). Further, not only does Berger 
establish the need for proper judicial oversight of the government’s surveillance of its 
                                                 
38 In his dissent, Justice White commented on the contemporaneous Congressional action during the 
Supreme Court hearings on Katz and Berger, perceived to address what was thought to be a gap in law 
enforcement surveillance surrounding electronic surveillance, inclusive of wiretapping (Berger v. New 
York). 
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citizens, but also combined with Katz, both cases stand for the proposition that private 
conversations are protected under the Fourth Amendment.39  
(3) Tracking Technology—United States v. Knotts. 
Technology’s ability to assist law enforcement surveillance continues to evolve. In 
Berger and Katz, at issue was over hear technology. In Knotts, law enforcement’s use of 
beeper technology for surveillance came before the Supreme Court. Beepers have 
become obsolete, as most law enforcement surveillance techniques now use satellite-
based technology (Shah, 2009, p. 283). However, the framework for the court’s analysis 
of the beeper surveillance technology continues to resonate within the Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. The issue before the Knotts court was whether the government’s 
use of a beeper to track a moving vehicle on public streets and while parked at the 
driver’s residence was a search under the Fourth Amendment (United States v. Knotts). 
Secreted by law enforcement inside an item placed by the respondent into his vehicle, the 
beeper emitted signals for up to three days that enabled the police to track and follow the 
vehicle (p. 278). The court identified that the beeper provided information on the travel of 
a vehicle about the public way (pp. 282–284). The Court held that beeper provided only a 
more effective means of observation of a vehicle about the public way, something already 
ruled to not implicate the Fourth Amendment (pp. 282–284). In holding that no search 
under the Fourth Amendment occurred, the court held that the technology merely 
augmented the sensory ability of the officers (pp. 284–285).  
Knotts reflects the ambivalence of the Court in addressing the more 
fundamental privacy concerns raised by advancements in technology. The Knotts Court 
discusses, without resolution, whether continual mass surveillance under a dragnet-type 
law enforcement practice is subject to any differing constitutional analysis (United States 
v. Knotts, p. 284). Justice Stevens voiced concerns that the Knotts’ decision would create 
confusion for subsequent Fourth Amendment review given that the use of electronic 
surveillance readily implicates privacy concerns that Knotts does not address (p. 288),  
 
                                                 
39 The ensuing national debate over Berger& Katz contributed to Congressional enactment of Title III 
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, (Title III), discussed herein pp. 118–121. 
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with Justice Stevens concurring. However, by narrowly defining the issue before the 
Court, the Knotts Court chose to ignore those privacy concerns not immediately before it 
(p. 284).  
The reticence of the U. S. Supreme Court to address the overall 
privacy impact of surveillance technology used by the government to monitor the public 
movement of its citizens is repeated in subsequent cases, including its 2012 decision in 
Jones, and contributes to the ongoing uncertainty of the privacy boundaries under Fourth 
Amendment decisions involving technology. Even though the Knotts court recognized 
that the beeper technology did not implicate the Fourth Amendment, it gave voice to 
concerns over the greater levels of detailed information that technology allows (United 
States v. Knotts, p. 284). As a measure of quantity rather than just an issue of sense 
enhancement, the use of sensor surveillance technology may provide a need for greater 
constitutional protections (Hutchins, 2007, p. 440). However, the degree of intrusion or 
the quantity required to create differing constitutional review remains unanswered despite 
concerns raised in the public and by the Court itself. Fourth Amendment doctrine 
continues to analyze the use of each specific technology, rather than the privacy interest 
at stake, thereby failing to provide sufficient guidance to government for evolving 
technologies used for surveillance. 
(4) Kyllo v. United States. In Kyllo v. United States, the issue 
before the Supreme Court was whether the government’s use of infrared thermal imaging 
was a Fourth Amendment search (Kyllo v. United States). The technology was used from 
a public street to determine heat sources within the home (Kyllo v. United States).40 
Identifying thermal imaging as a form of sense enhancing technology, the Court held that 
its use would rise to a constitutionally cognizable search if the information derived from 
within the home were not possible without the technology (pp. 34–35). In that the normal 
senses could not detect heat within a home, the use of the technology to obtain 
information from within the home was ruled a search under the Fourth Amendment 
(p. 35).  
                                                 
40 The distinction of use of technology outside the home harkens back to the decision in Olmstead in 
which no Fourth Amendment search was found to have occurred given government did not enter the home. 
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Kyllo demonstrates that place continues to weigh prominently in 
the Fourth Amendment privacy analysis. Enhanced privacy protections attach to the 
interior of the home (Kyllo v. United States, p. 40). The Kyllo Court held that to find 
differently would allow police technology to circumvent the intention of the Fourth 
Amendment’s limitations on government intrusion into the private lives of its citizens (p. 
34). Therefore, it is not only the technology used, but also where the government 
surveillance reaches that influences the Courts determination of whether a search for 
Fourth Amendment purposes occurred. In 1928, the Supreme Court Justice Brandeis 
opined that the Constitution must address what may be, not just what has been (Olmstead 
v. United States, p. 474). However, given the fact that driven analysis occurs under 
Fourth Amendment review, law enforcement is left to guess as to the appropriate 
standards and boundaries for evolving surveillance technology.  
The role of technology and the expectations of society that result 
from its use remain hotly contested privacy issues. Defining Fourth Amendment privacy 
standards through the evaluation of specific technologies creates a tautology wherein the 
Court determines whether a reasonable expectation of privacy is anticipated by defining 
society’s standards for use of that technology (Barrett, 2002, p. 23). However, dramatic 
technological change may lead to periods in which societal expectations regarding the use 
of technology and its relation to privacy are in flux (United States v. Jones, p. 962), with 
Justice Alito concurring. Ultimately, evolving technology may produce significant 
changes in privacy expectations and deciding such expectations ahead of the evolution 
presents challenges for privacy and use of evolving technology. If Fourth Amendment 
doctrine has not been able to provide and establish consistent standards for individual 
privacy protections and the government’s use of surveillance within the last 94 years, it is 
time for a new direction?  
5. The Privacy Challenge Given GPS and Evolving Technology 
While technology may change, law enforcement’s need to conduct criminal 
investigations remains. Under Fourth Amendment doctrine, the courts determine whether 
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the surveillance technology in use was sense augmenting,41 identifying that if law 
enforcement was able to legally accomplish the action independent of the technology, 
then no search under the Fourth Amendment constitutional protections attach (Hutchins, 
2007, pp. 434–435). GPS is one technology that law enforcement is increasingly using, 
given that it as an efficient and economical way of tracking suspects and developing 
evidence (Shah, 2009, p. 281). However, GPS technology provides more information 
than just route and location information. GPS allows government to amass individual, 
discrete data such that a broader, more descriptive, and therefore intrusive, set of data 
results (United States v. Maynard, pp. 561–562).  
GPS facilitates tracking surveillance in a manner consistent with beeper 
technology. However, it also is capable of providing significantly augmented data, which 
has the ability to generate a mosaic of information regarding the private life (United 
States v. Maynard, pp. 561–562).42 In part, the prevalence of GPS in modern society also 
contributes to the growing privacy concerns over data aggregation and mass monitoring 
by the government. 
a. Case Law Approach to Addressing Government’s Use of Sensor 
Technology Surveillance 
Despite the prevalence and use of sensor technology by the government to 
conduct mass monitoring of its citizens, minimal legal guidance exists. Much of the 
existing doctrine has evolved over time because of various judicial decisions addressing 
the government’s use of technology to conduct surveillance. The challenge with a case 
law-based doctrine is that it is slow to develop and is factually driven, which results in 
incremental change and sometimes seemingly conflicting decisions based on the facts 
presented to the court. However, the social use and acceptance of technology is moving at 
a rapid pace. Awaiting legal decision on the use of technology is neither practical nor 
                                                 
41 Generally, sense augments refers to “extrasensory” tools, electronic or scientific that allow law 
enforcement to gather information beyond that capable through an individual’s normal human senses 
(Webb, 2011–2012, p. 760). 
42 Under the mosaic theory, disparate items of information, while of little value individually, take on 
added significance when combined with other items of information, thereby creating a sum greater than its 
parts (Pozen, 2005, p. 630).  
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beneficial, as technology develops rapidly and is quickly introduced into society. Law 
enforcement has been using GPS for over two decades, yet the Supreme Court did not 
accept review of the government’s use of the technology until 2012. 
The legal validity of the government’s use of sensor technology, namely 
GPS, to conduct surveillance came to a head when the U.S. circuit courts of appeals split 
as to whether the use of GPS constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.43 The 
Jones case generated interest within both law enforcement and civil advocacy groups 
because it was the first time the Supreme Court was to address the use of GPS by law 
enforcement to conduct surveillance.  
What was seen as the controlling law by some courts, Knotts, held that the 
use of a tracking device by the government to conduct surveillance of a vehicle upon the 
public way was not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes (Knotts, 1983, p. 284). The 
law was settled that no reasonable expectation of privacy is anticipated for a vehicle 
operating on the public way given the public exposure of the vehicles and their 
movements (Kerrane, 2011, p. 1723). However, the technology in question in Knotts was 
a beeper tracking device and not GPS, which had not yet been addressed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Therefore, the lower courts were left to interpret the application of the 
provisions of the Fourth Amendment to the government’s use of GPS to conduct 
surveillance.  
b. A Split of Circuit Court Opinion 
(1) Knotts as Controlling the Issue of GPS Surveillance by 
Law Enforcement. In addressing the issue of law enforcement using GPS to conduct 
surveillance, the 7th, 8th and 9th Circuits identified United States v. Knotts as controlling. 
These circuits held that use of GPS by law enforcement for surveillance of an individual 
was not a Fourth Amendment search in that it merely obtained information that would 
                                                 
43 The 94 U.S. judicial districts are divided into 12 regional circuits, each with a court of appeals. A 
court of appeals hears appeals from the district courts located within its circuit, including appeals from 
decisions of federal administrative agencies. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has nationwide 
jurisdiction to hear appeals in specialized cases, including patent laws and cases decided by the Court of 
International Trade and the Court of Federal Claims (United States Courts, n.d.). 
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otherwise be available to law enforcement, namely the travel of the vehicle upon the 
public way (United States v. Cuervas-Perez; United States v. Marquez; United States v. 
Pineda-Moreno).  
(2) United States v. Cuervas-Perez. Within the 7th Circuit, in 
United States v. Cuervas-Perez, the court held that the government’s use of GPS to 
conduct a surveillance of a person was not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes 
(United States v. Cuervas-Perez, pp. 273–274). The Cuervas court acknowledged the 
holding of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Maynard, but distinguished its decision. The 
Cuervas court followed the precedence of the Knotts decision, in holding that vehicles 
that travel upon the public way have no expectations of privacy and are subject to lesser 
Fourth Amendment protections (United States v. Knotts, pp. 281–282). Noting the 
privacy concerns over the real-time information provided by GPS, the court identified 
that the technology did not create the information, but drivers did so by driving upon the 
public roads (United States v. Cuervas-Perez, p. 274). Noting that the GPS device was 
installed on the subject’s vehicle while upon the public way and that the 60 hours of 
surveillance was not of sufficient length to expose the individual’s otherwise private 
activity, the court held no Fourth Amendment privacy implications arose from the 
government’s use of the GPS surveillance (p. 274). In essence, the Cuervas court 
maintained that just because the GPS made the government’s surveillance more efficient, 
it did not invoke Fourth Amendment privacy concerns because the use of the GPS was 
not a search. 
(3) U.S. v. Marquez. In U.S. v. Marquez, the 8th Circuit 
followed Knotts in holding that the government’s use of GPS to conduct surveillance of a 
vehicle moving about the public way did not implicate Fourth Amendment privacy 
concerns (United States v. Marquez, p. 610). The GPS device was attached to the 
individual’s vehicle while parked in a public parking lot, relayed information for a period 
of slightly less than five months and could only transmit information while outdoors (p. 
607). The court held that the police had a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle tracked 
was involved in the interstate transport of drugs and the use of the GPS device merely 
allowed the police to conduct lawful surveillance more efficiently (p. 610). While noting 
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privacy concerns raised about government’s ability to engage in “wholesale 
surveillance,” Marquez stated the installation and use of the GPS device was neither 
random or arbitrary, and, therefore, such concerns did not play into the facts before the 
court (p. 610).  
(4) United States v. Pineda-Moreno. In United States v. 
Pineda-Moreno, the 9th Circuit was not concerned over the length and duration of the 
government’s surveillance. Rather, the court defined the issue as whether the placement 
of the GPS device on a vehicle parked on the public way invoked privacy protections 
under the Fourth Amendment (United States v. Pineda-Moreno, p. 1213). The 
government’s GPS surveillance of the subject lasted for a period of four months (p. 
1213). The court followed the precedence of Knotts, holding that the government 
obtained information about the subject’s travel along the public way, and therefore, no 
search for Fourth Amendment purposes occurred (p. 1216).44  
The Cuervas, Marquez and Pineda-Moreno courts analyzed the 
government’s use of GPS to conduct surveillance through a focus on how and where the 
technology was installed, and how it tracked the movement of the vehicle under 
surveillance, thereby representing a very physical focus for Fourth Amendment search 
determinations despite increasing virtual implications (United States v. Cuervas-Perez, 
pp. 273–273; United States v. Marquez, p. 601; United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 2010, p. 
1217). While these courts raised the possibility of differing analysis under the Fourth 
Amendment should the government surveillance arise to the level of mass surveillance of 
the movement of vehicles upon the public way, none ruled on the issue. Further, the issue 
was narrowed, with the courts focusing on how and where the surveillance was 
conducted, that of movement upon the public way, rather than on the detailed information 
of time, space, and location that GPS provides.  
                                                 
44 It should be noted that on February 12, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment against 
Pineda and remanded the decision back to the 9th Circuit for further review in light of the decision in U.S. 
v. Jones. The U.S. Supreme Court made no further comment (See Pineda-Moreno v. United States, 132). 
Upon remand, the 9th District held that suppression was not warranted because the agents objectively relied 
on then-existing binding precedent when they approached Pineda–Moreno’s Jeep in public areas, attached 
tracking devices to it, and used those devices to monitor the Jeep’s movements (United States v. Pineda-
Moreno, 688). 
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(5) U.S. v. Maynard. The D.C. Circuit split from the other 
circuit courts of appeals in identifying that Knotts was not dispositive when faced with 
GPS surveillance conducted by the government. The Maynard court conceded that Knotts 
was controlling for government’s surveillance of a vehicle moving about the public way 
(U.S. v. Maynard, pp. 563–564). However, the Maynard court defined the issue before it 
as one of first impression, noting that the Supreme Court has not answered the issue as to 
whether “mass” electronic surveillance requires a warrant (p. 558).  
In Maynard, the court focused on the depth and length of 
surveillance, rather than how the technology was attached or where it tracked the vehicle 
under surveillance (United States v. Maynard, pp. 557–558). Called into question was 
whether the issue was government-conducting surveillance of that which was in the 
public view as opposed to the whole of the information; the mosaic that GPS provides to 
the government (pp. 562–563). The court noted that a reasonable person does not expect 
individuals to be able to monitor continuously their every movement in a vehicle, 
including route, length, location, stops, and duration of those stops over a period of 28 
days, as occurred within the case before it (p. 558). As such, the 6th Circuit held that the 
use of GPS by the government to conduct surveillance was a search under the Fourth 
Amendment and its warrant requirements attached (p. 563). The split among the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals as to whether the government’s use of GPS to conduct surveillance 
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment set the stage for Supreme Court review 
of the matter.45 
(6) Jones v. United States. The Supreme Court accepted review 
of the issue in Jones v. United States, (Maynard),46whether law enforcement’s use of 
GPS to conduct surveillance was a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and 
                                                 
45 Supreme Court Rule 10 provides that review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but one 
of judicial discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for a compelling reason. 
Including in the Court’s authority is the review of those cases where a U.S. court of appeals has entered a 
decision in conflict with the decision of other U.S. courts of appeals on the same important matter (S.Ct. 
Rule 10. 2010). 
46 U.S. v. Jones was a consolidated case, originally named U.S. v. Maynard. However, the conviction 
of the defendant Maynard was upheld by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals while the defendant Jones’ 
conviction was overturned as a result of the GPS claim. The government sought writ of certiorari from the 
U.S. Supreme Court only as to Jones and the issue of whether GPS is a search for Fourth Amendment 
purposes. 
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decided the case on January 23, 2012 (United States v. Jones). The Court unanimously 
held that the government conducted a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment 
when it attached a GPS tracking device to the property of the subject under investigation 
(United States v. Jones).47 The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, identified 
the property interest as controlling in determining whether a Fourth Amendment search 
occurred (p. 953). The Court held that the government conducted a search in attaching the 
GPS device to the personal property of the subject under investigation with the intent to 
collect information and actually having collected information (pp. 948, 952).  
In relying upon traditional trespass theory as a threshold issue to 
resolve whether the use of GPS in Jones was a search under the Fourth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court avoided having to answer as a matter of law whether the government’s 
use of mass surveillance invokes Fourth Amendment privacy concerns (Hutchins, 2012). 
The Supreme Court left open to subsequent review whether it is constitutional for the 
government to track an individual’s movement for a period of time as long as no physical 
trespass to individual’s property occurs (Rosen, 2012). As a result, despite being the first 
Supreme Court decision on GPS surveillance by the government, Jones provides minimal 
guidance to law enforcement on the appropriate boundaries under the Fourth Amendment 
for the use of sensor surveillance technology.  
Somewhat equivocally, the majority opinion also held that the 
reasonable expectations test, the Katz standard, remains valid law (United States v. Jones, 
pp. 952–953). Absent the threshold trespass by the government, the foundation for the 
Jones decision, the Court held that governmental surveillance without trespass would 
remain subject to a Katz analysis (p. 953). However, the Court failed to further define the 
reasonable expectations of privacy in a digitized world, and therefore, the distinctions are 
left for the lower courts to work out. 
The Jones court did hold that the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy test is an expansion of, rather than a substitute for, the common-law trespassory 
                                                 
47 Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion of five justices. Justice Sotomayor joined the majority 
opinion but also wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Alito wrote a concurrence, but only in result, 
and was joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and Kagan. 
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test (United States v. Jones, p. 952). However, it failed to address remote, e.g., non-
trespassory surveillance, and as a result, the critical privacy inquiry remains—does the 
government’s expansive use of pervasive, mass surveillance of its citizens movement 
upon the public way overcome reasonable expectations of privacy? How Jones impacts 
subsequent legal review of the government’s use of sensor technology to conduct 
surveillance remains uncertain. In part, the decision in Jones reaffirms that location 
remains a critical reference in determining the constitutional protections afforded 
individuals (Gershman, 2010, p. 927). However, Justice Alito noted that the Court’s 
decision would create vexing problems for courts reviewing future surveillance cases, 
particularly where the government’s surveillance is remote, without physical intrusion 
upon the subject’s private realm (United States v. Jones, p. 962), with Justice Alito 
concurring. The physical trespass doctrine, the basis for the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Jones, fails to address the government’s ability to conduct GPS surveillance when the 
GPS is carried by the party being tracked—namely through cellular telephone technology 
or as a result of an event data recorder, (EDR), technology in automobiles48 (The 
Editorial Board, 2013). 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s narrowing of the privacy issue 
before it, rather than examining the privacy impact of the expanding use of pervasive 
mass surveillance technology by government, the gap between privacy protections and 
the government’s use of surveillance technology will continue to grow. The Supreme 
Court justices failed to define where and when Fourth Amendment constitutional triggers 
occur, despite noting that for most offenses, longer-term GPS surveillances may impinge 
upon constitutional expectations of privacy (Clancy, 2012, pp. 312–316). The 
disinclination of the Supreme Court to address the general privacy concerns raised by the 
government’s use of GPS to conduct surveillance is even more perplexing given the 
concerns noted within the majority and concurring opinions over the privacy impact of 
surveillance technology used by the government (United States v. Jones, p. 954), with 
                                                 
48 Over 96% of vehicles now have EDRs, (black boxes), which include GPS technology. However, the 
law is all over the place as to who can access the information and when, with only 13 states having laws. 
The Senate introduced a bill to mandate their installation in all vehicles, yet does little to address the 
privacy concerns raised by the data, which is not considered to be owned by the vehicle owner.  
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Justice Sotomayor concurring (pp. 956–957), and Justice Alito concurring (pp. 961–963). 
In failing to provide legal guidance and a framework to address the broader privacy 
issues triggered through the government’s use of surveillance technology, and not just 
identifying vague concerns, the Jones Court merely kicked the can—or the sensor—down 
the road.  
6. Evolving Body of Local Law 
In the absence of specific legal guidance, privacy protections afforded U.S. 
citizens are becoming an issue of local geography rather than consistent legal policy. 
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, lower courts have been more aggressive in defining legal 
parameters for the government’s use of GPS to conduct surveillance and its implications 
for privacy. In light of the refusal of the U.S. Supreme Court to establish the legal 
parameters for the government’s use of GPS surveillance in Jones, lower court decisions 
will continue to drive the legal privacy protections for individuals subject to the 
government’s use of mass surveillance technology. These decisions continue to come 
before the courts, with somewhat varying outcomes, as noted below. 
a. People v. Weaver 
In a pre-Jones decision, in People v. Weaver, the New York state’s highest 
court addressed whether the use of a GPS device attached to the vehicle of the subject 
under surveillance for a period of 65 days constituted a search (People v. Weaver, p. 
1201). The court found the government’s prolonged use of a GPS device to conduct 
surveillance to be a massive invasion of privacy, and as such, surveillance is inconsistent 
with even the slightest reasonable expectation of privacy (p. 1201). The Weaver court 
identified concerns over the lack of judicial oversight for the “dragnet use” of the 
technology that allowed access to intimate details of daily life at the sole discretion of 
law enforcement (p. 1203). Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the state court identified that 
26 years after Knotts, GPS technology forces the issue of whether twenty-four hour 
surveillance of any citizen were possible without judicial oversight (p. 1200). While 
recognizing the area remains unsettled as a matter of federal constitutional law, the 
Weaver court held that the state of New York’s constitution provides greater privacy 
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protections for its citizens, independent of any federal Fourth Amendment application (p. 
1202). Weaver demonstrates not only the different outcomes possible under traditional 
Fourth Amendment privacy analysis, but also the willingness and capacity of state courts 
to expand privacy protections to its citizens independent of the federal constitution. 
b. U.S. v. Skinner 
Within the 6th Circuit, pursuant to United States v. Skinner, no Fourth 
Amendment implications arise from the government’s use of the GPS located within the 
cellular phone of an individual tracked by the government (United States v. Skinner, p. 
777). In Skinner, the government obtained an order from a federal magistrate judge 
authorizing the release of subscriber information, cell site information, GPS real-time 
location, and “ping” data for the individual’s phone, and tracked the individual for a 
period of several days through several states (p. 776). Identifying the phone was a tool 
used in the furtherance of criminal conduct; the court held that no reasonable expectation 
of privacy is anticipated, despite the defendant’s stated expectation that the phone was 
not traceable by law enforcement (p. 777). In a nod to Knotts, the court noted that 
physically tracking a defendant and tracking him via cell phone GPS technology offers 
no constitutional difference (p. 778). The Skinner court held that law enforcement tactics 
must be allowed to advance with technological changes to prevent criminals from 
circumventing the justice system using technology (p. 778). 
In distinguishing its decision from that of the Supreme Court in Jones, the 
Skinner court noted that the defendant obtained the cellular telephone for the purpose of 
communication (United States v. Skinner, p. 781); unlike the action in Jones where the 
police physically occupied private property to place a GPS unit on the individual’s 
property, and the individual’s phone already included the GPS technology used to track 
the phone’s location (p. 781). The government used a known telephone number to track 
the device while it travelled upon public thoroughfares; therefore, the court ruled that 
Skinner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the GPS data and location of 
his cell phone” (p. 781). As a result, the use of cellular telephone GPS signals to track the 
location of a cellular telephone, and, ostensibly an individual, does not constitute a search 
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within the 6th Circuit. In this post-Jones decision, the legal focus remains on the level of 
governmental intrusion, and whether a reasonable expectation of privacy is anticipated.  
c. U.S. v. Nowka 
In U.S. v. Nowka, the defendant moved to dismiss video surveillance 
obtained as the result of the government’s installation of a camera upon a utility pole that 
allowed the camera to be aimed at the defendant’s property (United States v. Nowka). 
Relying in part upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, the claim before the court 
focused on the trespass from the installation and retrieval of the camera and the 
pervasive, 24 hour surveillance capacity of the surveillance camera (United States v. 
Nowka). However, the district court held that no governmental trespass occurred as no 
proof existed that the pole on which the camera was installed was either owned by the 
defendant or was on his property (United States v. Nowka). As a result, pursuant to Katz, 
the Nowka court held that no reasonable expectation of privacy was anticipated given that 
the camera took pictures of an area plainly visible to anyone (United States v. Nowka).  
Unlike the issues raised in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision in 
Maynard, the Nowka court did not address, nor was it concerned with, the length of the 
camera surveillance. Rather, the Nowka court analogized the camera surveillance before 
it to the surveillance conducted in Florida v. Riley (United States v. Nowka). In Riley, the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that no Fourth Amendment protections attached to a party 
arrested after law enforcement discovered contraband in a field by flying a helicopter 
over the individual’s property (Florida v. Riley, p. 445). Rather than delve into the 
privacy concerns raised by technology, the Nowka court decided the issue before it 
pursuant to traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine in focusing on how the GPS device 
was installed and how the government obtained the information rather than the breadth 
and duration of the government’s surveillance. 
As evidenced by the Skinner and Nowka decisions, the precedential 
guidance of Jones does not dispose of the issues raised by pervasive surveillance. In fact, 
Justice Alito notes that the Court’s decision in Jones fails to provide sufficient guidance 
for subsequent cases wherein the government uses technology that provides the ability to 
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conduct surveillance without trespass (United States v. Jones, p. 955). In a pre-computer 
age, the privacy protections of the Fourth Amendment were based upon practical 
considerations (United States v. Jones, p. 963), with Justice Alito concurring. However, 
attempting to analogize surveillance technology to physical intrusion, which is the 
precedential focus of Fourth Amendment doctrine, creates problems in logic given the 
mass amounts of minute data that can be obtained without physical intrusion (pp. 956–
957), with Justice Sotomayor concurring. This issue, tying Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence to a physical standard in a digital era, was a specific concern of five of the 
nine Supreme Court justices in Jones. See United States v. Jones, with Justice Sotomayor 
concurring (pp. 955–957), and Justice Alito concurring (pp. 961–963), and but for Justice 
Sotomayor’s identification of trespass as a constitutional minimum standard for 
determining the government conducted a search, thereby joining in the majority opinion, 
the decision in Jones may have been different (pp. 954–955), with Justice Sotomayor 
concurring. Accordingly, the precedential value of Jones will continue to be refined 
within the decisions of lower courts.  
In addition to limitations caused by courts narrowing the privacy issues 
addressed under fact-based decisions, the case law approach is also temporally limited. It 
takes years to resolve a constitutional challenge to an alleged privacy violation; the GPS 
device at issue in Jones was attached to the vehicle in 2005 (United States v. Jones, p. 
948). However, the pace at which technology is developed and introduced within the 
United States far outstrips the leisurely pace of fact driven case law. Pending definitive 
legal resolution of the appropriate boundaries for the use of surveillance technology, 
users and providers of new technology suffer from a lack of certainty, not only in data 
privacy, but also in the use and procurement of the technology involved (Elaluf et al., 
2011, p. 6). Therefore, the risks in adopting new technology without clear guidance on 
privacy or legal restrictions will continue to be a barrier to effective and appropriate 
governmental use of sensor technology to conduct surveillance.  
Ultimately, the challenge in defining privacy via constitutional legal 
review is that while the courts debate the meaning of words, privacy is an area of emotion 
and inherent right (Solove, 2010, p. 1513). As noted in Jones, the legislature can more 
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rapidly and ably respond to changing public attitudes regarding technology and craft the 
delineations that appropriately balance privacy and public safety in a timely, 
comprehensive way (United States v. Jones, p. 964), with Justice Alito concurring. The 
balancing of interests, privacy, and public safety, through clear and comprehensive 
legislative guidance, would better serve both public safety and personal civil liberties.  
7. Statutory Response to Technology Surveillance  
No comprehensive statutory protection for privacy exists within the United States 
and, as a result, a gap occurs in the protection for citizens from governmental intrusion 
into the private realm (Solove, 2010, p. 1517). As information becomes more digitized, 
the third party doctrine and the lesser protections afforded transaction data as opposed to 
communications data allow for significant privacy intrusions (Bagley, 2011, p. 167). 
However, Americans are increasingly using cloud computing and other private sector 
service providers to create, store, and publish their personal papers and effects, thereby 
increasing reliance upon third parties for the storage of their personal information (pp. 
154–155). While the courts have held that automation of manual processes are not 
constitutional issues, Fourth Amendment doctrine continues to review privacy issues 
involving technology within a quaint perspective and fail to address the privacy 
implications that digital information brings forth, as compared to paper documents. The 
existing patchwork of state and federal statutory laws does not cover this gap nor do it 
fully protect individual privacy. 
Existing statutes that address privacy are incomplete and do not cover privacy as a 
single issue. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the United States is a society that 
chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance (United States v. 
Knotts, p. 282). However, in contrast to the most of the developed world, the United 
States has no strong, comprehensive law protecting privacy (Stanley & Steinhardt, 2003, 
p. 15). Given the adherence to the third party doctrine by U.S. courts under the Fourth 
Amendment, only limited protections exist for digital records, and, therefore, privacy 
protections for electronic communications generally come from statutory protections 
(Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS), 2009, ch. 1B3). Statutes do 
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provide two advantages over Fourth Amendment constitutional law—they can be drafted 
to delineate protections and consequences specifically for the failure to adhere to the 
statute and they may be drafted to apply to specific interests, such as directing the actions 
of private parties. However, in that many of the existing legislative privacy statutes were 
adopted in response to specific privacy concerns, privacy statutes vary significantly in the 
protections offered to individuals (Bergelson, 2003, p. 392).  
New surveillance technology often generates a legislative reaction as privacy 
concerns grow. Statutory regulations amongst the different jurisdictions vary, thereby 
resulting in a lack of consistent guidance over government surveillance or clear 
protection for privacy (Helft & Miller, 2011). Legislation driven in response to a specific 
technology fails to provide guidance for current and future privacy issues, which results 
in a continuously reactive response to new privacy intrusions. For example, arising from 
the disclosure of Judge Robert Bork’s video rental choices during his Supreme Court 
confirmation battle, video records are now protected through The Video Privacy 
Protection Act of 1988 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2002)) (Electronic Privacy 
Information Center, 2011). However, in 2012, many consumers no longer rent movie 
videocassette tapes, as identified within the act. Rather, they use the Internet to obtain 
their movie via a download—something not envisioned or addressed under the Video 
Privacy Protection Act. A limited legislative intent results in limited privacy protections, 
as a review of some of the key privacy statutes demonstrates. 
a. Federal Legislative Response to Law Enforcement’s Use of 
Eavesdropping Surveillance—Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968  
One of the first statutes that addressed law enforcement’s use of 
surveillance technology, the Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968, (“Title III”), provides federal regulation and control over the surveillance of 
electronic communications (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522). Title III demonstrates Congress’ 
ability to create legislation that balances the competing interests of law enforcement 
investigative needs and civil liberty interests independent of the provisions of the Fourth 
Amendment. Title III operates as a comprehensive statutory framework that regulates 
 96 
real-time monitoring of wire and electronic communications (Computer Crime and 
Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS), 2009, ch. 1B3). It also serves as an example of the 
strength of statutory authority limiting the government’s use of surveillance technology 
and also its weaknesses from a privacy perspective. 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari to two cases involving 
the use of electronic surveillance by the government in 1967. Extensive Congressional 
hearings were ongoing during the Berger hearing before the Supreme Court (Berger v. 
New York, pp. 112–113). Granting writ of certiorari to Berger and Katz signaled 
Congress that legislative action would have to await the Court’s decisions (Kerr, 2004, p. 
849). The Supreme Court decisions in Berger and in Katz established constitutional 
limitations over the government’s use of technology in wiretapping private 
communications (Berger v. New York; United States v. Jones, pp. 950, 959–960), with 
Justice Sotomayor concurring. Title III was Congress’ legislative response to the 
Supreme Court decisions in Berger and Katz and remains valid law today. Title III 
addressed the constitutional standards established by the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Berger and Katz and provided legal authority to law enforcement to conduct wire 
surveillance while mandating rules of procedure that ensured the government’s actions to 
specified standards.  
When it comes to privacy protections regarding wiretapping surveillance, 
statutes provide the primary source of protection (Kerr, 2004, p. 850). Title III provides 
for a limited grant of authority to law enforcement to conduct electronic surveillance, 
provided adherence to the legislatively specified procedural requirements occurs as listed 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). Section 2518 delineates the mandated requirements for the 
safeguard of citizens subject to governmental surveillance of electronic communications, 
including the identity of the subject, the nature of the communication, the time 
provisions, the minimization requirement, the record keeping and warehousing 
provisions, and a notice requirement (Sheridan, 1975, p. 339). Title III also prohibits 
private citizens from access to and the use of certain electronic surveillance (18 U.S.C. §§ 
2511, 2515). In enacting Title III, Congress ensured that the complex field of electronic 
 97 
surveillance was not left to the Courts to govern through evolving case law and stare 
decisis (United States v. Jones, p. 963), with Justice Alito concurring.  
Title III also ensures that the government adheres to consistent standards 
when eavesdropping on the communications of its citizens. In granting specific authority 
to law enforcement to conduct electronic surveillance, Congress pre-empted independent 
state legislation governing the surveillance of electronic communications, absent 
adherence to federal standards (United States Attorneys Manual (USAM), 1997). Title III 
mandates that wiretapping be limited to the investigation of serious crimes as delineated 
within the statute, and may be allowed under similar state laws, including murder, 
kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in dangerous drugs or other 
felony crimes (18 U.S.C.A. § 2516(1) &(2)). The courts have found that in enacting Title 
III, it was Congressional intent that the use of wiretapping be reserved as an 
extraordinary investigative tool of last resort (United States v. Giordano). No wiretap 
order may be issued unless law enforcement can show that other investigative procedures 
have failed, are useless, or are too dangerous (18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c)). Finally, under 
Title III, law enforcement must always consider whether normal investigative procedures 
could be used as effectively and given the evidence obtained as a result of each 
succeeding wiretap (United States v. Castillo-Garcia). Congress has assumed the lead in 
addressing privacy concerns associated with wiretapping, and the deference of courts to 
Title III rather than constitutional law in deciding such cases confirms Congress’ 
authority (Kerr, 2004, p. 840). Title III demonstrates Congressional authority to enact 
controlling legislation for governmental use of technology in conducting surveillance and 
could provide a model for addressing new surveillance technologies.49  
However, Title III does not control the government’s use of all electronic 
surveillance technology. Title III is a comprehensive statutory response to wiretapping, 
but it is limited in its privacy protections, as it only addresses a specific surveillance 
technology used by the government (United States v. Torres). As such, Title III serves 
                                                 
49 In fact, the proposed ECPA 2012 Amendment is modeled after some of the requirements contained 
within Title III, as discussed herein and certain portions of the proposed GPS Act, as discussed herein. 
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limited purpose in addressing the government’s use of surveillance technology developed 
since 1968, a significant gap given the explosive growth of sensor technology.  
b. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
In 1986, Congress amended Title III by enacting the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, (ECPA) (Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
of 1986, §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2712, 3121–3126). ECPA was Congress’ attempt to 
address privacy in the digital age (Wells, 2009, p. 230). ECPA was intended to address 
the fact that no longer is personal information secreted behind closed doors as hard drives 
now serve as filing cabinets and personal computers now store massive amounts of 
personal information, inclusive of financial and medical records (Saylor, 2011, p. 2812). 
ECPA is a trio of laws: the Wiretap Act or Title III (18 USCA §§ 2510–2522), which 
governs the interception of the contents of electronic communications; the Stored 
Communications Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711), which covers the disclosure of certain 
electronic communications, and the Pen Trap statute (18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3126), which 
regulates the real-time collection of communications address information (Burstein, 2008, 
p. 185). However, as with Title III, ECPA is limited in its protections and is primarily 
aimed at technology used by the government for the surveillance of communications 
(Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 2011).  
ECPA also applies to private entities (18 U.S.C. § 2510). Statutory 
restrictions on private parties are important as entities, such as third-party service 
providers, contribute to privacy concerns in a digital world, and particularly for stored 
and downloaded digital content. When a private party has been given information that the 
government seeks, the U.S. Supreme Court has been known to hold that no expectation of 
privacy exists under the Fourth Amendment (Kamin, 2004, p. 104). Therefore, private 
parties have the potential to circumvent constitutional limitations on government through 
the use of third-party communications services, such as Internet service providers, to 
facilitate governmental surveillance (Kerr, 2004, p. 872). In drafting ECPA legislation to 
ensure applicability to private parties, Congress attempted to address concerns over the 
role of private parties and data surveillance of U.S. citizens, albeit within certain limited 
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circumstances50 (Kamin, 2004, p. 121). However, at least one court has held that the 
ECPA’s concern for privacy extends only to government action and third-party service 
providers, such as ISPs, are free to turn stored data and transactional records over to 
nongovernmental entities (United States v. Hambrick, p. 507). Therefore, the application 
of ECPA is still evolving given the growth of electronic communications.  
When enacted, ECPA extended protections to electronic communications 
that fell outside the existing statutory scope of Title III, and thereby, were without clear 
constitutional protections (Burnstein, 2008, p. 186). ECPA was drafted to include the Pen 
Trap Statute and the Stored Communications Act, in addition to the existing Title III, The 
Wiretap Act. Under ECPA, protected content includes any information concerning the 
substance, purport, or meaning of that communication as it applies to any wire, oral, or 
electronic communication (18 U.S.C. § 2510(8); EPIC, n.d.a.). Essentially, if an 
electronic communication is in transit from origination to destination, the Wiretap Act 
applies; if it address information, such as phone number, then the Pen Register Act 
applies, and if it is already in electronic storage, then the Stored Communications Act 
governs (Oyama, 2006, p. 503).  
c. Pen Register Act 
A pen register is a device that records or decodes dialing, routing, 
addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a 
wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that the pen register 
does not include the contents of any communication (18 U.S.C.A. § 3127 (3), (4)). Pen 
registers record addressing information, such as telephone numbers and do not collect the 
contents of communications (United States v. New York Telephone Company).  
The U.S. Supreme Court has found that no reasonable expectation of 
privacy is anticipated in the information generated by a pen register (Smith v. Maryland, 
pp. 742–745). In Smith, the issue presented to the Court was whether the phone numbers 
generated from a pen register installed by government without a warrant should be 
                                                 
50 For example, employers have wide discretion to monitoring employees email under the business 
use, consent and purpose exceptions of ECPA, and as a result, the greatest restraint on workplace 
monitoring of electronic communications is the employer’s statement of what is their policy. 
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suppressed as evidence (p. 737). The defendant in question was accused of robbing 
someone and then repeatedly calling this individual subsequently (p. 737). The Supreme 
Court found that telephone subscribers do not harbor any general expectation that the 
numbers they dial will remain secret; as such information is routinely used and disclosed 
to various parties within the context of normal business practices (p. 743). Absent a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone numbers, no search for Fourth 
Amendment purposes occurred (p. 743).  
Subsequently, other courts have expanded the application of Smith to e-
mail and Internet users, finding that no expectation of privacy is anticipated for email 
addresses or the internet protocol (IP), addresses of websites visited, because the 
information is provided to and used by Internet service providers as a matter of routine 
business. For example, in United States v. Forrester, the 9th Circuit analogized the 
government’s use of a pen register to capture email address information or IP addresses 
of websites visited through an Internet service provider to Smith and held that such use 
was not a search (United States v. Forrester). In Forrester, the government used 
information captured from a pen register installed through a service provider to capture 
email address information, the IP addresses of websites visited, and the overall account 
volume (p. 505). Therefore, the Forrester court held that the government’s access to such 
information does not implicate the Fourth Amendment because users have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in such addresses (p. 509). The court found the use of email 
addresses indistinguishable from the use of telephone numbers, and identified that the 
voluntary relay of contact number information through a third party negated any general 
expectation that the numbers, or email addresses, will remain secret (p. 510).  
The Pen Register Act does not translate fully to digital address tracking, 
but share similarities in that they represent addressing information to which content is 
delivered to another address, be it telephone or email. In that the Supreme Court has not 
definitively ruled on the protections afforded email addresses and IP addresses, what, if 
any, protections apply are left for the courts to interpret and determine. However, 
ignoring the growth of social connectivity in digital space, the result of a rigid adherence 
to the third-party doctrine, would fail to provide Fourth Amendment privacy protections 
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for a significant component of daily life (Strandburg, 2011, pp. 614, 639). Therefore, 
ECPA’s application to email addresses supports modern communication practices. 
d. Stored Communications Act 
The Stored Communications Act, (SCA), addresses the government’s 
access to data already generated and held, regardless of how stored (EPIC, n.d.a.). The 
SCA was originally established to regulate electronic mail and data transmissions and 
remote computer processing and data storage (Robison, 2010, p. 1205). The SCA Act 
regulates government access to transaction records, in part by requiring a subpoena for 
access to subscriber information (18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712). However, the SCA does not 
require a warrant to access all stored data, thereby creating privacy problems within the 
modern context (Strandburg, 2011, p. 645). The 1980s technology, when SCA was 
enacted, differs significantly in comparison to the explosion of email, social networking 
and other communication technologies now available and in widespread use. 
The courts are left to determine the outcome of the intersection of the SCA 
and third party doctrine as it applies to Internet communications. Some courts have ruled 
that customers of communication service providers do not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in customer account records maintained by a third party (United States v. 
Perrine). In Perrine, the government used data collected through the identification of IP 
access attempts and other email addresses to obtain subscriber information in prosecuting 
the appellant for child pornography (p. 1199). In fact, the Perrine court has noted that 
every federal court that has reviewed the issue has held that subscriber information 
provided to an Internet provider is not protected by the Fourth Amendment’s privacy 
expectation (p. 1205). While Perrine is in alignment with the Fourth Amendment’s third 
party doctrine, little electronic communication occurs without involving a third party. In 
that most websites now require users to disclose PII to gain access to services, and 
subsequently, store both content and non-content user information without legal 
limitation, the third party doctrine creates significant privacy concerns in a digital age 
(Bagley, 2011, p. 167).  
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Other courts are noting that the provision of consumer location 
information to a cellular service provider is not necessarily a voluntary disclosure. In re 
Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication 
Service to Disclose Records, the government sought disclosure of historical cell location 
information pursuant to the SCA, 18 U.S.C. §2703(d) and was appealing the denial by the 
magistrate judge (In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of 
Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to Government, p. 305). The 
government argued that no warrant or subpoena was needed but rather a court order 
sufficed to obtain the records it sought, given that the records were kept in the regular 
course of business (pp. 307–308).51 The 3rd Circuit found that the SCA standard required 
only specific and articulable facts showing that reasonable grounds existed to believe that 
the contents or record of a communication are relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation, which is a lesser standard than the probable cause required by the 
lower court (p. 313). However, the 3rd Circuit Court also found that cell phone customers 
have not voluntarily shared location information with a cellular provider in any 
meaningful way (p. 317). The court remanded the case back to the lower court to 
determine under articulable facts whether the government met the standards required 
within 18 U.S.C. §2703(d) (p. 317).  
Recently, further legislative action was taken to amend ECPA under the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act Modernization Act of 2012, (ECPA 2012). H.R. 
6529(11th): ECPA 2.0 Act of 2012 was introduced on September 21, 2012 by 
Representative Lofgren (D-CA 16) and was referred to committee (Govtrack.us, 2012). 
On November 29, 2012, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved a modified version of 
the original submission under H.R. 2471,52 which would require law enforcement official 
to obtain a warrant from a judge to access messages in individual email accounts, 
                                                 
51 The 3rd Circuit noted the additional support of other magistrates in the denial of the government’s 
access to the information, in the lower court’s primary finding that the government must show probable 
cause for a § 2703(d) order and identification that the government has long been required to obtain court 
approval for the installation and use by law enforcement agents of a device enabling the government to 
record or track the movement of a person or thing (In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a 
Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to Government, 2010, pp. 308–309).  
52 See, H.R. 2471. http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Leahy-Substitute-to-HR2471.pdf.  
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excepting certain exclusions (Savage, 2012). In part, update and clarification of the 
electronic communications protected under ECPA is needed so that law enforcement, 
communications service providers, and other communications vendors have clear 
guidelines and standards as technology advances amidst dated law and standards 
(Cheverie, n.d.). Most significantly, under ECPA 2012, Senator Leahy’s proposed 
amendment would expand protection to all emails, whether stored online or off (Sledge, 
2012). It would also protect information stored in the cloud, such as documents in Google 
Driveg (Sledge, 2012). As with ECPA in 1986, ECPA 2012 attempts to address privacy 
issues implicated as a result of modern communications technology. 
ECPA was intended to protect against unauthorized interception of 
electronic communications (In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider 
of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to Government, p. 313). 
However, ECPA fails to provide real protection for modern electronic communications, 
as a 1986 law is tracking 2012 technology (Sledge, 2012). ECPA still only applies to 
certain technologies and how the courts apply and interpret ECPA depends upon what 
type of information is sought and how old it is (Helft & Miller, 2011). Lesser protections 
for data in storage as compared to protections for data in transit, fail to account for 
today’s digital processes and how communications occur on a daily basis (Freiwald, 
2007, pp. 17–18). Government needs to obtain a search warrant, which requires a hearing 
before a judge with proof of probable cause that the targeted individual is engaged in 
criminal conduct only when it seeks to read e-mails that have not yet been opened by 
their recipient and are fewer than 180 days old (Savage, 2012). Those messages that the 
individual has read, and retains in an email account are afforded lesser protections 
(Savage, 2012). Additionally, no suppression remedies or penalties exist for the failure to 
adhere to ECPA standards (United States v. Perrine, 2008).  
In part, the ECPA protections exist as they do because of how technology 
was used in the 1980s. Given the dearth of email inbox capacity, most email messages 
important to the reader were downloaded and stored on a hard drive, as opposed to 
today’s expanded inbox capacity and use of cloud computing (Sledge, 2012). A court 
order or subpoena issued by a prosecutor will suffice for these types of messages (Sledge, 
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2012). Paradoxically, those messages opened and retained by the user are provided lesser 
privacy protections than those emails delivered and remain unread. Regardless, ECPA 
2012 remains under legislative debate, as concerns are raised over identifying the 
appropriate balance between public safety and privacy, and the impact upon criminal 
investigations that higher standards for government access would create (Savage, 2012). 
As it stands now, absent statutory governance, the third party doctrine under the Fourth 
Amendment serves to limit reasonable expectations of privacy in electronic 
communications given that most, if not all, such communications are stored within a 
third-party process. However, as evidenced by Congress’ legislative address of 
communications privacy through the enactment of Title III and ECPA, a legislative 
response can be an effective means by which to address privacy protections not 
necessarily inherent in the Fourth Amendment. 
e. The Privacy Act of 1974 
The Privacy Act of 1974, (The Privacy Act), governs the use and retention 
of PII by the federal government53 (The Privacy Act of 1974). The Privacy Act requires 
an information privacy officer and limits the collection and use of PII by federal entities 
(The Privacy Act of 1974, 8 (u)). Under § 552a(b) of the Privacy Act, agencies are 
prohibited from disclosing to any person or other agency any PII record that is contained 
in a system of records by any means of communication, except pursuant to a written 
request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record 
pertains (Bechhoefer v. U.S. Dept. of Justice). However, law enforcement investigations 
are exempt from the disclosure restrictions, thereby allowing for broader collection and 
dissemination of PII within law enforcement (The Privacy Act of 1974, (b)). Therefore, if 
an individual is subject to criminal investigative focus through governmental 
surveillance, privacy protections decrease under the Privacy Act. 
As with most privacy legislation in the United States, The Privacy Act’s 
jurisdiction is limited. The Privacy Act governs PII data processed and collected by the 
                                                 
53 The Privacy Act, albeit by reference, unambiguously defines the term “agency” as an agency of the 
federal government under Section 552(f) despite a broader reference under section 7(b) (Schmitt v. City of 
Detroit). 
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federal government and does not directly apply to collection or use by local governmental 
or private entities (Shaffer, 2000, p. 28).54 Given that law enforcement investigations are 
exempt from the PII collection and communication standards of the Privacy Act, it has 
minimal impact on data derived from law enforcement surveillance (The Privacy Act of 
1974, 8 B iii & (j) 2). Since the Privacy Act has minimal impact on local law 
enforcement, a significant user of mass surveillance technology, it provides little real 
privacy protection for the expanded collection of PII data through the use of pervasive, 
mass surveillance technology. 
However, the Privacy Act does provide guidance as to those PII data 
collection practices deemed appropriate by Congress. Under The Privacy Act, agencies 
may only maintain PII relevant and necessary to accomplish a required purpose of the 
agency (The Privacy Act of 1974, (e)(1)). Agencies maintaining PII are required to 
establish appropriate administrative, technical and physical safeguards to insure the 
security and confidentiality of records (The Privacy Act of 1974, (e)(10)). Disclosure of 
PII record information without the individual’s consent is prohibited, absent certain 
codified exceptions, e.g., use for research, criminal investigation or tax purposes (The 
Privacy Act of 1974, (b); Alexander v. F.B.I.). 
f. The Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance Act  
In keeping with the seemingly past practice of using legislation to address 
privacy concerns brought forward by a specific technology, a bill is pending before 
Congress that addresses the government’s use of GPS technology for surveillance. The 
Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance Act (GPS Act, 112th Congress (2011–2012) 
S.1212 and H.R. 2168),55 was first introduced in June 2011, and seeks to establish clear 
guidelines for governmental and private use of geolocation information (GPS Act). Thus 
far, the GPS Act has failed to gain legislative traction and remains inactive within 
                                                 
54 The Privacy Act may have some application to local government, as distilled through local 
participation in fusion centers, federal task forces or through certain federal grant requirements under 28 
C.F.R.§23, but is not an area of review within this thesis. 
55 Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), the lead Senate sponsor of the legislation, identifies the need for 
legislation because the government is trying to “race a technological Indy 500” with laws “out of the horse-
and-buggy era” (Anderson, 2011).  
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subcommittee, despite a recent attempt to amend the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, (S. 
3414), with provisions of the GPS Act, (S.AMDT. 2688) (GPS Act).56  
The GPS Act calls for enhanced oversight of government surveillance by 
requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant from a judge before conducting GPS-
enabled surveillance (GPS Act §2602(h); GPSGov, 2011). As with Title III, under the 
GPS Act, for law enforcement to obtain geolocation data from a variety of electronic 
devices, including cellular telephones, probable cause would be needed to obtain a 
judicial warrant to access geolocation information (GPS Act, §2601(5); Anderson, 2011). 
The GPS Act would also remove the legal distinctions, and differing privacy protections, 
between stored and real time location data (Granick, 2011). Despite the arbitrary 
distinctions made under ECPA, both types of data are significant sources of information 
(Granick, 2011). Furthermore, under §2605, the GPS Act holds private entities 
accountable for data disclosures and allows a right of civil action for those whose privacy 
rights have been violated in contravention of the GPS Act (GPS Act, §2605).  
In the recent decision in Jones, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to define 
constitutional parameters for law enforcement’s use of GPS in conducting surveillance of 
U.S. citizens. As a result, lower courts and state legislatures will continue to parse out the 
boundaries for permissible use of GPS by the government. Given the mobility of U.S. 
society, the GPS Act would ensure a consistent set of rules of engagement for law 
enforcement and ensure that privacy protections against persistent governmental 
surveillance through GPS are not based upon geography. However, while the GPS Act 
includes key protections for privacy, as with Title III, should the GPS Act become law, it 
will only address a specific surveillance technology in use by the government, namely 
GPS. Yet, in the absent of judicial direction and despite its focus on one technology, the 
GPS Act is one method to provide guidance to law enforcement and to protect individuals 
from the indiscriminate use of GPS surveillance by the government. 
                                                 
56 The GPS Act has failed to gain traction and remains inactive within subcommittee, despite a recent 
attempt to amend the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, (S. 3414), with provisions of the GPS Act, (S.AMDT. 
2688) (GPS Act, 2011; Walton, 2012). Whether the bill will be reintroduced remains to be seen. 
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g. The Gap  
The existing statutory scheme that seeks to protect the privacy of U.S. 
citizens has proven to be anemic. As pervasive surveillance and mass aggregation of the 
derivative data grow, so will the uncertainty about when and how the law protects 
individual privacy interests. Absent a comprehensive statute on data privacy, the 
piecemeal approach to legislative protections will continue, with little real protection 
afforded to individuals in a digital age. The courts have proven to be either incapable or 
unwilling to address the privacy implications of mass surveillance by the government, as 
recently reinforced by the U.S. Supreme Court’s failure to identify the constitutional 
limitations for the government’s use of sensor technology to conduct surveillance in its 
decision in Jones. Further, the Supreme Court willingly signaled that Congress, more so 
than the courts, should address the issue given it has the ability to better respond to 
privacy issues raised as a result of rapidly changing technology (United States v. Jones, 
pp. 963–964), with Justice Alito concurring. Unlike the courts, legislatures can 
experiment with different rules and make changes when necessary based upon outcomes, 
both anticipated and unanticipated (Kerr, 2004, p. 871). A comprehensive federal statute 
addressing data privacy protections, rather than continuing to legislate the government’s 
use of a single technology, will serve to protect privacy in accordance with the civil 
liberties guaranteed Americans. 
h. Statutory Data Privacy Protection 
Statutory data privacy protection is not without foundation. Unlike the 
United States, the rest of the developed world engages in strong comprehensive privacy 
laws (Stanley & Steinhardt, 2003, p. 15). Further, within the United States, little to no 
individual privacy protection is in place for the use and subsequent re-use of PII data, 
particularly for non-governmental users of such data. People are increasingly spending 
their lives in digital space, knowingly and unknowingly, exposing their personal details 
and images to constant recording by a great number of sensor devices, both private and 
government owned (Bignami, 2007, p. 235). Does convenience inevitably become a trade 
off for privacy such that it changes the shape of expectations of privacy? (United States v. 
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Jones, p. 963). Within this technology-rich society, millions of pieces of PII data are 
created, stored, and searched with great ease (p. 963). A variety of technologies within 
widespread use, from RFID toll transponders to cellular telephone location data, maintain 
PII as a routine business matter, and little legal control is exercised over the subsequent 
storage and reuse of the PII data generated. Given the increasingly blurred lines between 
public and private information, a data protection act would serve the interests of both 
government and individuals in identifying clear and consistent guidelines for data use, 
access, retention, and dissemination.  
Clear and comprehensive federal legislation regulating the privacy rights 
and responsibilities of government, individuals, and commercial enterprises that collect 
PII is needed due to the development of privacy laws in the international arena 
(Bergelson, 2003, pp. 394–395). In fact, unlike the United States, the European Union 
has specifically recognized, in principle and in discussion, the differences in privacy 
claims against the government and private individuals, and in establishing the 
fundamental framework for the consent of sharing PII (Litan & Swire, 1998, p. 683). The 
United States continues to prefer a voluntary, self-regulatory approach to data privacy 
protections, and has established the Safe Harbor framework to facilitate international 
business operations for U.S. companies dealing with personal data (Export.gov., 2012). 
While the United States shares democratic principles with EU member states, as of now, 
U.S. citizens do not share in similar privacy protections.  
C. PRIVACY PROTECTIONS ABROAD 
While the U.S. courts grapple with defining proper use of technology by 
government through facts specific to individual cases, the lack of data privacy protection 
for Americans is starting to have disparate impact in comparison to citizens of other 
countries. For example, Path, a social network company, uploaded the personal address 
book data to facilitate further data mining from over 2 million users without disclosure 
(Shih, 2012). While such action potentially places Path in violation of Britain’s Data 
Privacy Act, Path users in the United States have no similar legal protections as no 
federal law protects the privacy rights of U.S. citizens against such actions and Fourth 
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Amendment limitations do not apply to private entities (Shih, 2012). Further, unlike the 
United States where PII may be stored for subsequent use with minimal legal restriction, 
within much of the European Union, such information must be destroyed pursuant to law 
as soon as it is no longer needed to conclude the transaction between the provider and 
consumer (Bignami, 2007, p. 238).  
Many European countries offer specific enumerated privacy protections for their 
citizens. Within the European Union, data protection is treated as a basic human right 
(Bignami, 2007, p. 233). Countries that recognize explicit constitutional privacy 
protections for either the individual and/or the home include Belgium, Brazil, Finland, 
Greece, Israel, Italy, Spain, and Sweden (Privacy International, 2007). Some countries, 
like The Netherlands, grant specific rights of privacy to individual and, distinctly, to the 
home (The Netherlands Constitution).  
Proportionality is a recurring theme under European privacy. Generally, the focus 
of European privacy laws is on maintaining the contextual integrity of individual privacy 
in light of governmental need for surveillance (Taylor, 2011, p. 460). For example, 
individual privacy protections under the German Constitution provide for proportionality 
in conducting governmental surveillance, with a preference for as minimal interference as 
possible with those subjected to surveillance (Zoufal, 2008, p. 138). In regards to data 
retention, the German constitutional requirement is four pronged, and requires 1) 
proportional data security standards, 2) proportional purpose limitation, 3) transparency, 
and, 4) judicial control and limitation (Bellanova, De Hert, & de Vries, 2010, p. 4).  
The European focus on proportionality and balance in determining privacy 
interests is reflected within U.S. law, but is not as overt nor as strongly represented within 
U.S. statutory language, at least on a comprehensive level. For example, the standards for 
the Title III wiretap mandate balancing individual privacy and government interests by 
requiring that prior to the issue of a judicial order, other traditional, less invasive 
investigative means must have been addressed, as well as limits on the duration for a 
wiretap to ensure that the wiretap does not continue any longer than is necessary to 
achieve the objective of the authorization (18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(1) & (5)). The U.S. 
Constitution provides inherent rights, including the right to be free from unreasonable 
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search and seizure pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. However, constitutional law is 
one of interpretation, and the inclusion of technology into the fact pattern provides for 
differing outcomes as to what the constitutional protections actually mean. See, Katz, 
wherein the Court identifies the need for neutral predetermination of the scope of a search 
to protect against the government’s sole discretion (Katz v. United States, pp. 358–359). 
Further, Katz also stands for the need to balance the individual’s expectation of privacy, 
the subjective expectation, against that which society is willing to recognize as 
reasonable, the objective (pp. 360–361). As such, albeit within a less overt legal 
schematic, both the U.S. courts and Congress have recognized the need to balance 
governmental investigative need with individual privacy, in alignment with general EU 
concepts on privacy requiring proportionality in light of government electronic 
surveillance.  
1. European Convention on Human Rights 
The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)57 recognizes specific grants 
of privacy as a matter of inherent human right (Council of Europe, n.d.). The Council of 
Europe has treaty oversight for the ECHR, and both treaty and case law establish that 
ECHR rights are guaranteed to citizens within the European Union (Bignami, 2007, p. 
241). Article 8 of the ECHR guarantees the right to private life and family life, but it also 
provides for restrictions of this right under certain circumstances (Morariu, 2009, p. 47). 
Article 8 protections are limited, and can be modified to safeguard national security, 
defense, public security, or the prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of 
criminal offenses (ECHR Article 8(2)). In Article 8, protections are subject to “public 
security” restrictions, the protections are fluid, and dependent upon the definitions 
existing within society at the time of definition (Morariu, 2009, p. 47).  
As the ECHR relates to PII privacy, three principles emerge: 1) data collection 
and use must be conducted by a public authority for a public purpose, 2) the purpose 
must be legitimated, as defined in Article 8(2), and 3) the interference must be 
                                                 
57 The Council of Europe includes 47 member countries and seeks to develop common principles 
based on the ECHR in the protection of individuals (Council of Europe, n.d.). 
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proportional in that it is the least burdensome intrusion in support of the public purpose 
(Bignami, 2007, p. 242). With regards to governmental surveillance, the ECHR language 
and interpretation supports the principle that regulation is necessary when interference 
with private life occurs due to governmental surveillance (Taylor, 2011, p. 461). The 
ECHR legal framework not only specifically delineates proper action; it inserts a 
requirement of governmental balance of need and proportionality. Despite judicial 
practice of balancing the private and governmental interests under Constitutional privacy 
review, other than the provisions of Title III wiretap requirements, the statutory address 
of privacy in the United States often lacks such balancing requirements. 
2. Data Protection Acts 
Data protection acts regulate the retention and use of derivative data rather than 
uses of a specific technology. As such, data protection laws are seen as technology 
neutral (Elaluf et al., 2011, p. 6). Unlike a Fourth Amendment review, which must first 
identify whether a protected privacy interest does exist, a data protection act defines the 
privacy interests protected and the applicable legal standards. Therefore, the law becomes 
a means to protect privacy by identifying when the privacy interest is substantial enough 
to demand state action rather than state neutrality (Taylor, 2011, p. 457). Given the 
growth and magnitude of pervasive, mass surveillance technology in use by both private 
and governmental actors, protection of PII is a growing concern. Data protection acts 
establish clear guidance for lawful action in regards to privacy standards regardless of the 
technology involved.  
3. The European Union Data Retention Directive 
Within the European Union, PII for citizens of member states is protected under 
The Data Retention Directive, (The Directive) (Council Directive 2006/24/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006).58 The Directive provides 
guidance and standards for the collection and transmission of PII and other electronic 
data (Article 4 and Article 5). The Directive addresses data issues, such as the source and 
                                                 
58 The Directive, Council Directive 2006/24/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54, is available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32006L0024:EN:HTML. 
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destination of the communication, type and duration of the data, the type of equipment 
used, and the location and the identity of the party communicating (Morariu, 2009, p. 53). 
The Directive limits long-term access to PII by establishing retention limits of no less 
than six months and no greater than 24 months, absent certain exemptions (Article 6). 
Developed, in part, to address a perceived gap in PII access and use by law enforcement, 
The Directive exists to limit the amount of personal information available to the police 
(Bignami, 2007, p. 233). However, The Directive also allows for flexibility given that not 
all data is equal, and therefore, not equally protected (p. 236).  
The Directive’s call for proportionality arises out of ECHR Article 8(1), which 
grants respect for private and family life, home, and personal correspondence (ECHR 
Article 8(1)). However, the right to privacy is limited by the ECHR Article 8 exception of 
necessity (Article 8(2)). Necessity has been interpreted as requiring proportionality 
between the privacy interference and the pressing social need, for example, the protection 
of society from criminal activities (Morariu, 2009, pp. 54–55). As such, under the EU 
concept of proportionality a balancing of the individual’s interests against those 
competing interests, usually those of government is required (Article 8(2)). Within this 
framework, The Directive serves to guide data privacy boundaries for its member nations 
in determining the proper proportion and balance of privacy interests. 
EU member states still interpret and define the parameters of privacy within the 
laws of their individual nations. However, The Directive has certain standards, including 
adherence to the principal of proportionality, which requires determination as to whether 
the government’s interference with the individual privacy right is commensurate in 
achieving the legitimate object that the state sought to achieve (Taylor, 2011, p. 461). 
Despite mandated implementation of The Directive for EU member countries, many 
countries have yet to implement fully the provisions of The Directive, particularly as it 
applies to the telecom and internet industries (Ringland, 2009). Individual EU states are 
left to interpret The Directive’s provisions within the context of local law and standards.  
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4. A Practical Example—The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom and its experience with CCTV serves an example of the 
balancing of privacy interests within the EU system of law, ECHR Article 8 minimum 
privacy requirements, and PII data standards (Taylor, 2011, p. 467). The United Kingdom 
has engaged in the balancing of privacy and the government’s use of surveillance 
technology since the early 1990s, when its early implementation of CCTV began with 
minimal regulation or oversight (Zoufal, 2008, p. 129).  
Co-regulation, self-regulation with government, and private sector involvement, 
was a driver in the development of privacy standards for the U.K.’s early use of CCTV 
(Zoufal, 2008, p. 129). In part, the lack of formal legislation governing the use of 
surveillance technology contributed to the development of voluntary codes of practice 
and emerging standards for CCTV implementation (Webster, 2004, pp. 231–232). In 
effect, practice drove policy. However, as the use of CCTV surveillance grew, so did 
concerns over privacy. Given that the voluntary codes of practice did not have legal 
consequence, minimal relief or consequence for the failure to follow or enact standards to 
ensure privacy occurred.  
a. Code of Practice 
No statutory governance over CCTV surveillance of public areas occurred 
until March 1, 2000 when the U.K.’s Data Protection Act of 1998, (DPA), came into 
force (Information Commissioner, 2000, p. 2). The 2000 Code of Practice (2000 Code) 
incorporated the DPA’s data protection principles while advocating for good practices 
and standardization of the use of CCTV (p. 2). The 2000 Code incorporated DPA 
mandates, including the criminalization of the use of an unregistered CCTV system to 
record people in a public or private place unless it meets certain criteria (The Data 
Protection Act of 1998, n.d.). The 2000 Code demonstrated an evolution of both thought 
and technology and included specific, articulated decision points as to whether the stated 
need for CCTV technology was proper and proportionate in relation to its use 
(Information Commissioner, 2000, pp. 6–7). By incorporating the DPA’s legal  
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requirements with recommendations for best practices, the U.K. government sought to 
inform practice while striving for the accountability in the use of surveillance technology 
for both private and governmental entities. 
Reflecting not only the changes in technology, but also those within 
society, the 2000 Code was updated in 2008 (Information Commissioner, 2008, p. 3). The 
2008 Code was developed, in part, with the input of practitioners and had a goal of 
establishing more privacy oriented ways of using CCTV (p. 3). The 2008 Code updates 
were all based on the legally enforceable data protection principles of the 1998 Data 
Protection Act (p. 4). Unlike the earlier 2000 Code, the failure to adhere to the guidance 
within the 2008 Code could lead to legal consequence, with 62 legally enforceable 
standards to ensure compliance with the DPA (The Data Protection Act of 1998, n.d.). 
Further, the 2008 Code also included are 30 points of good practice, which together with 
the standards, were designed to build and maintain public confidence in CCTV systems 
and to ensure that they operate within the law (The Data Protection Act of 1998, n.d.). 
While the DPA mandated legal compliance, the recommendations for good practice 
sought to ensure that policy ensured privacy protections through actual practice. 
Perhaps as a manifestation of the rapid development in technology and its 
use, only three years later in February 2011, the U.K. government sought formal 
guidance on updates to the 2008 Code. The consultation had the stated goal of ensuring 
the use of CCTV technology to promote public safety, while providing assurance that its 
use is reasonable, justifiable, and transparent (Home Office, 2011, p. 3).59 This code 
update was expanded to include not only CCTV, but ANPR as well (p. 3). The 
progression of CCTV guidance from voluntary standards to those with measurable 
accountability and linked to a legally enforceable national data protection act 
demonstrates a public/private partnership centered on self-governing standards coupled 
with regulation that enhance privacy principles. Even absent formal legal action within 
the United States, the U.K. good practices model provides a policy option to develop 
consistent practice on surveillance technology.  
                                                 
59 The consultation for input closed as of May 25, 2011. New publication has not yet occurred (Home 
Office, 2011).  
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b. U.K. Data Protection Challenge 
The U.K.’s Code of Practice is linked to data protection, in that CCTV 
surveillance, as with most sensor surveillance technology, collects and stores PII (Taylor, 
2002, p. 72). Both the DPA and the EU’s governing standards have privacy protections 
for the individual. Within the United Kingdom, the individual’s right to privacy exists not 
only in the initial collection of the PII data, but also in the subsequent dissemination of 
the data captured (Taylor, 2002, pp. 76–78). The review of the collection and use of 
surveillance data, as balanced against proportionality, arose in an early case before the 
Court on Human Rights. 
In Peck v. The U.K., the Court on Human Rights, (Strasbourg), accepted 
jurisdiction over a claim by a U.K. citizen, Geoffrey Peck, that the dissemination of 
CCTV footage of his public suicide attempt was an impermissible intrusion into his 
private life (Case of Peck v. United Kingdom, pp. 10–15). The Strasbourg Court found 
the release of the footage, which showed his actions upon the public way, to be a serious 
interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life (p. 63).  
In deciding the case, the court was tasked with balancing the interference 
with the private life of the individual against the public policy goals of CCTV, which 
sought to garner public confidence in CCTV through covert display of its ability maintain 
public order (Case of Peck v. United Kingdom, p. 79). The collection of the image, the 
actual suicide attempt, was not at issue for Mr. Peck, and the Court did not find issue with 
the initial collection (pp. 54, 60). The Strasbourg Court did focus on the broad 
dissemination of the CCTV surveillance, identified a potential pool of hundreds of 
thousands of viewers, and found that it created a serious interference with Mr. Peck’s 
personal life (pp. 62–63). The Court held that while the government maintained a 
laudable policy goal of public safety and demonstrating the efficacy of CCTV, other 
options were available to protect the individual’s privacy, inclusive of consent or 
masking of the individual, and found that the disclosure constituted a disproportionate, 
and therefore, unjustified interference with his private life, in violation of Article 8 of the 
Convention (pp. 80–87).  
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The Peck court’s decision was based on the principles of proportionality in 
balancing the government’s interest in the initial intrusion, the collection of the CCTV 
images in furtherance of public policy goals, against the available options for 
minimization of the privacy intrusion, the subsequent dissemination (Case of Peck v. 
United Kingdom, pp. 80–87). As the United Kingdom moves forward in its integration of 
CCTV and other pervasive mass surveillance technology, such as ANPR, within its Code 
of Practice, sensitivity to the subsequent retention and dissemination of the data calls for 
articulated policy and guiding standards. Data retention and collection becomes entwined 
with the general concepts of privacy intrusion as the data becomes more digitized, and 
therefore, accessible more broadly. 
c. Statutory Data Protection within the United Kingdom. 
Statutory privacy protections within the United Kingdom include the Data 
Protection Act( Data Protection Act 1998 c. 29). The domestic statutory protections are 
also supported through the ECHR and The Directive. Within the DPA, specific guidance 
exists for the legal processing of PII data, as well as the retention and publication of such 
data. Section 20 requires notice for the collection of PII, and Section 21 makes it an 
offense for failure to notify, absent due diligence. Article 55 identifies the penalties for 
violations of the DPA. Part VI of the DPA identifies the authority and scope of the 
information ministers duties (See Articles 51–54). The DPA readily and clearly identifies 
the administrative guidelines for collection and dissemination of PII. 
Unlike the United States, where no single agency has responsibility for the 
oversight of privacy information, the DPA establishes an Information Commissioner, 
with not only the responsibility for oversight, but whose duties include developing Codes 
of Practice (Article 52). Any entity, public or private, engaged in processing PII data 
must register with the Commissioner (Information Commissioner’s Office, n.d.). As 
such, the complex issue of proportionality in the use and retention of PII becomes more 
standardized, given a central decision point, and oversight and published regulations and 
codes of practice, within the United Kingdom, as compared to the United States. 
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For data protection laws to have value, they must be effective. Regardless 
of the written word, data protection rights, in and of themselves, must be supported by 
policy and standards to guide government activity in regards to surveillance, both overt 
and covert (Taylor, 2011, p. 467). From a government perspective, protecting privacy 
should not merely be about ensuring compliance with the requirements of a specific law, 
but rather incorporating principles of human rights as a commonsense, ethical 
requirement in the conduct of surveillance (National Research Council of the National 
Academie, 2008, p. 53). Yet, civil libertarians are ambivalent about the existence of data 
protection acts, as support may be seen as acquiescence to the prevalence of surveillance 
as the norm, rather than mass surveillance generating a privacy concern in and of itself 
(Morariu, 2009, p. 58). However, the gate is open, so to speak, and no privacy value 
derives from ignoring the growing web of governmental and private mass surveillance in 
U.S. society.  
Regulation and accountability for collection and use of PII would serve to 
further individual privacy interests. Given the private data disclosed when engaging in a 
variety of daily activities, acceptance of surveillance in U.S. society, be it from 
government or private entities, may become the norm (United States v. Jones, p. 962). 
The U.K. CCTV Code of Practice demonstrates how government can facilitate public 
awareness, open discussion, and collaboration on the issue of privacy, data protection, 
public safety, and government accountability. Minimally, a similar call for an initial 
guidance review of existing practices within the United States might provide for a better 
informed public discussion on the status of the use of sensor technology for mass 
surveillance.60  
                                                 
60 Recently, the White House published a document on consumer privacy, which set forth a call to 
action for the various stakeholders involved in protecting consumer privacy in a networked world, under 
the guidance of the Federal Trade Commission, to develop a statement of basic privacy principles and a 
sustained commitment by all stakeholders to address consumer privacy issues. Therefore, such a call to 
action for surveillance technology is not necessarily without foundation (Consumer Data Privacy in a 
Networked World, 2012).  
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V. POLICY OPTIONS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE 
New surveillance systems will fundamentally alter the relationship 
between government and citizens.  
–Justice Sotomayor 
Several options are presented below that would provide options to bridge the gap 
and serve to protect privacy rather than merely limit the use of a specific technology. 
However, ensuring the proper balance between privacy and public safety is more a matter 
of subjective balancing rather than science. A variety of options exist to address the 
growing challenge of maintaining privacy given the expansive of pervasive mass 
surveillance, but none are all encompassing. The options explored include 1) self-
governance over the use of sensor technology, 2) use of the judicial process to continue to 
define the limits of the government’s use of surveillance technology under existing 
Fourth Amendment doctrine, 3) state control and definition of the privacy protections 
afforded their citizens, or 4) enacting comprehensive federal legislation to address the 
government’s use of sensor technology and the derivative PII data that results. Of these 
four options, the first has negligible accountability for those establishing self-governed 
standards. The second and third options represent the status quo and provide no 
additional safeguards for civil liberties and minimal direction for law enforcement in the 
furtherance of privacy protections. The fourth option, while providing long-term 
protection for privacy, requires political will to address an increasingly complex legal and 
social problem arising out of the mass surveillance of the movement by citizens in public 
by government. No single option is a panacea for protecting privacy, but ignoring the 
growing web of surveillance, and collection and dissemination of PII serves neither 
privacy interests nor government’s public safety needs. 
A. SELF-GOVERNING STANDARDS 
Establishing self-governing standards demonstrates commitment to civil liberties 
and legal mass surveillance practices. Further, voluntary, self-imposed standards provide 
for self-determination over mass surveillance policies and practices in light of legal 
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inertia. However, from a civil liberties perspective, self-governing standards are less than 
satisfactory in that they often lack outside review oversight and transparency and are 
malleable. One area in which self-regulation has been relatively successful is for newly 
developing technology, where economic issues exist in addition to privacy issues. For 
example, with Near Field Communications,61 the European Union encouraged self-
regulation to facilitate open competition and quick development of economically 
sustainable business models using the technology (Elaluf et al., 2011, p. 46). Also, within 
the United Kingdom, given the lack of formal regulation standards, co-regulation, a 
similar process to self-regulation, occurred with the initial development of CCTV 
(Zoufal, 2008, p. 129). However, as demonstrated by the updates in the U.K.’s Code of 
Practice and the ensuing increase in legal oversight of CCTV, privacy standards evolve 
with the technology and its acceptance within society. It may well be that self-regulation 
works better in the early stages of surveillance technology implementation, while the 
parameters of use are rapidly evolving and the full extent of the beneficial use of the 
technology, as well as its privacy implications, remains unknown. Within the United 
States, the need for caution in establishing legal parameters ahead of the social 
acceptance and use of technology with society has been voiced by the Supreme Court 
(City of Ontario v. Quon, p. 2,629). 
Within the United States, self-regulation around surveillance technology has 
mostly developed through so-called model policies, which lack legal authority for 
mandated implementation or oversight. For example, The Constitution Project62 has 
published “Guidelines for Public Surveillance” with policy recommendations for law 
enforcement’s use of surveillance technologies (Constitution Project, 2007). Professional 
groups, such as the IACP, which is comprised of criminal justice stakeholders, also draft 
model policy recommendations for its members, including the “Privacy Impact 
Assessment Report for the Utilization of Automated License Plate Readers” (IACP, 
                                                 
61 Near Field Communication enhances RFID systems by allowing two-way communication between 
endpoints, smart phones or other enabled devices. As compared to earlier RFID systems that were one-way 
only, two-way communication between enabled devices allows payment contacts or other such actions 
(Nosowitz, 2011). 
62 The Constitution Project is a bipartisan group focused on providing credible policy 
recommendations for a myriad of challenging constitutional.  
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2009). However, these types of policy recommendations are often generalized given the 
wide variance in statutory regulation and organizational structures among the states. 
Therefore, it is up to the individual members to determine whether the recommendations 
are legally appropriate for their jurisdiction and, if so, whether they will adopt or adapt 
the policy recommendations.  
Additionally, many governmental agencies, inclusive of public safety agencies, 
draft internal policies governing the use of surveillance technology. Voluntary adoption 
of privacy policies can be a concrete representation of an agency’s commitment to 
ensuring appropriate standards are in place to protect civil liberties. The DHS Traveler 
Redress Inquiry Program, (DHS TRIP), is one example of voluntary standards. Policies 
and procedures for individuals regarding restrictions on flight and their ability to petition 
the DHS TSA should they believe that government has incorrect information regarding 
their status are available publicly through the DHS website, thereby enhancing 
transparency and accountability for the organization’s now public standards.63 Law 
enforcement agencies also adopt procedures relative to surveillance and other privacy 
policies, which facilitate accountability and transparency (General Order 03-05 Video 
Surveillance Technology, 2011).  
However, internally drafted policies are malleable, as they are subject to 
modification based upon executive decision, and as a result, often lack the gravitas of 
legal mandate. Additionally, no legal means exists to guarantee the adoption of or 
adherence to voluntary, self-initiated standards. The failure of mandated adherence 
becomes an issue for private entities where economics and not social policy drive 
decisions. Therefore, self-regulation is not always embraced as an effective solution, 
particularly in the arena of privacy and civil liberty protections. Yet, in the absence of 
specific legal guidance, self-regulation over the use of surveillance technology and policy 
provides for autonomy and can be used to address the gap between public concern and 
government accountability. 
                                                 
63 The DHS TRIP program (Homeland Security, n.d.a.). 
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B. JUDICIAL DECISION PROCESS 
The Fourth Amendment has traditionally been used to define the legal parameters 
for allowable governmental intrusion into the private lives of its citizens. A line of 
Supreme Court decisions, dating back to the 1928 decision in Olmstead v. United States 
and continuing through the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in United States v. Jones, 
have attempted to define the limitations on government’s intrusion into the private realm 
of its citizens through the use of technology. However, Fourth Amendment judicial 
doctrine for developing technologies favors judicial caution with deference to legislative 
action relative to rules involving law enforcement investigations (Kerr, 2004, p. 805). 
Whether the precedent driven legal process of the U.S. courts remains a viable method 
for addressing privacy concerns in a digital age is still under debate.  
While technology advances rapidly, the legal decision process under the Fourth 
Amendment is incremental. Further, because judicial review under the Fourth 
Amendment is factually driven, the decisions are often seen as inconsistent, even when 
based upon seemingly similar technologies (Capper, 2011, p. 191). In 1928, the 
technology driving the privacy concerns before the court was the government’s use of a 
wiretap to eavesdrop on phone calls originating within the home (Olmstead v. United 
States). The Olmstead Court held that no Fourth Amendment search occurred absent a 
physical intrusion by the government (p. 438). Almost 40 years later, the U.S. Supreme 
Court reviewed a privacy claim involving the same technology but a different location—a 
public phone booth. In 1967, the Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States, holding 
that the Fourth Amendment protects people and not places (Katz v. United States, p. 351). 
Retreating from Olmstead, the Katz court ruled that a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
protected under the Fourth Amendment, might exist independent of the location of 
intrusion, be it in the home or in public (Katz v. United States, p. 353).  
Subsequently, new technologies continue to come before the U.S. Supreme Court; 
however, rather than address the privacy impact, the Supreme Court continues to review 
how technology is used, under a framework established using landline telephones. Beeper 
tracking technology, thermal infrared surveillance, and GPS, have all been decided in the 
ensuing years, all under the precedence of the Katz standard of reasonable expectation of 
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privacy (United States v. Knotts; United States v. Karo; Kyllo v. United States; United 
States v. Jones). Lower courts are deciding cases involving GPS and cellular telephone 
tracking (United States v. Bermudez; United States v. Amaral-Estrada; United States v. 
Flores-Lopez In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic 
Communication Service to Disclose Records to Government). However, reluctance 
continues to occur in reviewing these technologies anew by deciding upon the privacy 
impact of new, more intrusive technology rather than the government’s use of the 
technology. As a result, modern surveillance technology and its resulting digital lode of 
PII is reviewed within a legal framework established over 55 years ago when the 
technology in issue was eavesdropping on a landline telephone. 
Courts seek to narrow the issues under decision, thereby neglecting complexity, 
which is a hazardous way to set public policy on privacy and technology (Hosein, 2010, 
p. 153). The Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, which ignored the issues raised by 
pervasive mass surveillance by government, provides a concrete example of the ability to 
narrow an issue to avoid complexity. As a result, judicially driven law on mass 
surveillance technology may not provide adequate guidance for government nor serve to 
protect individual privacy. 
Further, judicial determinations, based on specific facts, before the courts drive 
case law, and the resulting distinctions based upon those facts, often fail to provide for 
clear guidance for the government’s use of surveillance technology. With technology, the 
application of past facts to determine current legal outcomes may well be comparing 
apples to oranges. The Supreme Court has recognized that rapid changes in the dynamics 
of communication are not just evident in the technology, but also in what society accepts 
as proper behavior (City of Ontario v. Quon, p. 2623). The judicial case law process, with 
its focus on established precedent, is faulty from the start if the technologies that guided 
the precedent bear no resemblance to those currently under review (Herbert, 2011, pp. 
448–450).  
Additionally, as newer technology emerges, the level and degree of the 
government’s physical intrusion into personal space, a touchstone of Fourth Amendment 
analysis, becomes less identifiable. Physical privacy intrusions, as opposed to pervasive 
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government surveillance, resonate more readily within the public psyche, as evidenced by 
the ongoing public outrage and governmental adjustment resulting from the very public 
inconvenience and indignity of airport screening (Harris, 2012). However, modern 
surveillance technology can be far more intrusive and far less visible than traditional 
physical searches. For example, the pinging of cell phones through cellular tower 
triangulation does not technically intrude upon an individual’s personal space, but does 
provide information not only about movement across public space, but allows for 
continual surveillance of the individual’s every movement, which in turn, provides 
significant PII regarding the person carrying the cellular phone being tracked (United 
States v. Jones, p. 933).  
Despite years of recognition of the privacy impact that technology brings, the 
U.S. Supreme Court remains ambivalent in establishing Fourth Amendment standards 
that limit the government’s use of mass surveillance technology. On the one hand, the 
Court has stated that the law must account for the advancement of technology and the 
implications for privacy as a result (Kyllo v. United States, p. 36). On the other hand, it 
has also noted that the use of technology in novel ways creates thorny problems and no 
need exists to rush to resolution if it is not necessary to address the privacy issue before 
the Court (United States v. Jones, p. 954). Despite a long history of raising concerns over 
the impact of technology and privacy, the U.S. Supreme Court continues to maintain that 
in 2012, it is still not the time to address the impact of technology and long-term 
surveillance (p. 954). The current Fourth Amendment framework, which requires 
independent analysis of each new technology through past legal precedence, serves 
neither the needs of the government in conducting criminal investigations nor the privacy 
protections sought by civil libertarians.  
The U.S. Supreme Court’s restraint, as evidenced in narrowly drawn decisions 
about how a technology is used by the government, despite decades of voicing concerns 
over the potential privacy impact of mass aggregation of data, fails to ensure timely 
address of constitutional privacy issues. However, modern life is intertwined with 
technology, which provides a data rich information environment in which absent legal 
restraint, government could readily obtain the intimate details of the daily lives of its 
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citizens with relative ease (Bignami, 2007, pp. 235–236). As a result, given its adherence 
to precedent, Fourth Amendment doctrine is often not as robust as is needed to address 
the rapidly evolving privacy issues surrounding the government’s rapidly evolving use of 
mass surveillance technology and the subsequent privacy impact of its use, dissemination 
and retention of the data derived from these technologies. 
C. LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS FOR PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 
The Fourth Amendment has been the focus for privacy issues arising from 
criminal investigations using new technology; it is statutory law that generates real 
privacy protections (Kerr, 2004, p. 807). The legislative process is more nimble than the 
precedential driven judicial law process (Committee on Technical and Privacy 
Dimensions of Information for Terrorism Prevention and Other National Goals, National 
Research Council, 2008, pp. 152–153). Further, the courts have already demonstrated 
deference to Congress in regards to technology standards, as evidenced by the enactment 
and the court’s adherence to Title III. Therefore, definitive legislative guidelines on 
privacy and data protection would inform and guide both citizens and government, while 
ensuring protection of civil liberties. 
However, statutory protections for privacy are often issue specific, derived from a 
patchwork of federal and local laws (Stanley & Steinhardt, 2003, p. 15). Further, the 
varying judicial decisions that attempt to reconcile Fourth Amendment law with local and 
federal statutes that govern specific privacy interests create uncertainty as to privacy 
standards. In an age in which technology enhances the government’s ability to mass 
monitor the public movement of its citizens, the absence of firm, guiding statutory 
privacy laws creates fissures for civil liberty protections and HLS.  
1. State Oversight of Privacy Rights of its Citizens  
The states are left to determine privacy standards as appropriate, absent federal 
law pre-emption or in light of an explicit grant of authority (Lane, 2003, p. 128). The 
Supreme Court has held that general rights of privacy are the responsibility of the states 
(Katz v. United States, pp. 350–351). Some states currently have explicit privacy 
protections for their residents. For example, the Florida Constitution provides that “Every 
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natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the 
person’s private life except as otherwise provided herein (Florida State Constitution, art. 
1, sec. 23). “A legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to 
draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way” 
(United States v. Jones, p. 934). In some respects, the states have stepped up to ensure 
privacy protections of their citizens in the absence of federal guidance.  
Using GPS as an example, some states, including California, have statutorily 
limited the right to track a person electronically to law enforcement by identifying that 
using GPS without a person’s knowledge is a violation of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. See, e.g., California Penal Code section 637.7, Stats. 1998 c. 449(S.B.1667)§2. 
Other states, including those, such as Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Minnesota, and 
Florida, all legislatively address the standards for use of GPS by law enforcement, with 
some mandating law enforcement officers must obtain a warrant prior to use of GPS. See, 
e.g., 18 Pennsylvania Constitutional Statute § 5761; South Carolina Code Annotated § 
17-30-140; Minnesota Statute § 626A.37, §626A.35; and Florida Statute § 934.06, 
934.42). Seceding responsibility for statutory privacy to the states would generate 52 
different sets of rules governing the conduct of governmental surveillance.  
Additionally, state legislated privacy rights are limited protections in that they 
provide protections only within the state. Reconciling differing privacy standards under 
the laws of the individual states would be problematic for law enforcement and for 
individual privacy in an increasingly mobile world, as the type and degree of privacy 
protections would be based upon geography rather than standardized legal rule. Granting 
sole jurisdiction over privacy to the states may also negatively impact interstate criminal 
investigations, with state lines determining whether an investigation can continue and 
under what rules of engagement. Reserving the protection of privacy to the individual 
states, as called for in Katz, not only creates inconsistent privacy rights among U.S. 
citizens, it creates barriers for criminal investigations across state lines.  
Examining privacy from a data collection and dissemination perspective, the 
outcome of mass surveillance by the government further compounds the problems arising 
from state legislative control of privacy. Within the realm of HLS, sharing information is 
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often a critical component of public safety strategies (Department of Homeland Security 
Information Sharing and Safeguarding Strategy, n.d.). Ostensibly, mass surveillance data 
is collected and retained to benefit public safety further. Therefore, surveillance is 
predicated upon the subsequent use and dissemination in the investigation of crime. 
However, if one state allows law enforcement to collect and store certain data, yet 
another prevents such collection, then significant practical and legal barriers arise. As a 
practical effect, the most restrictive state law becomes the controlling norm for any 
criminal investigation that might possibly cross-state borders, even if it does not. For 
example, within the Washington, DC area, four states converge within a relatively narrow 
geographic area. Would a law enforcement investigation risk the possibility of losing 
evidence of a crime if it occurs within one jurisdiction that does not have the same 
privacy standards as another? Finally, with today’s surveillance technology, an individual 
does not have to be physically present to conduct surveillance or to collect PII data. 
Therefore, a state may not have legal jurisdiction over distance-based surveillance and 
data collection, another impediment to ensuring privacy64 (Lane, 2003, p. 128). 
States are stepping up to fill the privacy gap that affects their citizens in the 
absence of federal guidance for limitations on privacy intrusions. States are also 
establishing broader protections for their citizens, seemingly rejecting the confusing and 
restrictive interpretation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment (Gershman, 2010, p. 
929). However, given the expanding use of technology, digital social networks, and the 
mobility of modern society, determination of privacy rights through land boundaries does 
not make practical sense—either for individual privacy or for law enforcement 
investigations. As such, the concept of the states as shepherds of individual privacy rights 
fails to protect individual privacy fully given the prevalence of mass surveillance and 
technology advancements.  
                                                 
64 While not a subject of this thesis, in that much of electronic communication can be seen as a form of 
interstate commerce, the level and degree of protection that the states could provide for its citizens may be 
negatively impacted by federal laws, such as the Interstate Commerce Clause. For example, the web’s 
underlying telecommunications infrastructure is already regulated through federal law.  
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2. Federal Legislative Prerogative 
Congress successfully addressed privacy concerns raised through law 
enforcement’s use of surveillance technology by establishing federal standards for 
eavesdropping under Title III. Effective measures to address the current legal and privacy 
concerns resulting from the government’s use of mass surveillance technologies will 
require no less an exercise of legislative authority, particularly so given the variable and 
distinct legal mandates that currently address surveillance technology and other privacy 
interests. Additionally, the wide range of surveillance technologies currently in use will 
make individuated legislation challenging. 
Existing federal legislation addresses privacy concerns arising from technology, 
albeit not on a coordinated, comprehensive scale. One example of such federal legislation 
is HIPAA, which was Congress’ response to the explosive growth of technology in the 
medical field (EPIC, n.d.c.). Among other standards, HIPAA identifies who is covered, 
what information is covered, and its permitted uses and disclosures, as well as mandating 
the notice of privacy practices and establishing rights (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, n.d.). Other federal privacy laws address some of the broader data 
collection and/or privacy protection issues, including the Electronic Privacy 
Communications (ECPA), the Privacy Act of 1974, or the E-Government Act of 2002. 
However, these laws are either issue specific or fail to address privacy protections 
comprehensively. For example, The Privacy Act and E-Government Act apply primarily 
to the federal government. ECPA is somewhat limiting in that it provides different 
protections based on where email is held and offers varying degrees of privacy based 
upon the perceived importance of the privacy interest involved (Justice Information 
Sharing, n.d.). Additionally, absent limited exceptions, federal legislation fails to provide 
comprehensive guidance or accountability for local law enforcement agencies that use 
surveillance technology.  
Congress has legislative authority to enact privacy standards, and recently, an 
attempt was made to exert federal jurisdiction over surveillance standards for GPS 
through The GPS Act, which remains pending before Congress (GPS Act, n.d.). As Title 
III did for wiretapping, should The GPS Act pass, it will provide a comprehensive 
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statutory legislative framework for GPS surveillance (Wyden, n.d.). Statutory guidance 
for lawful GPS surveillance during criminal investigations would serve to assist law 
enforcement. Given the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones that avoided ruling on the 
privacy implications generated by the mass surveillance capacity of GPS, The GPS Act 
would define limitations for governmental action and provide explicit individual privacy 
protections that the courts are unwilling or unable to address. Another recent example of 
Congressional legislative action around privacy was the recent attempt to enact ECPA 
2012 (H.R. 2471. (112th): Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 
2012). In introducing the bill, Senator Leahy sought to update ECPA to keep pace with 
technology (Savage, 2012). One key provision is that the bill seeks to provide the same 
protections for emails stored by third parties, as with papers stored in the home (Savage, 
2012). Additionally, absent certain exemptions, a warrant would be needed to access the 
emails stored by a third party service provider (H.R. 2471, p. 3, line 18–26).  
The federal legislative approach to privacy is not without barriers. Both The GPS 
Act, and ECPA 2012, remain pending bills, highlighting a key limitation of the legislative 
approach to protecting privacy, the need to have the political will to ensure passage into 
law. Further, Congressional focus remains myopic and generally only addresses a single 
or limited privacy issue. As seen with HIPAA, The GPS Act, and ECPA 2012, the 
privacy concerns that drive the legislation, the impact of mass surveillance and data 
collection on the private lives of citizens, are recurrent, even if the technology is not. In 
this regard, Congress parallels the courts in addressing only the technology vehicle rather 
than the underlying civil liberty concern—privacy.  
D. CONCLUSION 
As technology changes, expectations of privacy may shift, but the underlying civil 
liberty protections for privacy should remain. Through its legislative authority, Congress 
is in the unique position of being able to protect individual privacy, rather than merely 
limiting how government uses a specific technology to conduct surveillance of its 
citizens. Proper balancing of individual privacy and governmental need requires 
Congress to establish the rules governing information gathering and for the courts to 
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evaluate those rules (Solove, 2010, p. 1538). Given the lengthy delay for legal decision 
and the law’s inability to be sufficiently flexible to adapt to the rapidly evolving 
surveillance technology in use within the HLS field, a new approach is needed. Rather 
than having the courts continue to fail to bridge the growing gap between surveillance 
technology and individual privacy, Congress can step forward now to the protect the 
privacy of Americans from unwarranted intrusions from both governmental and private 
entities by enacting a federal data protection act.  
Comprehensive statutory data privacy protection is needed because the existing 
patchwork of federal, state and local privacy laws are insufficient to address privacy in a 
digital age. Further, most privacy legislation is centered on a specific issue or technology, 
and therefore, does not address the government’s expanding use mass surveillance 
technology to monitor the public movement of its citizens. Where national conformity is 
valued, federal law is the more useful vehicle to ensure consistency (Lane, 2003, p. 136). 
Exercise of federal jurisdiction over data privacy would ensure consistent, minimal 
standards for privacy protection with clear rules of engagement for all, including private 
entities. Given that PII and its use and retention, the byproduct of mass surveillance 
technology, is not specifically addressed in a structured, comprehensive law within the 
United States, a federal data privacy protection act would ensure privacy protections for 
U.S. citizens based upon identified privacy values rather than reactive legislation to 
address new technology developments.  
No perfect balance exists for protecting civil liberties while supporting 
governmental surveillance in the furtherance of the investigation of criminal acts, 
inclusive of terrorism. The law, although jealous of individual privacy, has not kept pace 
with advances in technology (Berger v. New York, p. 48).65 Eventually, precedential legal 
review centered on specific facts involving a specific technology will fail in providing 
any real privacy protections for U.S. citizens. While technology has changed the 
American way of life, when it comes to the delivery of privacy protections to U.S. 
                                                 
65 While the Berger court grappled with landline telephones and older eavesdropping technology, the 
privacy concern over technology’s rapid encroachment has remained voluble in the time since that 
decision. 
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citizens, the law relies upon a legal framework that evolves from the use of a landline 
telephone in a public telephone booth (Katz v. United States). At some point, the speed in 
which technology evolves will bypass precedential relevance, akin to comparing how to 
change the channels on a television; the remote is simply quite distinct and unique from 
manually changing a dial, and they do not compare. 
Privacy determinations under the Fourth Amendment take years and the 
individual legal skirmish lines drawn with each new surveillance technology and its use 
create uncertainty. For example, over seven years had passed from the installation of the 
GPS device by the government to the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones (United States 
v. Jones, p. 947); seven years of continued use and investment in GPS surveillance by the 
government and continued uncertainty as to the privacy implications of pervasive mass 
surveillance generated through the use of GPS. Given the Supreme Court’s narrow 
decision in Jones, which relied upon trespass theory, the legal uncertainties still remain 
for “novel modes of surveillance,” and are left for the lower courts to address (p. 954).  
For every new surveillance technology used, law enforcement agencies are left to 
guess whether its use will comport with the eventual decision of the Supreme Court. Not 
only does this uncertainty generate social costs based upon civil liberties concerns, but 
the years of delay in arriving at final judicial decision generates significant financial costs 
given the actual dollars spent on technology investments and the potential for financial 
waste if a court subsequently determines that the use of a specific technology violates the 
Fourth Amendment. Further, Fourth Amendment doctrine has no legal authority over the 
growing private sector’s use of sensor technology and the subsequent commodification of 
the derivative PII data. Alternatively, a federal data protection act would identify the 
privacy interests protected, rather than subsequently determining the limits for 
government actions in using a specific technology.  
Technology will continue to move the social norms for the boundaries of 
individual privacy given its advancement and prevalence within U.S. society. The more 
the courts continue to voice concerns about technology’s encroaching impact upon 
privacy, without action taken to limit that encroachment, the less likely it will be that 
privacy remains a viable legal concept. Further, the Katz two-pronged reasonable 
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expectation of privacy standard may well support judicial determinations that any mass 
surveillance technology used by government is not a search for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, given the pervasive presence of mass surveillance within U.S. society. In turn, 
such a decision could thereby eliminate the subjective, individual expectation of privacy 
as a matter of law (United States v. Jones; Chemerinsky, 2006, p. 950).  
Additionally, Fourth Amendment doctrine establishes permissible boundaries for 
governmental surveillance that may not comport with what individuals would expect as 
reasonable, as illustrated by the case law on cellular telephones. Judicial determinations 
hold no expectation of privacy is anticipated for location data when carrying a cellular 
telephone (United States v. Bermudez; United States v. Amaral-Estrada; United States v. 
Flores-Lopez). Yet, in purchasing a cellular telephone, most people would reasonably 
expect that they are purchasing a communication device and not a tracking device. 
However, given GPS technology embedded in cellular telephones and cellular tower 
location technology, cellular telephone users also carry a tracking device with them for a 
good portion of their daily activities, into and including the home, one that government 
can access with relatively minimal standards (United States v. Bermudez; United States v. 
Amaral-Estrada; United States v. Flores-Lopez).  
The Jones court identified that thorny and vexing issues are associated with 
determining the privacy impact of long-term surveillance of its citizens by the 
government (United States v. Jones, p. 954). However, if defining privacy interests and 
the government’s proper use of evolving surveillance technology is not needed now, at a 
time when Americans are actively monitored by the government and other tracking 
technology while merely going about their daily business, when do Fourth Amendment 
privacy concerns become relevant and timely? Whether disparate, individual judicial 
decisions are the manner in which Americans should have their privacy protected is 
subject to debate and question. However, as a matter of ensuring the civil liberties that 
Americans have traditionally enjoyed, legislative action defining what privacy interests 
will be protected is a far more logical, efficient, and effective option for protecting 
privacy in a digital age. 
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The government’s increasing reliance upon sensor technologies fuels civil 
liberties concerns as ever larger databases result from the data collected through the use 
of sensor and other technology (Stanley & Steinhardt, 2003, p. 15). As the data obtained 
from sensor technologies becomes more aggregated and increasingly more capable of 
individuation, the privacy issue is not limited to one of intrusion, but rather one of 
dissemination—which is not a Fourth Amendment issue. A lack of clear guidelines and 
accountability for data collection and retention practices can result in civil liberties 
violations and create mistrust in government (Taylor, 2002, p. 1). Governmental reticence 
in curtailing the disproportionate use of technology serves little social or legal value; as 
lack of governmental guidance will likely lead to further privacy litigation and erode real 
privacy protections in the wake of technological advances. The judicial focus on the 
government’s use of a specific technology not only impedes proper government 
surveillance, it obfuscates the real issue—privacy.  
Given the lethargy of the courts in addressing the impact of surveillance 
technology on privacy interests, legislatures have stepped up to fill the gap, albeit through 
a piecemeal approach. While some federal privacy protections exist against surveillance 
and access to PII, no comprehensive legislation addresses the privacy rights of U.S. 
citizens. The statutory patchwork of privacy laws at both the federal and local level are 
often directed towards specific, limited privacy interests and provide little guidance for 
appropriate government surveillance. More than 50 federal statutes address various 
aspects of digital security either directly or indirectly, but no overarching legislative 
privacy framework exists (Fischer, 2012, pp. 1–2). Further, while some state legislatures 
have stepped up to legislate privacy protections for their citizens, the variance in local 
laws results in disparity in privacy protections, thereby creating limitations for effective 
criminal investigations given the mobility of persons within U.S. society.  
A clear and consistent legislative mandate as to what privacy interests are 
protected, the level of protection afforded, and the defined rules of engagement for 
governmental surveillance and the use of sensor technology, will address the growing 
concern over technology’s impact on civil liberties. Legislative action will also support 
the public safety efforts of government through a provision of clear guidance for criminal 
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investigations and standards for processing the derivative data provided with sensor 
technologies. Given that no major legislation focused on technology and security has 
been enacted since 2002, and that ECPA, the governing federal statute on digital privacy, 
was enacted in 1986, the need to address privacy and technology legislatively is long past 
due (Fischer, 2012).  
A federal data protection statute would provide the comprehensive privacy 
protection needed as a result of the expansive growth and use of sensor technology in 
U.S. society, by both governmental and private entities. Even where new legislation has 
been provided, such as with the ECPA 2012, or the GPS Act, the legislative focus 
remains narrow, as with email communication and the need for a warrant to read emails, 
as proposed for the ECPA 2012, or the regulation of the use of a specific surveillance 
technology, GPS, under the GPS Act. However, as with case law driven by precedence, 
chasing technology through legislation will ultimately fail to protect privacy, because the 
development and use cycle for technology evolves far more rapidly than legislative 
action. The GPS Act was first introduced in 2011 and the ECPA 2012 was introduced in 
September 2012, yet neither has advanced (Govtrack.us, 2012). Both are responses to 
significant technology advances occurring for years prior to the introduction of 
legislation, and technology will continue to advance while Congress debates the values of 
specific provisions of the legislation (Sledge, 2012).  
A data protection act would direct the debate toward what privacy interests should 
be protected rather than what technology uses should be legislated. Minimally, as seen in 
the European Union, such legislation could govern the creation and access to PII, and 
mandate predicates, such as relevance to the governmental need, limitation of subsequent 
scope of use and purpose, and digital minimization and erasure once the PII data is no 
longer needed for the investigation (Bignami, 2007, p. 236). Enactment of a data 
protection act would also put the United States on the same privacy foundation as other 
democratic governments in Europe and ensure open access and participation in the global 
society in which all now live. Interoperability within the global economy requires mutual 
recognition of commercial data privacy, and while individual legislative schemes may 
differ, mutually recognized privacy protections are needed (Consumer Data Privacy in a 
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Networked World: A Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the 
Global Digital Economy 2012, pp. 31–33). Further, by recognizing standardized privacy 
principles through a data protection act, individual privacy rights become standardized, 
which in turn, provides guidance and direction for the courts and law enforcement as to 
what privacy interests are protected, rather than trying to direct the use of a given 
surveillance technology. Finally, in enacting a data protection act, the government will 
clearly establish the inherent privacy rights of U.S. citizens, rather than leaving it for the 
judiciary to decide as a matter of discrete, fact-driven judicial review. In other words, 
such legislative action would mandate governmental accountability to its citizens.  
Ultimately, it is the role and responsibility of the government to act with 
transparency and accountability to the citizens its serves, as well as to act with legitimate 
authority in ensuring public security using mass surveillance technology. While much of 
the daily life is recorded through various surveillance mechanisms, private and 
governmental, control over an individual’s PII should remain inviolate. Advancing 
technology and recent legal decisions do not support such a claim, and privacy erosions 
continue, albeit in a piece meal fashion. However, “privacy is not a discrete commodity, 
possessed absolutely or not at all” (Smith v. Maryland, p. 749). Privacy has been at the 
heart of U.S. democracy from its inception and remains an integral value of democratic 
government (Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for 
Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy 2012 [Pres. 
Obama introduction], p. 3). In the ultra-connected world in which all live, federal 
legislation addressing privacy through a comprehensive data protection act will go a long 
way in minding the gap between privacy and surveillance technology.  
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